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Problem area 
With the steady increase in air 
traffic, the aviation system is under 
continuous pressure to increase 
aircraft handling capacity. The 
introduction of Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minima (RVSM) above 
‘Flight Level 290’ implies that the 
capacity bottleneck within the air 
transport system has changed from 
en-route towards the Terminal 
Manoeuvring Area (TMA) around 
busy airports. The diversity of 
airport operations (departures, 
approaches, missed approaches) and 
risk events (e.g. collision risk, wake 
turbulence risk, third party risk, 
runway incursion) implies that the 
safety assessment of newly 
proposed Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) systems and flight 
procedures in the airport 
environment is quite complex. New 
safety assessment methods are 
needed to assess safety. In this 
respect, the two most capacity 
limiting risk events, addressed in 
this Report, are wake vortex 
encounters and the collision risk 
between aircraft.  
 
Various new ATM systems and 
flight procedures are proposed to 
increase airport capacity while 
maintaining the same (required) 
level of safety. Newly proposed 
systems to cope with wake 
turbulence and allow a reduction of 
wake vortex separation minima 
include the ground based ATC-
Wake system (for air traffic 
controllers) and the on-board I-
Wake system (for pilots). An 
increase in runway capacity may 
also be achieved by using parallel 
runways more effectively or by 
designing new and advanced flight 
procedures. For all the new air 
traffic operations evaluated in this 
Report, International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) standards and 
best practices do not exist and new 
safety assessment methodologies, 
incorporating the roles of the Air 
Traffic Controllers and pilots, are 
developed and applied. Introducing 
and/or planning changes to the air 
transport system cannot be done 
without showing that minimum 
safety requirements will be 
satisfied. This thesis therefore not 
only deals with the safety 
assessment process itself, but also 
with the setting of risk requirements 
for the newly proposed ATM 
systems and flight procedures.  
 
Description of work 
The approach taken is to apply risk 
based decision making to support 
the introduction of new air traffic 
operations and systems for reduced 
aircraft separation in the airport 
environment. As worldwide 
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quantitative risk requirements for 
the newly proposed air traffic 
operations are not yet established, 
the question arises how to assess the 
level of risk which may be 
considered acceptable. Evidently, a 
zero incident/accident risk can not 
be realized and therefore risk 
criteria are developed. There are 
several fundamental questions that 
are resolved: 
• What is the safety level of the 
current air traffic operations? 
• Are the separation minima for 
the current air traffic operations 
overly conservative? 
• Can the current separation 
minima safely be reduced?  
• What are the requirements for 
the newly proposed air traffic 
operations and systems? 
 
These questions require more 
comprehensive risk assessment 
models and risk criteria than  
currently available. Therefore, to 
answer these questions, several 
methodologies for the setting of risk 
criteria are developed and applied to 
the following safety studies:  
• Collision risk analysis of the 
usage of parallel runways for 
landing; 
• Collision risk analysis of 
simultaneous missed 
approaches on converging 
runways; 
• Wake vortex safety assessment 
of single runway approaches; 
• Safety assessment of ATC-
Wake single runway departures; 
• Safety assessment of the WV 
DWA single runway operation 
with reduced separation. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The main focus is the development 
of safety assessment methodologies 
with the aim to reduce aircraft 
separation minima. Historically, 
such methods are based on 
experimental flight tests and 
operational data analysis. This 
report contributes with new 
methods based on mathematical 
modelling and risk based decision 
support, where the risk criteria for 
the risk events are expressed in 
suitable incident/accident risk 
metrics based on historical data. 
 
1.Collision risk analysis studies 
To increase airport capacity, the 
Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has proposed use of the 
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 
system during independent parallel 
approaches. Although safety 
analyses of the PRM system have 
provided operational 
recommendations and requirements, 
collision risk during a double 
missed approach was not previously 
quantified or assessed. To fill this 
gap, this thesis develops and applies 
new collision risk assessment 
models. It is shown that the 
collision risk between aircraft 
conducting a simultaneous missed 
approach can indeed be 
considerable, and needs to be 
addressed to ensure that safety is 
not jeopardized. A limitation of the 
modelling approach is that the 
possibility of intervention when 
blunders occur is not taken into 
account. Therefore, to be able to 
also cope with such human factors 
issues (e.g. Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) monitoring and instructions 
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and pilot reactions), the Traffic 
Organization and Perturbation 
Analyzer (TOPAZ) methodology is 
extended and applied for analysis of 
the collision risk during 
simultaneous missed approaches to 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
converging runways 19R (now 
indicated as 18C) and 22.  
 
Collision risk analysis of the usage 
of parallel runways for landing 
An increase in runway capacity may 
be achieved by using existing 
parallel runways more effectively or 
by building additional parallel 
runways. In order to evaluate the 
risks related to independent parallel 
approaches, insight into the 
collision risk during all approach 
flight phases, including 
intermediate approach, final 
approach, and missed approach, is 
necessary. Section 2 describes a 
probabilistic risk analysis of the 
collision risk between aircraft 
conducting independent parallel 
approaches under Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC), 
thereby using Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) procedures. A suitable 
risk metric and a Target Level of 
Safety are adopted. Various 
scenarios with varying runway 
spacing and different operational 
conditions are evaluated. The main 
conclusions from the analysis are: 
• The collision risk probability 
can be considerable and 
unacceptable under certain 
conditions, especially near turn 
on to the localizer and during a 
dual missed approach. 
• Technological improvements 
and operational procedures 
focusing on increased safety 
during final approach only do 
not significantly lower the 
overall collision risk between 
aircraft conducting independent 
parallel approaches. 
Independent parallel runway 
approaches may be judged 
acceptably safe if the runway 
spacing is greater than 1270 m and 
unsafe if the spacing is less than 
930 m, provided that there is: 
• At least 20 to 30 degrees angle 
of divergence between the 
nominal missed approach 
tracks, with turns to be executed 
‘as soon as practicable’ and not 
above 500 ft; 
• Some longitudinal distance 
between the parallel runway 
thresholds, where the aircraft 
with the highest Final Approach 
Point approaches the runway 
located ‘farthest away’. 
 
Collision risk analysis of 
simultaneous missed approaches on 
converging runways 
Section 3 concerns a risk analysis of 
simultaneous missed approaches on 
Amsterdam Schiphol converging 
runways 19R and 22, where the 
Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) 
of runway 22 was proposed to be 
reduced from 350 ft to 200 ft. This 
allows the use of runway 22 during 
actual Category I weather 
conditions, and supports 
optimization of the arrival 
scheduling. A collision risk model 
is developed for assessment of 
various missed approach procedures 
on runway 22, with possibly a left 
turn after completion of the initial 
missed approach phase. 
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Numerical evaluations show that 
the collision risk may attain an 
unacceptably high level under 
certain conditions, especially when 
approaching aircraft on runways 
19R and 22 both make a straight 
missed approach, and ATC does not 
intervene. For trying to maintain the 
collision risk at a low and 
acceptable level, some risk reducing 
measures are identified. In 
particular, ATC monitoring and 
instructing – turn right! or climb to! 
– to aircraft conducting a missed 
approach on runway 19R in case of 
a previous straight missed approach 
on runway 22 is required. Provided 
that these identified measures are 
applied, the proposed reduction of 
the OCA of runway 22 to 200 ft is 
risk neutral within a broad spectrum 
of missed approach procedural 
aspects, and may be judged 
adequately safe. This conclusion is 
also valid for the possible future 
situation, where the final missed 
approach altitude is raised from 
2000 to 3000 ft. 
 
2.Wake vortex risk analysis studies 
Wake vortex research has generally 
focused on analysis of wake vortex 
behaviour in different weather 
conditions and on analysis of the 
impact on wake encountering 
aircraft. Wake vortex safety related 
to proposed operations for reduced 
separation was not previously 
quantified or assessed in terms of 
incident/accident risk probabilities. 
To fill this gap, a Wake Vortex 
Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) 
methodology is developed and 
applied. WAVIR has received 
significant interest worldwide, and 
other organisations have followed 
with similar methods. The Airspace 
Simulation and Analysis for 
Terminal Instrument Procedures 
(ASAT) tool, which is used by the 
FAA, has been extended to assess 
the probability of a wake encounter 
behind a variety of leader aircraft 
and under different weather 
conditions. Airbus has now 
developed a Vortex Encounter 
Severity Assessment (VESA) tool, 
which allows assessment and 
comparison of aircraft reactions and 
effects of vortex encounters behind 
various aircraft. DLR has 
established the WakeScene (Wake 
Vortex Scenarios Simulation) 
Package to assess the relative 
encounter probability behind 
different wake vortex generating 
aircraft. However, so far, the 
WAVIR methodology is still the 
only method that enables explicit 
modelling of the role of both pilots 
and air traffic controllers working 
with new systems for reduced 
aircraft separation. 
 
Wake vortex safety assessment of 
single runway approaches 
Both in Europe and in the United 
States, the feasibility of increasing 
runway capacity through reduced 
wake vortex separation distances 
between aircraft in the arrival and 
departure flows is being 
investigated. Traditionally three 
methods have been used to 
determine safe wake vortex 
separation distances: (i) flight test 
experiments, (ii) historic 
operational data, and (iii) analytical 
models. Section 4 describes the 
development of the Wake Vortex 
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Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) 
methodology and its application, 
within S-Wake, to assess the safety 
of single runway wake vortex 
separation distances. The main 
results of the S-Wake project show 
that an increase in runway 
throughput might be achieved 
through exploiting favorable wind 
conditions (sufficiently strong 
crosswind and/or strong headwind). 
It is further motivated that this can 
only be achieved through the use of 
new and advanced concepts of 
operations with appropriate decision 
making tools for air traffic 
controllers and pilots. Both in 
Europe and the United States, such 
proposed Concept of Operations for 
reduced wake vortex separation 
depends heavily on the use of wake 
vortex prediction and detection 
information, with explicit roles and 
responsibilities for the pilots and 
controllers working with such wake 
avoidance systems. This has 
therefore led to the design of the 
ground based ATC-Wake system 
and an on-board wake detection, 
warning and avoidance system, the 
topics of Sections 5 and 6 of this 
report respectively. 
 
Safety assessment of ATC-Wake 
single runway departures 
One potential approach to reduce 
the wake vortex separation distance 
between aircraft at take-off is by 
utilizing the ATC-Wake system and 
operational concept designed to 
allow variable aircraft separation 
distances, as opposed to the fixed 
distances presently applied at 
airports. Section 5 quantifies the 
possible safety implications related 
to installation of ATC-Wake and 
use during the departure phase of 
flight. This includes an assessment, 
with the WAVIR tool-set, of 
required crosswind values for which 
reduced aircraft separation can be 
applied. For the ATC-Wake 
departure operation with reduced 
separation, two more issues are 
considered: 1) the air traffic 
controller will warn the pilot about 
a potential wake vortex encounter in 
case an ATC-Wake alert is raised, 
and 2) if an ATC-Wake system 
component provides wrong advice, 
there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. 
Consequences might be catastrophic 
in case of a light aircraft following a 
heavy aircraft. 
 
For airports with ATC-Wake in use, 
Section 5 indicates that the present 
separation of two to three minutes 
between aircraft departing at the 
same runway might be reduced to 
120, 90, or even 60 seconds for all 
aircraft types in the presence of 
sufficient crosswind. As these 
indicative separation minima, 
dependent on crosswind conditions, 
do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, the setting of 
requirements for the ATC-Wake 
system components was further 
investigated. This is done through a 
qualitative analysis of the effect of 
failures of the ATC-Wake system 
components. It is concluded that the 
Monitoring and Alerting system and 
Meteorological Nowcasting systems 
are crucial and sufficient accuracy 
and reliability shall be guaranteed. 
Additionally, it is noted that 
controllers shall be made very 
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aware that a timely warning to the 
pilots is also crucial (safety training 
might help to increase awareness). 
 
Safety assessment of the WV DWA 
single runway operation with 
reduced separation 
Another potential improvement of 
wake vortex safety in the airport 
environment is through installation 
and use of a Wake Vortex 
Detection, Warning, and Avoidance 
(WV DWA) system on-board 
aircraft. The fundamental part is a 
pulsed Light Detection and Ranging 
(LiDAR) sensor system that 
measures disturbances in the 
atmosphere and enables real-time 
forewarning of turbulent conditions. 
Section 6 presents an investigation 
of wake vortex safety under 
reduced separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM 
between all aircraft) during 
approach and landing when using 
an on-board wake detection, 
warning and avoidance system.  
 
The I-Wake system is proposed as a 
safety net in support of ATC 
decided reduced separation, 
intended for protection along the 
glide path from ILS/GS intercept. A 
WV DWA single runway arrival 
procedure assumes that a missed 
approach is initiated, after the flight 
crew receives an alert indicating 
that the aircraft will likely 
encounter a severe wake vortex. 
This study quantifies the wake 
vortex induced incident/accident 
risk through the use of the WAVIR 
methodology, extended with an 
aircraft/pilot missed approach 
model and a causal model for the 
WV DWA system failure 
probability. The assessment of wake 
induced risk levels for the approach 
phase when reduced aircraft 
separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM between 
all aircraft) is applied is performed 
for different aircraft types and 
various wind conditions. Aspects 
considered are e.g. the time for 
caution and alert and the WV DWA 
system capabilities. 
 
The use of a WV DWA system 
seems to reduce the wake vortex 
induced risk only slightly as 
compared to the current practice. 
The main reason for this is the fact 
that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the 
runway threshold. Therefore, WV 
DWA use would be most beneficial 
at low altitudes, where a rebounding 
wake might be present. Note that 
for wake vortex safety reasons 
initiation of a missed approach is 
not recommendable at low altitudes. 
 
Applicability 
The new mathematical methods all 
support two common rationales for 
acceptance of a newly proposed air 
traffic operation, namely by 
showing that the number of risk 
events does not exceed some pre-
defined, and agreed upon, risk 
requirement and furthermore also 
does not increase with the 
introduction of the new operation. 
The developed risk assessment 
models are based on risk metrics in 
terms of incident/accident 
probabilities per movement, with 
risk requirements derived on the 
basis of historical incident/accident 
data. It is shown that the current 
wake vortex aircraft separation 
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minima, which depend on the 
aircraft weight, are indeed overly 
conservative under certain 
conditions. Introduction of variable 
wind dependent aircraft separation 
rules will enable increase of airport 
capacity, while maintaining safety. 
Aircraft separation can be reduced 
safely, provided that new wake 
vortex prediction, detection and 
avoidance systems - such as ATC-
Wake (for air traffic controllers) 
and I-Wake (for pilots) - are 
implemented for operational use. It 
has been shown that specific missed 
approach procedures, which take 
into account local airport runway 
layout, will lead to an increase of 
airport capacity. The safety 
assessments build confidence in the 
operational use of the new proposed 
ATM systems and flight procedures 
for the application of reduced 
aircraft separation in the airport 
environment. The results from the 
collision risk analysis studies have 
been used directly by the Dutch 
Civil Aviation authority and Air 
Traffic Control Centre, and were 
brought forward successfully to the 
ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel. 
The results from the wake vortex 
risk analysis studies are used 
directly for the design and the 
setting of requirements for the 
ATC-Wake and I-Wake systems 
and their associated concepts of 
operation. It is shown that both are 
promising concepts for increasing 
aircraft handling capacity in the 
airport environment. As a result of 
the wake vortex safety studies, new 
concepts of operations for reduced 
wake vortex separations are now 
being validated in Europe (under 
co-ordination of EUROCONTROL) 
and the United States (under co-
ordination of the FAA and NASA). 
Trials at European airports are 
foreseen as the ideal way forward 
for gathering the required data to 
complete the local Safety Cases 
realize the reduction of the wake 
vortex separation minima.
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Summary 
With the steady increase in air traffic, the aviation system is under continuous pressure to 
increase aircraft handling capacity. The introduction of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
(RVSM) during the en-route phase of flight implied that the capacity bottleneck within the air 
transport system has changed from en-route towards the Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) 
around busy airports. The diversity of airport operations (departures, approaches, missed 
approaches) and risk events (e.g. collision risk, wake turbulence risk, third party risk, runway 
incursion) implies that the safety assessment of newly proposed air traffic operations in the 
airport environment is quite complex. New safety assessment methods are needed to assess 
safety. In this respect, the two most capacity limiting risk events, addressed in this Report, are 
wake vortex encounters and the collision risk between aircraft.  
 
Various new Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems and flight procedures have been proposed 
to increase airport capacity while maintaining the same (required) level of safety. Newly 
proposed systems to cope with wake turbulence and allowing reduction of wake vortex 
separation minima include the ground based ATC-Wake system (for air traffic controllers) and 
the on-board I-Wake system (for pilots). An increase in runway capacity may also be achieved 
by using parallel runways more effectively or by designing new and advanced flight procedures. 
For all the flight procedures evaluated in this report, International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) standards and best practices do not exist and new safety assessment methodologies, 
incorporating the roles of the Air Traffic Controllers and pilots, are developed and applied. 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the air transport system cannot be done without showing 
that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. This thesis therefore not only deals with the 
safety assessment process itself, but also with the setting of risk requirements for the newly 
proposed ATM systems and flight procedures.  
 
The approach taken is to apply risk based decision making to support the introduction of new air 
traffic operations and systems for reduced aircraft separation in the airport environment. As 
worldwide quantitative risk requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations have not 
yet been established, the question arises how to assess the level of risk which may be considered 
acceptable. Evidently, a zero incident/accident risk can not be realized and therefore risk criteria 
will have to be developed. There are several fundamental questions that must be resolved: 
 What is the safety level of the current air traffic operations? 
 Are the separation minima for the current air traffic operations overly conservative? 
 Can the current separation minima safely be reduced?  
 What are the requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations and systems? 
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These questions require more comprehensive risk assessment models and risk criteria than 
currently available. Therefore, to answer these questions, several methodologies for the setting 
of risk criteria are developed and applied to the following safety studies:  
 Collision risk analysis of the usage of parallel runways for landing; 
 Collision risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on converging runways; 
 Wake vortex safety assessment of single runway approaches; 
 Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures; 
 Safety assessment of the WV DWA single runway operation with reduced separation. 
 
The developed new and innovative methods all support two common rationales for acceptance 
of a newly proposed air traffic operation, namely by showing that the number of risk events 
does not exceed some pre-defined risk requirement and furthermore also does not increase with 
the introduction of the new operation. The developed risk assessment models are based on risk 
metrics in terms of incident/accident probabilities per movement with, where possible, risk 
requirements derived on the basis of historical incident/accident data. 
 
It is shown that the current wake vortex aircraft separation minima, which depend on the aircraft 
weight, are indeed overly conservative under certain conditions. Introduction of variable wind 
dependent aircraft separation rules will enable increase of airport capacity, while maintaining 
safety. Aircraft separation can be reduced safely, provided that new wake vortex prediction, 
detection and avoidance systems − such as ATC-Wake (for air traffic controllers) and I-Wake 
(for pilots) − are implemented for operational use. It is also shown that specific missed approach 
procedures, which take into account the local airport layout characteristics, may lead to an 
increase of airport capacity. This is shown for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol runway 22. 
 
The safety assessments have built sufficient confidence in the operational use of the proposed 
new ATM systems and flight procedures for the application of reduced aircraft separation in the 
airport environment. The results from the collision risk analysis studies have been used by the 
Dutch Civil Aviation authority and Air Traffic Control Centre, and were brought forward 
successfully to the ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel. The results from the wake vortex risk 
analysis studies have been used to support the design and also the setting of requirements for the 
ATC-Wake and I-Wake systems and concepts of operation. Next step will be to complete the 
validation process for the use of these systems through the production of the Safety Cases 
towards installation of these systems at airports and in aircraft respectively. Trials at European 
airports are foreseen as the ideal way forward for gathering the required data to complete the 
local Safety Cases and realize the foreseen reduction of the wake vortex separation minima. 
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Samenvatting 
Als gevolg van de toename van het luchtverkeer staat het luchtvaartsysteem onder druk om 
meer vliegtuigen af te handelen. De introductie van kleinere verticale separatieafstanden (van 
2000 voet naar 1000 voet) tijdens het en route deel van de vlucht impliceerde dat het capaciteit 
knelpunt in het luchtverkeer verplaatst is naar de luchthavens. De verscheidenheid aan 
vliegprocedures (startend en landend verkeer, eventuele doorstarts) en de bijbehorende 
veiligheidsrisico's, impliceert dat de veiligheidsbeoordeling van nieuwe systemen en procedures 
in de luchthavenomgeving vrij complex is. Er is een behoefte aan nieuwe methodieken voor het 
beoordelen van de veiligheidsimplicaties van deze voorgestelde wijzigingen. De meeste nieuwe 
vliegprocedures zijn gericht op het verminderen van minimaal vereiste separatieafstanden tussen 
vliegtuigen, zodat meer vliegtuigen kunnen worden afgehandeld. Om het minimum vereiste 
veiligheidsniveau te blijven garanderen, zal voor invoering van nieuwe systemen en procedures 
aangetoond moeten worden dat risico’s als bijvoorbeeld botsingen tussen vliegtuigen of 
ongevallen als gevolg van zich achter vliegtuigen bevindende tipwervels niet vermeerderd.  
 
Nieuwe operationele concepten en systemen als ATC-Wake (voor verkeersleiders) en I-Wake 
(voor piloten) richten zich op verkleinen van de minimaal vereiste tipwervel separatieafstanden. 
Een capaciteitstoename kan echter ook bereikt worden door het ontwerpen van nieuwe 
vliegprocedures voor het efficiënter gebruik van parallelle landingsbanen. Voor alle procedurele 
wijzigingen waarvoor de veiligheid in dit proefschrift wordt geëvalueerd, geldt dat ICAO 
standaarden en/of geaccepteerde veiligheidsmethodieken (nog) niet bestaan. Daarom worden 
nieuwe en innovatieve veiligheidsanalysemethoden ontwikkeld en toegepast. Dit proefschrift 
gaat, ter ondersteuning van regulerende instanties, tevens in op het vaststellen van veiligheids-
normen. Waar mogelijk, wordt hierbij gebruik gemaakt van historische data over ongevallen. 
 
De aanpak gaat uit van de toepassing van op veiligheidsrisico’s gebaseerde besluitvorming, ter 
ondersteuning van de (veilige) invoering van nieuwe vliegprocedures en systemen voor kleinere 
vliegtuigseparatieafstanden in de vliegveldomgeving. Omdat wereldwijde kwantitatieve 
veiligheidsnormen voor de nieuw voorgestelde vliegprocedures en systemen nog niet bestaan, 
doet zich de vraag voor hoe het acceptabele veiligheidsniveau bepaald dient te worden. 
Verschillende fundamentele vragen dienen hiertoe beantwoord te worden: 
 Wat is het veiligheidsniveau van de huidige vliegprocedures in de vliegveldomgeving? 
 Zijn de huidige vliegtuigseparatieafstanden mogelijk te conservatief? 
 Kunnen de huidige vliegtuigseparatieafstanden veilig verkleind worden? 
 Wat zijn de veiligheidseisen voor de invoering van nieuwe vliegprocedures en systemen? 
 
Het beantwoorden van deze vragen vereist andere risicoanalysemodellen en veiligheidsnormen 
dan momenteel beschikbaar en gebruikelijk. Vandaar dat, om hier een antwoord op te vinden, 
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verschillende nieuwe methoden voor het vaststellen van risico criteria zijn ontwikkeld. Deze 
zijn vervolgens toegepast in de volgende veiligheidsstudies: 
 Analyse van het botsingsrisico bij het gebruik van parallelle banen voor landingen;  
 Analyse van het botsingsrisico bij doorstarts op convergerende landingsbanen;  
 Veiligheidsanalyse van het risico op ongevallen door tipwervels achter vliegtuigen;  
 Veiligheidsanalyse van de ATC-Wake operatie voor startend vliegverkeer;  
 Veiligheidsanalyse van de I-Wake operatie voor landend verkeer met kleinere separatie. 
 
De nieuw ontwikkelde methoden en risicoanalysemodellen ondersteunen twee algemeen 
aanvaardde motivaties ter acceptatie van nieuwe vliegoperaties en systemen, namelijk door aan 
te tonen dat het risico op een ongeval niet hoger wordt dan een maximaal aanvaardbare norm én 
dat dit risico tevens niet hoger wordt dan momenteel het geval is. Alle ontwikkelde risico-
analysemodellen zijn gebaseerd op ongevalskansen per vliegbeweging (landing of start) met, 
waar mogelijk, veiligheidsnormen gebaseerd op historische gegevens en data over ongevallen. 
Er is aangetoond dat de vliegtuigseparatieafstanden, die momenteel met name gebaseerd zijn op 
het gewicht van de betrokken vliegtuigen, daadwerkelijk te conservatief zijn onder bepaalde 
condities. Invoeren van nieuwe variabele weersafhankelijke separatieregels zal de capaciteit van 
vliegvelden veilig kunnen vergroten. Nieuwe operationele systemen als ATC-Wake (voor 
verkeersleiders) en I-Wake (voor piloten) dienen te zorgen voor betrouwbare voorspelling en 
detectie van tipwervels in de vliegveldomgeving. Er is ook aangetoond dat geavanceerde 
doorstart procedures, die rekening houden met het specifieke banenstelsel van vliegvelden, 
kunnen leiden tot een veilige capaciteitsvergroting van vliegvelden (zoals Schiphol). 
 
De uitgevoerde veiligheidsanalyses hebben al geleid tot een veilige vergroting van de capaciteit 
van het luchtverkeer. De resultaten van de botsingsrisicoanalyses zijn door de Nederlandse 
Luchtvaart Autoriteit en de Luchtverkeersleiding gebruikt, en zijn daarnaast ook ingebracht bij 
het ICAO ’Obstacle Clearance Panel’. De resultaten van de veiligheidsanalyses van het risico op 
ongevallen door tipwervels zijn gebruikt om de systeemeisen ten behoeve van kleinere 
separatieafstanden vast te stellen. Het voorgestelde ontwerp van de ATC-Wake en I-Wake 
systemen en de bijbehorende operationele concepten geeft een duidelijke richting aan voor de 
toekomstige operationele validatie voor het gebruik van deze systemen in de vliegveld 
omgeving. Als volgende stap wordt voorzien het produceren van de lokale ‘Safety Cases’, 
gebruikmakend van klimatologie data met betrekking tot de weersomstandigheden op de 
beoogde vliegvelden. Installatie van ATC-Wake op vliegvelden en I-Wake in vliegtuigen, en 
continuering van de deelname van Europese vliegvelden en luchtverkeersleidingscentra in het 
validatieproces is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde om te komen tot verdere capaciteitsvergroting. 
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ϑ ijt  Wake Encounter Severity Properties (vortices generated by aircraft j at moment t) 
WeakEncφ  Weak Encounter Threshold Boundary (as function of height) [in rad] 
ModEncφ   Moderate Encounter Threshold Boundary (as function of height) [in rad] 
SevEncφ   Severe Encounter Threshold Boundary (as function of height) [in rad] 
ExtrEncφ   Extreme Encounter Threshold Boundary (as function of height) [in rad] 
Pcollision  Conditional collision probability between two aircraft 
pijMinInc   Probability of a minor incident of aircraft i (induced by the vortices of aircraft j) 
pijMajInc   Probability of a major incident of aircraft i (induced by the vortices of aircraft j) 
pijHazAcc   Probability of a hazardous accident of aircraft i (induced by vortices of aircraft j) 
pijCatAcc   Probability of a catastrophic accident of aircraft i (induced by vortices of aircraft j) 
PT(a→b)  Transition probability from encounter class a to risk event b 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under pressure to increase aircraft handling 
capacity. The introduction of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima during the en-route phase of 
flight implied that the capacity bottleneck within the aviation and air transport system will 
change from en-route towards Terminal Manoeuvring Areas (TMA) around busy airports. The 
diversity of airport operations (departures, approaches, missed approaches) and risk events (e.g. 
collision risk, wake turbulence risk, third party risk, runway incursion) implies that the safety 
assessment of newly proposed flight procedures in the airport environment is quite complex. 
New safety assessment methodologies are needed to assess the safety. The newly proposed 
flight procedures aim to reduce the separation distances between aircraft at take-off and landing 
without compromising safety. In this respect, the two most capacity limiting risk events are 
wake vortex encounters and the collision risk between aircraft.  
 
 
Figure 1-1  Wake vortex generated behind a heavy aircraft 
 
Aircraft create wake vortices when flying, restricting runway capacity (Figure 1-1). These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. However, with 
the aid of accurate meteorological data and precise measurements of wake turbulence, more 
efficient intervals can be set, particularly when weather conditions are stable in time.  
 
The ATC-Wake project aims to develop and build a ground based wake vortex prediction, 
monitoring, and alerting system for Air Traffic Controllers that will allow variable wind 
dependent aircraft reduced separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently 
applied. Similarly, the I-Wake project aims to develop an aircraft on-board wake vortex 
detection, warning and avoidance system. A combination of both is foreseen as the ideal way to 
cope with the risk related to wake turbulence in the airport environment. 
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An increase in runway capacity may also be achieved by using existing parallel runways more 
effectively or by building additional parallel runways. A reduction of the minimum parallel 
runway spacing for independent parallel approaches was proposed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), provided usage of the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system [27, 
39]. For the safety assessment of the associated flight procedure, evaluation of the collision risk 
between aircraft is required. A recent study focusing on improvement of the capacity at 
Schiphol airport addresses the risk related to simultaneous missed approaches on runways 19R 
and 22, where a reduction of the Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) would allow the use of 
runway 22 in actual Cat I weather conditions. 
 
For the newly proposed flight procedures, ICAO standards and best practices do not exist and 
therefore new safety assessment methodologies and toolsets, preferably incorporating the roles 
of the Air Traffic Controllers and pilots, will need to be developed and applied. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop and apply safety assessment methodologies to 
support the safe introduction of newly proposed aviation systems and flight procedures. A 
variety of mathematical techniques, based on statistical analysis and expert judgment, will be 
developed for assessment of incident/accident risk. The aim is to reduce the separation distances 
between aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety. Evaluation of separation 
distances - imposed by wake turbulence and collision risk - has historically been conducted 
using three approaches:  
1. Experimental flight test data,  
2. Historic operational data, and  
3. Analytical models.  
 
As the newly proposed flight procedures and systems are not yet in operation, this thesis follows 
the third approach. The aim is to build sufficient safety confidence, enabling the decision 
makers to decide on operational testing and/or even direct implementation.  
 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the air transport system cannot be done without showing 
that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. In this respect, the risk requirements intend 
to be compliant with the Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARR 4) posed by 
EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Commission (SRC). This means that the setting of risk 
requirements for risk based decision making is an important issue within this report. Historical 
incident/accident data will be used to support the risk based decision making process. 
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1.3 Approach: risk based decision making 
The approach taken is to apply risk based decision making to support the introduction of new air 
traffic operations and systems for reduced aircraft separation in the airport environment. As 
worldwide quantitative risk requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations have not 
yet been established, the question arises how to assess the level of risk which may be considered 
acceptable. Evidently, a zero incident/accident risk can not be realized and therefore risk criteria 
will have to be developed. There are several fundamental questions that must be resolved: 
1. What is the safety level of the current air traffic operations? 
2. Are the separation minima for the current air traffic operations overly conservative? 
3. Can the current separation minima safely be reduced?  
4. What are the requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations and systems? 
 
These questions require more comprehensive risk assessment models and risk criteria than 
available. Historically, safety assessments are often based on experimental flight tests and 
operational data analysis. This report will contribute with new methods based on mathematical 
modelling and risk based decision support, where the risk criteria for the risk events will be 
expressed in suitable incident/accident risk metrics based on historical data. To increase airport 
capacity, the FAA has proposed use of the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system during 
independent parallel approaches. Although safety analyses of the PRM system have provided 
operational recommendations and requirements, collision risk during a simultaneous missed 
approach was not previously quantified or assessed. To fill this gap, this report will develop and 
apply new collision risk assessment models. Wake vortex research has generally focused on 
analysis of wake vortex behaviour in different weather conditions and on analysis of the impact 
on wake encountering aircraft. Wake vortex safety related to newly proposed operations for 
reduced aircraft separation was not previously quantified or assessed in terms of 
incident/accident risk probabilities. To fill this gap, a new Wake Vortex Induced Risk 
assessment (WAVIR) methodology will be developed and applied. 
 
Several methodologies for the setting of risk criteria have been proposed up to now. Some 
methods worth mentioning for air traffic operations are: 
1. Air transport as safe as surface public transport (e.g. railway or bus); 
2. Expected passenger fatality rate in air traffic comparable with population fatality rate due 
to all causes; 
3. Air crew risk of accidental death comparable with other occupations; 
4. Current air traffic accident rates with a factor of improvement; 
5. Maintaining current air traffic accident statistics; 
6. Fitting in with present safety requirements for air traffic operations. 
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These methods all support two commonly accepted rationales for acceptance of a newly 
proposed air traffic operation / system by involved interest groups (i.e. pilots, controllers, 
regulators), namely by showing that the number of risk events: 
 does not exceed some pre-defined, and agreed upon, risk requirement; 
 does not increase with the introduction of a new air traffic operation. 
 
Various novel and innovative safety assessment methodologies to derive risk criteria and to set the 
appropriate requirements for the introduction of new air traffic operations in the airport 
environment are introduced in this thesis. The proposed methods will be based on: 
 Risk metrics in terms of incident/accident probabilities per movement; 
 Risk requirements derived on the basis of historical incident data. 
 
The mathematical risk assessment models and toolsets will be developed and implemented into 
the NLR Information System for Safety and Risk analysis (ISTaR). Where possible, models will 
be validated with historical data or statistical data from simulation experiments. 
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
This Section 1 provides an introduction to the newly proposed air traffic operations for which 
the safety will need to be assessed. Section 2 deals with a reduction of the minimum required 
parallel runway spacing for independent parallel approaches. In Section 3, an assessment of 
collision risk between aircraft conducting a simultaneous missed approach on converging 
runways is given. Section 4 describes the development and application of the Wake Vortex 
Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology. An assessment of the risk of a wake vortex 
induced incident/accident during current practice single runway arrivals and under different 
weather conditions is given. Section 5 presents an assessment of wake vortex safety related to 
single runway departures. The WAVIR methodology is extended with a graph based model 
structure, in order to evaluate the impact of hazards and system failures when ATC-Wake is 
used. Section 6 presents an assessment of the risk of a wake vortex induced incident/accident 
related to the WV DWA single runway arrival operation under reduced separation (2.0 and 2.5 
NM between landing aircraft). Conclusions and recommendations are given in Section 7. 
References are contained in Section 8. The Appendix A contains a description of the 
mathematical models used for the assessment of wake vortex induced incident/accident risk.  
 
1.4.1 Collision risk related to independent parallel approaches 
An increase in runway capacity may be achieved by using existing parallel runways more 
effectively or by building additional parallel runways. An important factor for both is the 
reduction of the minimum required distance between parallel runways used for independent 
parallel approaches. The minimum required runway spacing for independent parallel approaches 
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has already been reduced several times, thereby trying to maintain the same required level of 
safety. These reductions were induced by improved operational procedures and technological 
improvements. The latest reduction to 1035 m (3400 ft), approved by ICAO as from November 
9th 1995, was initiated by an airport capacity programme developed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), and based on use of the Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system. 
Reducing the minimum required runway spacing without taking other measures generally brings 
along an enlargement of risks which must be avoided. The main risk is the risk of collision 
between aircraft. In order to evaluate the risks related to independent parallel approaches, 
insight into the collision risk during all approach flight phases, including intermediate approach, 
final approach, and missed approach, is necessary. 
 
Section 2 describes a probabilistic risk analysis of the collision risk between aircraft conducting 
independent parallel approaches under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), thereby 
using Instrument Landing System (ILS) procedures. First, ICAO standards and recommended 
practices for simultaneous ILS approaches are described. The risk model, developed for 
determination of the collision risk during identified hazardous flight phases is presented. In 
order to assess the minimum required runway spacing, a suitable risk metric is selected and a 
Target Level of Safety is adopted. A number of scenarios with varying runway spacing and 
different operational conditions are numerically evaluated. The worst case scenario is identified, 
risk reducing measures are examined, and recommendations for a safe operation are given. 
 
1.4.2 Simultaneous missed approaches on converging runways 
The increase in air traffic implies that for busy airports, such as Schiphol, new flight procedures 
are being developed. For some proposed procedures, ICAO regulations do not exist and a safety 
assessment incorporating the role of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots is required. The 
Dutch Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) and the Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL) 
propose to reduce the Obstacle Clearance Altitude1 of runway 22 from 350 ft to values less than 
200 ft. This would allow the use of runway 22 in actual Cat I weather conditions, which will 
support the optimization of arrival scheduling.  
As a consequence, the point where a missed approach is initiated, when the missed approach is 
based on visibility conditions or un-stabilized approach, moves to a point further down the 
approach for runway 22. Section 4 describes a risk analysis performed to quantify and evaluate 
the risk of simultaneous missed approach procedures on runways 19R and 22, up to and 
including ILS Cat I circumstances. Runway 19R is one of the primary runways for arriving 
                                                    
1
 The Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) is the lowest altitude above the elevation of the relevant runway threshold or above the 
aerodrome elevation, as applicable, used in establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle clearance criteria. 
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aircraft 2, and is favourable because of noise restrictions and the minimum impact on the other 
runways. Arrivals on runway 22 are not favourable with respect to noise as the approach is right 
across the centre of Amsterdam. Combined use of 19R and 22 is therefore in principle limited to 
inbound peak time periods and in general not allowed during the night. The missed approach 
procedure for runway 19R is straight ahead on runway track, whereas the procedure for runway 
22 prescribes a left turn with required track change of 63°. For safety reasons, the turn may only 
be initiated after completion of the initial missed approach phase. As a consequence, in case of a 
simultaneous missed approach on the runways 19R and 22, the two aircraft missed approach 
tracks might be close under certain non-favourable conditions. Therefore, although the 
procedure for runway 19R does not prescribe a turn, in reality ATC often instructs aircraft 
conducting a missed approach to initiate a turn away from the nominal trajectory for runway 22. 
 
Section 3 outlines the methodology to determine the collision between aircraft, and describes its 
application to assess the safety of the independent usage of runway 22 as a Cat I ILS runway. 
The new methodology uses 3 NLR tools ((Information System for Safety and Risk Analysis 
(ISTaR), Traffic Organizer and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ), and Flight track and Aircraft 
Noise Monitoring System (FANOMOS)) in order to assess the collision risk between aircraft 
conducting a simultaneous missed approach to Schiphol runways 19R (now 18C) and 22. 
 
1.4.3 Wake vortex safety assessment of single runway approaches 
With the increasing air-traffic congestion problems around major airports, the problem of wake 
turbulence has gained a lot of interest, both in the United States of America (USA) and in 
Europe. Research in the US by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
was mainly focused on the development of an Aircraft wake VOrtex Spacing System (AVOSS) 
and wake vortex advisory systems. In Europe, airport operators such as Frankfurt Airport are 
spending large efforts in introducing new airport approach procedures (e.g. the High Approach 
Landing System/Dual Threshold Operation (HALS/DTOP) [108]) in order to enable separation 
distances between aircraft to be reduced while retaining safety. The current separation minima 
based on aircraft maximum take-off weight, basically stem from the 70's.  
Although experience obtained over the past 30 years indicates that the wake vortex separation 
minima are ‘sufficiently safe’, the current safety level is unclear. Also there is a deficiency of 
tools and methods for bringing into account new developments in operational usage at busy 
airports and the introduction of new bigger aircraft in the air transport system.  
 
                                                    
2
 In this report, the numbering of the Amsterdam Schiphol runways is in accordance with the runway numbering in use before the 
opening of the Polderbaan (in 2003). Note that Schiphol runway 19R (the Zwanenburgbaan) is now indicated as 18C. 
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Therefore, in Section 4, the new Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology 
is presented, and applied to assess wake vortex safety for single runway approaches under 
current practice flight regulations. In view of the uncertainties and the difficulties in 
understanding the wake vortex phenomena, a probabilistic approach will be followed to 
evaluate the safety related to different separation distances between landing aircraft on a single 
runway. The probabilistic approach is based on a stochastic framework that incorporates sub 
models for wake vortex evolution, wake encounter, and flight path evolution, and relates the 
severity of encounters to possible risk events (i.e. incidents/accidents). The impact of weather 
conditions on wake vortex induced risk will be studied, so as to show that a reduction of the 
current separation minima – and consequently an increase of capacity – might be possible under 
certain wind conditions (in particular crosswind and/or strong headwind).  
 
New wake vortex detection, warning, and avoidance systems (as being developed in ATC-Wake 
and I-Wake) require actions from air traffic controllers and pilots in case there is a discrepancy 
between wake vortex prediction and detection information. The 'classical' WAVIR approach, 
which originates from the S-Wake project, is not able to account for human and system 
performance. Therefore, the next Sections will introduce additional ways of dealing with wake 
vortex risks, taking into account operational hazards and system failures that can occur. 
 
1.4.4 Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures 
One potential approach to increase airport capacity is to reduce the separation time between 
aircraft at take-off without compromising safety. Accurate meteorological forecasts and precise 
measurements of wake turbulence enable more efficient intervals to be set, particularly when 
weather conditions are stable in time. With the aid of smart planning techniques, these 
adjustments can generate capacity gains of up to 10%, which has major commercial benefits. 
ATC-Wake aims to develop and build an integrated system for ATC that would allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed times presently applied at airports. The 
present separation of two to three minutes between departing aircraft is designed to counter 
problems aircraft may encounter in the wake of large aircraft. For airports with ATC-Wake in 
use, the aim is to reduce the time separation between aircraft departing at single runways to 90 
seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient crosswind.  
 
The overall objective of this study is to quantify the possible safety improvements when using 
the ATC-Wake system and to assess the required crosswind values for which the “ATC-Wake 
mode”, with reduced aircraft separation, can be applied. The wake vortex induced risk between 
a variety of leader and follower aircraft, departing under various wind conditions, will be 
evaluated. The ATC-Wake decision-support system will help air traffic controllers decide how 
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long the intervals should be. In the operation for single runway departures, two separation 
modes are defined: 
 The Baseline Separation Mode with ICAO wake vortex separation minima; 
 The ATC-Wake Separation Mode with (reduced) separation minima that depend on the 
weather conditions but do not depend on aircraft wake vortex category. 
 
Section 5 outlines the methodology to assess wake vortex induced risk during ATC-Wake single 
runway departures. The methodology makes use of WAVIR in combination with a qualitative 
analysis of the impact of failure and/or hazards conditions related to the use of ATC-Wake. 
 
1.4.5 Safety assessment of WV DWA single runway arrivals 
A potential improvement of wake vortex safety in the airport environment is through installation 
and use of a wake vortex detection, warning, and avoidance system on-board aircraft. The 
fundamental part is a pulsed Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) sensor system that measures 
disturbances in the atmosphere and enables real-time forewarning of turbulent conditions. 
Fifteen seconds or less prior to encountering a severe wake, the flight crew will receive a visual 
and an aural WARNING alert. A CAUTION alert will be provided between 15 and 30 seconds 
before encountering a wake vortex that stronger than the caution threshold. This I-Wake system 
consists of a tactical and a strategic function. The tactical function measures atmospheric 
disturbances, and alerts the flight crew when a potentially severe wake vortex encounter is 
expected. The strategic function predicts wake locations and estimates wake behaviour based on 
information of generating aircraft and meteorological data. The strategic information is 
presented to the crew in order to raise the flight crew’s wake awareness. Information about 
possible wake hazards is displayed on the navigation display in the cockpit. 
 
Section 6 presents an investigation of wake vortex safety under reduced separation (2.0 or 
2.5 NM between all aircraft) during the approach and landing phases of flight when using such a 
WV DWA system on-board aircraft. It is assumed that the ATC-Wake system provides 
predictions for the prevalence of circumstances under which operations with reduced separation 
can take place. Wake vortex induced risk related to this type of operation has first been assessed 
qualitatively through a Functional Hazard Assessment [88]. Section 6 now presents a 
quantitative risk assessment based on a combination of the WAVIR methodology with a variety 
of mathematical models for aircraft/pilot performance and WV DWA system performance.
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
31 
 
2 Collision risk related to the usage of parallel runways for landing 
2.1 Introduction 
The steady increase in air traffic imposes a need for enhanced airport capacity. An increase in 
runway capacity may be achieved by using existing parallel runways more effectively or by 
building additional parallel runways. An important factor for both is the reduction of the 
minimum required distance between parallel runways used for independent parallel approaches 
[35, 38]. The minimum required runway spacing for independent parallel approaches has 
already been reduced several times, thereby trying to maintain the same required level of safety. 
These reductions were induced by improved operational procedures and technological 
improvements. The latest reduction to 3400 ft (approved by the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) as from November 9th 1995) was initiated by an airport capacity 
programme developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and based on use of the 
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system [27, 28, 39]. 
 
Reducing the minimum required runway spacing without taking other measures generally brings 
along an enlargement of risks which must be avoided. Main risk is the risk of collision between 
aircraft. Accident data regarding collisions between aircraft during parallel runway approaches 
is not available. In order to properly evaluate the risks related to independent parallel 
approaches, insight into the collision risk during all approach flight phases, including 
intermediate approach, final approach, and missed approach, is necessary. This enables the 
identification of hazardous situations, and the derivation of collision risk reducing measures. A 
thorough collision risk analysis strongly supports the decision taking about building (additional) 
parallel runways or defining specific approach and/or missed approach procedures. 
 
This study describes a probabilistic risk analysis of the collision risk between aircraft 
conducting independent parallel approaches under Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC), thereby using Instrument Landing System (ILS) procedures. The next Section 2.2 gives 
the prescribed procedures and requirements for simultaneous ILS approaches to parallel 
runways. Section 2.3 contains the identification of hazardous flight phases, identification of 
suitable risk measures, and adoption of the Target Level of Safety (TLS). Section 2.4 describes 
the risk model, developed for determination of the collision risk. In section 2.5, a number of 
scenarios, with varying runway spacing and under different operational conditions, are 
numerically evaluated. The worst case scenario is identified, and risk reducing measures are 
examined. The conclusions are given in Section 2.6. 
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2.2 Requirements and procedures for parallel approaches 
 
2.2.1 Required runway spacing for parallel approaches 
In general, parallel runways can be used for four different modes of operations: independent 
parallel approaches, dependent parallel approaches, independent parallel departures, and 
segregated parallel operations [30]. The first two operations are illustrated in Figure 2-1 (note 
that nmi denotes Nautical Miles). With segregated operations, one runway is used for 
departures, while the other runway is used for arrivals. According to mode of operation and 
weather condition, different runway spacings are required to obtain the same level of safety. 
Under IMC, dependent parallel approaches may now be conducted at runways spaced from 
2500 ft to 3400 ft, whereas independent parallel approaches are only permitted at runways 
spaced more than 3400 ft. Over the last 30 years, the minimum required runway spacing for 
independent parallel approaches has been reduced several times. An overview of these 
reductions is given in Table 2-1. 
 
Table 2-1  Minimum required runway spacing for independent parallel approaches 
Year Required runway spacing 
1962 6200 ft 
1963 5000 ft 
1974 4300 ft 
1995 3400 ft 
 
These reductions were induced by improved operational procedures and technological 
improvements, such as new navigation and landing systems, and surveillance radar of higher 
update rate and resolution. ICAO has approved the latest reduction to 3400 ft as from November 
9th 1995, provided that certain conditions and requirements are satisfied. One of these 
requirements is usage of the PRM system, which is a radar monitoring system intended to 
increase utilization of multiple, closely spaced, parallel runways under IMC [27, 28, 39]. 
 
2.2.2 Required operational procedures for parallel approaches 
According to available facilities (e.g. ground and onboard equipment), a variety of instrument 
approach procedures have been developed to guide aircraft safely to the runways during IMC. 
In general, an instrument procedure may have five segments: arrival, initial, intermediate, final, 
and missed approach. This study only considers usage of ILS, the presently most used 
procedure. A detailed description of ILS procedures can be found in the PANS-OPS [32]. For 
now, only the additional requirements for simultaneous ILS approaches to parallel runways are 
described. 
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For independent parallel approaches radar separation minima between aircraft on adjacent 
localizers are not prescribed [30]. The approaches must be flown straight in, with turn on to the 
localizer separated vertically by at least 1000 ft. This vertical separation has to be maintained 
until the aircraft intercept their glide path at the Final Approach Point (FAP). Separate radar 
controllers have to monitor the approaches once the 1000 ft vertical separation is lost during ILS 
procedures, and must intervene if any aircraft is observed to penetrate the No Transgression 
Zone (NTZ). The latter is a corridor of airspace located centrally between the two extended 
runway centre lines, with width depending on, among other aspects, the surveillance system, 
responding time of controllers, pilots and aircraft, and lateral track separation [30]. If one 
aircraft enters the NTZ, the aircraft on the adjacent localizer must be issued appropriate 
instructions to avoid collision, such as turns or the initiation of a missed approach. 
 
 
Figure 2-1  Independent and dependent parallel approaches. Derived from source [18] 
 
Other requirements for simultaneous ILS approaches to parallel runways are a maximum 
intercept angle with the localizer course of 30°, and nominal missed approach tracks diverging 
by at least 30°, with turns 'as soon as practicable' [30]. 
 
For dependent parallel approaches an in-between distance of 2 Nautical Miles (NM) between 
aircraft on adjacent localizers is prescribed. This diagonal separation brings along a minimum 
required longitudinal separation of about 4 NM between aircraft on the same runway track. As 
the minimum longitudinal separation for independent parallel approaches is about 3 NM, the 
runway capacity when using dependent parallel approaches is significantly less than that for 
independent approaches [39]. This clearly shows the importance of reducing the minimum 
required runway spacing for independent parallel approaches (see also Figure 2-1).  
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2.3 Risk analysis 
 
2.3.1 Identification of hazardous flight phases 
This study considers the risks related to independent parallel approaches. Risks also present 
during approaches to single runways are not taken into account. Such reference implies focusing 
on the collision risk between aircraft. The consequences may be catastrophic: probably loss of 
both aircraft and death of passengers and crew. The lives of people living in the vicinity of an 
airport may even be endangered. Evidently, hazardous situations may exist during flight phases 
containing a relative high uncertainty about the nominal flight trajectory if the runways are 
closely spaced. Two hazardous flight phases emerge: 
 Alignment with the localizer: 
A hazardous situation may exist if one (or both) approaching aircraft overshoots the ILS 
localizer 3, and deviates towards the adjacent runway, with possibly an endangered aircraft 
in its path. 
 A dual missed approach: 
A hazardous situation may exist if both approaching aircraft initiate a missed approach, 
especially if the missed approaches are to be initiated along runway direction and/or if 
there are strong crosswinds. 
 
An aircraft might also be seriously endangered by a wake vortex developed by an aircraft 
nearby. Up to now, the wake vortex has been ignored in the risk analysis of independent parallel 
approaches. The gradual reduction of the minimum required parallel runway spacing may raise 
concerns, especially in case of strong crosswinds. In this Section, the wake vortex problem is 
also not taken into account. 
 
2.3.2 Identification of suitable risk metrics 
There is no single common metric of risk (or safety). There are many different risk metrics 
which may be used for quantification of the risk of collision with an obstacle or between 
aircraft. Some of the risk metrics that can be applied for assessing the risk related to air traffic 
operations are given in Figure 2-2. Note that, in general, a collision may be regarded as a fatal 
accident, losing adequate separation may be seen as an incident, and the number of fatalities per 
collision will likely involve all passengers and crew. Other risk metrics can often be derived. In 
this respect, two types of commonly used risk metrics are individual risk metrics which are 
based on the risk to an individual being exposed to a risk on a regular basis, and societal risk 
metrics which take into account the number of persons to be killed in a single event.  
                                                    
3
 A localizer is the component of an Instrument Landing System (ILS) that provides lateral guidance with respect to the runway 
centreline. 
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Figure 2-2  Risk metric for air traffic operations (Source [3]) 
 
The suitability of a risk metric depends on, among other aspects, the system under 
consideration, the available data and the required results. In this respect, some considerations 
leading to the selection of an appropriate risk metric are: 
 The risk metric must be attractive and useful for the involved policy makers. 
 The risk metric must be able to represent the consequences of possible decisions in an 
appropriate way. In view of the steady increase in air traffic, this means that the collision 
probability per year might be more suitable than the collision probability per approach. 
 The risk metric must, if possible, not include risks which are outside the scope of the 
problem under consideration. The risk measure must therefore be restricted to the risk of 
collision between aircraft, during the approach part of a flight only. Risk measures defined 
in terms of accidents per flight hour or per mile travelled are not suitable, as the approach 
takes only a relative small amount of time. 
 The risk metric must be used to derive the minimum required parallel runway spacing for 
independent parallel approaches. For this usage, it is presently not clear if and how to take 
into account the risk to people living in the vicinity of an airport, as airport surroundings 
vary widely. 
 The risk metric must fit in with present safety requirements. However, worldwide risk 
criteria are not established for independent parallel approaches. The ICAO single runway 
approach safety requirement is defined in terms of maximum probability of collision with 
an obstacle per approach [31]. The FAA uses the collision probability per approach for 
independent parallel approaches [27]. EUROCONTROL has established Safety Regulatory 
Requirements for evaluation of ATM related incidents and accidents [78]. 
 It seems not appropriate to apply societal risk measures for quantification of the risk 
related to one part of a flight, as passengers and crew are exposed to risks during all parts 
of a flight. Societal risk measures for aircraft passengers seem only suitable for 
quantification of the overall collision risk of a flight. 
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 In other fields (e.g. the fields of surface public transport, hydraulics and civil engineering, 
chemical processes, and the nuclear field) there is a tendency to use risk measures related 
to a period of time more often. 
 Use of the collision probability per year brings along the possibility that, by conducting a 
small number of approaches, two parallel runways with a high collision probability per 
approach can be judged adequately safe. Especially for pilots or crew, this high peak level 
of risk will be unacceptable. 
 
Considering the above, there may not be one most appropriate risk metric. Two suitable risk 
metrics evolve for the safety analysis of two parallel runways used for landing. Both are defined 
with respect to the risk of collision between aircraft only: 
 The collision probability per approach: Commonly used, up to now, for evaluation of the 
risk during the approach part of a flight. It fits well within the present safety requirements 
for air traffic operations, but does not take into account an increase in runway capacity. 
 The collision probability per year (or its reciprocal, the expected average time interval 
between two collisions): Easy to interpret. It takes into account the runway capacity, and 
consequently the steady increase in air traffic. As an aid to planning or decision making, it 
may therefore be easier to use. 
Both risk metrics will therefore be used in this Section. 
 
2.3.3 Adoption of the Target Level of Safety 
To determine the minimum required parallel runway spacing, a Target Level of Safety (TLS) 
needs to be adopted. The TLS represents the level of risk which is considered acceptable. The 
acceptability of risk depends, naturally, highly on the magnitude of the consequences. In 
general, safety requirements are based on the principle that an inverse relationship should exist 
between the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of its consequences. In our case, the 
consequences could be catastrophic. A collision between aircraft mostly results in loss of both 
aircraft and death of all passengers and crew, and may even endanger the lives of people on the 
ground. Evidently, a zero collision probability can not be realized. As, up to now, a worldwide 
accepted TLS for independent parallel approaches has not yet been established, the question 
arises how to assess the level of risk which may be considered acceptable. Several 
methodologies for TLS assessment have been proposed up to now. Some methods worth 
mentioning for air traffic operations are [24, 29, 37]: 
 Air transport as safe as surface public transport (e.g. railway or bus); 
 Expected passenger fatality rate in air traffic comparable with population fatality rate due 
to all causes; 
 Air crew risk of accidental death comparable with other occupations; 
 Current air traffic accident rates with a factor of improvement; 
 Maintaining current air traffic accident statistics; 
 Fitting in with present safety requirements for air traffic operations. 
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Applying these methods does not necessarily lead to the same TLS. Moreover, they depend on 
the selected risk metric. As a result, several methods are difficult to apply in our situation. The 
first three methods are usually based on the number of fatalities per distance or per time 
travelled, which are both not suitable for the approach part of a flight. With regard to the fourth, 
the problem arises which size of the target factor of improvement must be used. From the above 
methods, the fifth and sixth seem most suited for this study. Note that different actor groups 
(e.g. airlines, airport authorities, controllers, crew, passengers or policy makers) may support 
different methods. Airlines often support the first, passengers the second, crew the third, 
whereas policy makers often support one of the last three methods. 
 
Maintaining current air traffic statistics 
Accident data regarding collisions between aircraft during parallel approaches is not available. 
We develop a method consisting of three steps: 
 Assessment of the accident probability per approach: 
The historical accident 4 probability per approach at 'reasonable safe' mainports, with more 
than about 150000 movements per year, is estimated at 7•10-7 [36]. 
 Assessment of the fatal accident probability per approach: 
The ratio fatal accidents : non-fatal accidents is of the order 1:4 [34]. This implies a 
historical fatal accident probability per approach of about 10-7. 
 Account for the number of fatalities, and the loss of two aircraft: 
The nc-criterion 5 is based on the assumption that accidents with n-times larger number of 
fatalities must correspond to a nc times lesser probability. Assuming that a collision may 
bring along about five times more fatalities than an average fatal accident [22], and using 
the nc-criterion leads to a TLS for the collision probability per approach of 1•10-8 if c=1.5 
and 4•10-9 if c=2. 
 
Fitting in with present air traffic safety requirements 
Safety requirements for independent parallel approaches are not yet defined. We develop a 
method based on the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) risk categorisation for ATC systems, 
which relates a number of hazard categories (catastrophic, hazardous/severe, major, minor, no 
effect) to a maximum probability of occurrence [33]. A collision between aircraft fits in the 
catastrophic category, for which the maximum probability of occurrence per flight hour is 
'extremely improbable', and defined at 10-9 per initial cause. Safety requirements specified per 
flight hour are however not suitable for the approach part of a flight.  
                                                    
4
  An accident is defined as the occurrence of an unintended ground contact outside the runway [36]. Note that this implies that 
only external safety is being considered, e.g. a crash on the runway is not included in the estimated historical accident probability. 
5
 The parameter c can be used to quantify the degree of (in)voluntarity of the people being exposed to a risk, thereby assuming 
that an involuntary risk requires a larger value of c. 
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The method now consists of three steps: 
 Assess the maximum probability of collision per flight: 
Depending on the world region, the mean flight time may be estimated at 2 to 4 hours [34]. 
This implies a maximum probability of collision between aircraft of 2•10-9 to 4•10-9 per 
initial cause. 
 Account for the number of initial causes: 
Assuming that there could be 1 to 5 initial causes leading to a collision, implies a 
maximum probability of collision between aircraft of 2•10-9 to 2•10-8 per flight. 
 Assess the TLS for the collision probability per approach: 
Dividing the risk of collision equally between the three main parts of a flight (i.e. take off, 
en-route, and approach) leads to a TLS of about 10-9 to 10-8. 
 
Application of both methods does not motivate the adoption of one particular TLS. Problems 
arising are a large number of numerical assumptions and lack of statistical accident data, leading 
to considerable uncertainty in TLS assessments. The methods suggest adopting a TLS ranging 
between one collision in 108 and 109 approaches, i.e. 
[ ]89 101,101 −− ××∈approachperTLS  (2-1) 
The TLS-area for the collision probability per year is derived by assuming on average 200000 
approaches per runway per year. This leads to a TLS ranging between one collision in 500 years 
and one collision in 5000 years, i.e. 
[ ]34 102,102 −− ××∈yearperTLS  (2-2) 
As a consequence of the difficulties in TLS assessment, the usage of a TLS as an absolute 
boundary-line between safe and unsafe is hard to justify. Besides, the uncertainty in collision 
risk assessments is often high, and sensitive to variations in model parameters. The 
determination of a safe separation standard is therefore also subject to uncertainty. The TLS 
concept does not really provide the means for taking this uncertainty into account. It is 
recommended to examine the possibility of broadening the TLS concept, by investigating the 
development of the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) approach for use in aviation 
risk management [29]. 
 
2.3.4 Definition of collision risk judgement scheme 
In order to set the TLS and/or broaden the TLS concept, policy makers must be consulted. In 
order to already judge the acceptability of calculated collision risk, a "collision risk judgement 
scheme" is defined for usage in this study: 
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 A scenario for which the collision risk is lower than the lowest boundary of the TLS-area, 
is judged adequately safe. 
 A scenario for which the collision risk is higher than the highest boundary of the TLS-area, 
is judged unsafe. Collision risk reducing measures must be taken. 
 A scenario for which the collision risk falls in between both boundaries of the TLS-area, is 
judged tolerable until the TLS has been set by policy makers. Besides, it is recommended 
to investigate the feasibility of risk reducing measures. 
 
2.4 Risk model 
 
2.4.1 Overview of the risk model 
A risk model is developed for the determination of the selected collision risk measures. The 
airspace around the airport where the collision risk is evaluated is restricted to the intermediate, 
final, and missed approach flight phases, thereby assuming that the arrival and initial phases 
bring along a negligible risk of collision. 
 
The risk model consists of three parts. The first part, the conditional collision probability model, 
developed by Couwenberg [26], describes how to calculate the conditional collision probability 
between two aircraft given the localizer interception times and types of operation (landing or 
missed approach). The second part describes the nominal flight trajectories and the probability 
distributions for the deviations from the nominal flight trajectories. The third part takes into 
account the missed approach rate, dependency between aircraft operations at adjacent runways, 
initiation altitude of a missed approach, localizer interception times, and air traffic density in 
order to derive the selected risk measures (collision probability per approach and per year). The 
remainder of Section 2.4 describes these three parts. A more detailed description of the risk 
model is given in Speijker [38]. The possibility of intervention when blunders occur is not taken 
into account. In reality, the collision risk might therefore be somewhat smaller than calculated. 
 
2.4.2 The conditional collision probability model 
Four different combinations of operations ijη  are considered, consisting of a landing or missed 
approach for aircraft i and a landing or missed approach for aircraft j. That is ( )jiij ηηη ,= , with 
2,1=iη  and 2,1=jη . The time dependent conditional collision probability between two aircraft 
i and j given their localizer interception times and types of aircraft operation (landing or missed 
approach at a fixed altitude) is now denoted by 
 
 (2-3) 
 
where ijη  indicates the four possible combinations of type of operations. 
),( ijcollision tP η
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Let the flight trajectories of aircraft i and j be represented by (xit ,yit , zit )  and (xjt , yjt , zj t ) , 
where the three vector components give the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical coordinates of the 
geometric centres of the rectangular bounding boxes about the aircraft respectively. The 
parameters dxi, dyi and dzi represent the size of aircraft i. In accordance with the ICAO Collision 
Risk Model (CRM) [33], the aircraft longitudinal position and speed will be taken deterministic. 
Let the stochastic movement (X(t),Y(t),Z(t))} now represent the relative position between the 
centres of the aircraft i and j, i.e. 
 
X(t)   =  X jt  - X it  
Y(t)  =  Y jt  - Y it (2-4) 
Z(t)  =  Z j t - Z it 
 
Define the collision area of aircraft i and j by 
2
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=  (2-5) 
Using the fact that a collision occurs when there is a simultaneous overlap of the bounding 
boxes in all of the three coordinate directions, it follows that: 
[ ] ijijzijyijxijcollision dtZdtYdtXPtP ηη <∧<∧<= )()()(),(  (2-6) 
The pilot controls the aircraft approach position using the navigation signals. The lateral 
position and vertical position are assumed independent, as these are based on the (independent) 
ILS localizer and glide slope navigation signals respectively. In case the stochastic aircraft 
movements in the 3 directions are independent, the conditional collision probability is equal to 
[ ] [ ] [ ] ijijzijyijxijcollision dtZPdtYPdtXPtP ηη <×<×<= )()()(),(  (2-7) 
Using the deterministic character of the longitudinal coordinate [33], the following expression 
for the conditional collision probability between two aircraft is stated: 
[ ] [ ] 0)(,)()(),( =<×<= pijzpijypijpcollision txdtZPdtYPtP ijηη  (2-8) 
where the passage time tP is determined from the localizer interception times and the 
deterministic velocities of both aircraft. Note that Pcollision (t, ηij) = 0, if x(t)≠0, ∀t.  
 
The lateral and vertical overlap probabilities can be determined from the probability density 
functions f Y it  and f jtY  by convolution. For the lateral overlap holds: 
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A similar expression can be derived for the vertical overlap probability. Since the lateral overlap 
probability is very small, equation (2-9) may be approximated by 
[ ] duufufdfddtYP j
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=≈<  (2-10) 
The vertical overlap probability can be considerable, and needs to be estimated by numerical 
integration (e.g. using Simpson's rule). 
 
2.4.3 Determining the flight trajectories 
The airspace around the airport where the collision risk is evaluated is restricted to the 
intermediate, final, and missed approach flight phases. The arrival and initial flight phases are 
assumed to bring along a negligible risk and are therefore left aside. 
 
The aircraft intercept their localizer at the Intermediate Fix (IF). From the IF, the aircraft are 
expected to fly along runway direction. During intermediate approach the flight trajectory is 
kept horizontal. From the Final Approach Point (FAP), an aircraft descends with a glide path 
angle of about 3°. Several reasons may cause an aircraft to initiate a missed approach at any 
altitude between the FAP and Decision Height (DH). The missed approach path consists of a 
curved part and a climb out part. From the Climb Out Point (COP), the aircraft climb under a 
constant climb out gradient. The missed approach track direction can only be changed from a 
certain altitude, above the COP. The nominal flight trajectories of aircraft approaching the 
adjacent parallel runways are sketched in Figure 2-3, and satisfy the requirements for 
independent parallel approaches, which are described in Section 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2-3  Top-view and side-view of the nominal flight trajectories 
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The probability distributions for the deviations from the nominal flight trajectories during 
intermediate approach are determined with data collected with the FANOMOS flight trajectory 
registration system in August 1995 at Schiphol runway 06. The probability distributions for the 
deviations from the nominal flight trajectory during final approach and missed approach are 
determined with a method developed by ICAO [31]. For an extensive description, see Speijker 
[38] and Couwenberg [26]. The deterministic aircraft speed, depending on aircraft category and 
position, is given in Table 2-2, and satisfies the requirements defined in the PANS-OPS [32]. 
 
Table 2-2  Deterministic aircraft speed in knots 
Aircraft 
Category 
Intermediate 
Approach 
Final Approach Missed Approach 
  2000-1000 ft 1000 ft-DH DH-1000 ft 1000-2000 ft 
A 120 95 70 90 100 
B 150 120 90 110 140 
C 190 150 120 140 200 
D 230 170 140 160 230 
 
2.4.4 Determining the identified risk metrics 
To obtain the collision probability between two aircraft, the missed approach rate, dependency 
between aircraft operations at adjacent runways, initiation altitude of a missed approach, and 
localizer interception times are taken into account. The conditional collision probability between 
two aircraft i and j given their localizer interception times, t iloc and t jloc , is defined by 
( ){ }∑∑
= =
•==
2
1
2
1
),(,)( 
i
collision
j
ij
P
jiij
loccollision tPPtP
η η
ηηηη  (2-11) 
with tloc= t jloc - t iloc as the time difference between the localizer interception times of aircraft j 
and i. The probabilities ijPη  (with η i=1,2 and η j=1,2 ) give the probabilities of the occurrence 
of the four combinations of type of operations: 
 ( ){ }jiijPP ij ηηηη ,==                 (2-12) 
 
These probabilities of occurrence are based on the missed approach rate and the dependency 
between aircraft operations at adjacent runways. Denote the stochastic missed approach rate by 
RMA, and let ρdep represent the extent to which the operations of aircraft i and j are dependent, 
where 0 ≤ ρdep ≤ 1. Full independency is given by ρdep=0, and full dependency by ρdep=1. In the 
latter case there are only two possibilities: a dual landing or a dual missed approach.  
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The probabilities ijPη (with η i=1,2 and η j=1,2 ), given realisation rMA of RMA and ρdep , are 
estimated by 
 
 ijPη  (rMA , ρdep) = (1- ρdep)(1- rMA)2 + ρdep (1- rMA)     , η i=1 and η j=1 
ijPη  (rMA , ρdep) = (1- ρdep)(1- rMA) rMA                        , η i=2 and η j=1   (2-13) 
 ijPη  (rMA , ρdep) = (1- ρdep)(1- rMA) rMA                        , η i=1 and η j=2 
 ijPη  (rMA , ρdep) = (1- ρdep) rMA 2 + ρdep rMA                  , η i=2 and η j=2 
Let 
MARf  denote the probability density function of the missed approach rate and dep
_
ρ  the best 
estimate for the dependency parameter. The probabilities ijPη  may now be stated as 
( ) 2 ,1  and  2 ,1 with  , ,,)(),( j1
0
==== ∫
=
ηηηηηρηη
ijiij
MAMAR
r
depMA drrfrPP MAijij        (2-14) 
In the absence of statistical data, the missed approach rate must be represented by a (subjective) 
probability distribution elicited through the use of expert opinion [25]. In this study, RMA is 
assumed to be Beta distributed with shape parameters pMA and qMA , i.e. RMA ~ Beta(pMA , qMA). 
For a motivation see Speijker [38]. The parameters pMA and qMA can be determined with a 
procedure based on elicitation of two percentiles [23]. Next aspect is the initiation altitude of a 
missed approach. As most missed approaches are initiated at or near DH [31], it is assumed that 
missed approaches are to be initiated at 200 ft, the DH for ILS Category I. 
 
To obtain the collision probability between two aircraft, the localizer interception times are now 
taken into account. Considering the independent use of the runways, it is assumed that the 
localizer interception times are uniformly distributed. 
 
Consequently, 
∫
=
=
ijT
t
collision
ij
collision dttPT
P
0
)(1  (2-14) 
with Tij such that each possible passage point is taken into account. 
 
The collision probability per approach, Pcollision per approach, can be determined in a similar way by 
taking into account the air traffic density as well. A method for determining the collision 
probability per approach is described in Speijker [38]. 
The collision probability per year, Pcollision per year, can be determined from the collision 
probability per approach by taking into account the number of approaches per runway per year, 
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n. Because of the fact that independent parallel approaches are being performed, a mutual 
independence between the runway approaches may be assumed, i.e. 
[ ] napproachpercollisionyearpercollision PP −−= 11  (2-15) 
If Pcollision per approach«1, this may be simplified by using first order approximation: 
approachpercollisionyearpercollision PnP ×≈  (2-16) 
which is equal to the expected number of collisions per year. 
 
2.5 Numerical evaluations 
 
2.5.1 Definition of a baseline scenario 
In order to obtain a first, most likely, estimation of the collision risk related to independent 
parallel approaches, a baseline scenario is defined which satisfies the currently prescribed 
operational procedures. Its main characteristics are: 
 Distance between runway thresholds, (xd,yd): The most interesting scenario is specified by 
xd=0 and yd=1035 m (the minimum required parallel runway spacing). 
 Traffic density: The time interval between aircraft approaching a runway is 75 s. 
 Average number of approaches per runway per year: 200000, reflecting the fact that, in 
general, during the night only part of runway capacity may be utilized. 
 Aircraft speed categories: C and D, for aircraft approaching the adjacent runways. 
 Aircraft sizes: 70.51×59.64×19.33 m, corresponding to a Boeing 747. 
 ILS Category: I, bringing along the largest uncertainty about the glide path. 
 Localizer interception: The angle with the localizer course is between 0° and 30°. 
 Intermediate approach altitudes: The aircraft approaching the adjacent runways are 
expected to fly at altitudes of 2000 ft (right runway) and 3000 ft (left runway). 
 Intermediate segment length: 5.0 km, in accordance with the collected flight data. 
 Glide path angle: 3°. 
 Climb out gradient: 4.0 %. 
 Missed approach initiation altitudes: 200 ft, which is the minimum required Decision 
Height (DH) for ILS category I. 
 Missed approach turns: 30° angle of divergence between the nominal missed approach 
tracks, with turns at an altitude of 500 ft. 
 Missed approach rate: Beta distributed stochastic variable with shape parameters pMA =1.17 
and qMA =84.66, corresponding to elicited median (50-th percentile) and 5-th percentile of 
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0.01 and 0.001 respectively. A value of 0.01 (one missed approach in 100 approaches) is 
also used in the ICAO CRM [31] and in the PANS-OPS [32]. 
 Dependency parameter , dep
_
ρ : 0.30, derived by assuming that the main reasons for a dual 
missed approach are turbulence and windshear (see Speijker [38]). 
 
2.5.2 Numerical results for the baseline scenario 
Based on the risk model, a computer program has been implemented in the NLR Information 
System for Safety and Risk analysis (ISTaR). With this computer program the baseline scenario 
has been numerically evaluated. The main results are: 
 The calculated collision probability per approach is 3.6•10-9. 
 The calculated collision probability per year per runway is 7.2•10-4. 
 The numerical values of both risk metrics fall within the defined TLS-areas, and may 
therefore be judged 'tolerable' until the TLS has been set by policy makers. 
 The probability of a near miss, which is defined as losing 500 ft vertical and lateral 
separation without colliding, is 7.44•10-5 per approach, which implies that about 15 near 
misses are expected to occur per year. This is relatively high and therefore worrying. Note 
that it would be possible to validate these near miss probability estimates with flight data, 
once two runways spaced exactly 1035 m are used for independent parallel approaches. 
 The maximum conditional probability of an aircraft entering a 2000 ft NTZ during final 
approach is considerable, and equal to 1.47•10-2 near glide path interception. 
 The collision probability during intermediate approach is highest when passage occurs near 
turn on to the localizer (magnitude about 10-7). 
 The collision probability during a dual missed approach is in between about 10-6 (when 
passage occurs near the turn altitude of 500 ft) and 10-10 to 10-11 (when passage occurs at a 
much higher altitude), and may be judged acceptable only in case of an early turn. 
 The collision probability during final approach maximally reaches a magnitude of about 
10-9 to 10-10, which is relatively low compared with the most hazardous phases during 
intermediate approach (near ILS localizer intercept) and a dual missed approach. 
 
The collision probability during final approach is already relatively low. Technological 
improvements and improved operational procedures, leading to further increased safety during 
final approach, do therefore not significantly lower the collision probability per year. To 
increase the safety related to independent parallel approaches, the relative high collision 
probability near both turn on to the localizer and near the turn altitude must be lowered. 
 
Varying the lateral distance between the two parallel runways, while keeping the other 
parameters according to the baseline scenario, shows that the collision risk increases with a 
gradually higher rate if the lateral distance decreases (Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4  Collision probability per year versus parallel runway spacing 
 
Important numerical results, valid under baseline operational conditions, are: 
 Below about 600 m runway spacing, a collision is most likely to occur every year. The 
collision probability per year increases even further if the lateral distance is reduced. 
 Below 930 m runway spacing, the collision risk reaches a high and unacceptable level of at 
least one collision in 100 million approaches (or one collision in 500 years). 
 Above 1270 m runway spacing, the collision risk attains a low and acceptable level of at 
most one collision in 1000 million approaches (or one collision in 5000 years). 
Note that the currently required minimum parallel runway spacing of 1035 m (or 3400 ft) falls 
within the 'tolerable area' of the 'collision risk judgment scheme'. 
 
2.5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis shows to which model parameters the risk measures (collision probability 
per approach and per year) are sensitive. Varying model parameters, while keeping the other 
conditions in accordance with the baseline scenario, indicates that the risk metrics are sensitive 
to, especially, the nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach, the angle of 
divergence between the nominal missed approach tracks, and the missed approach turn altitude. 
The influence of other missed approach parameters on the collision risk is relative low, but will 
be larger if the angle of divergence decreases or the missed approach turn altitude increases. It 
may even be considerable if missed approaches are to be initiated along runway direction. A 
detailed sensitivity analysis, including numerical computations, is found in Speijker [38]. 
2.5.4 Collision risk reducing measures 
The following metrics are currently prescribed by ICAO for simultaneous and independent 
parallel approaches, for trying to maintain the required level of safety: 
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 At least 1000 ft nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach; 
 At least 30° angle of divergence between the nominal missed approach tracks, with turns 
'as soon as practicable'; 
 A maximum intercept angle with the localizer course of 30°. 
In the following, the effectiveness of each of the first two metrics is numerically evaluated, 
while keeping the other conditions according to the baseline scenario. The impact of staggered 
parallel runways on the collision risk is also determined.  
 
 Nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach: 
According to Table 2-3, the risk decreases rapidly if the nominal vertical separation 
increases. With less than 500 ft, a collision is likely to occur within 1 to 3 years. 
 
Table 2-3  Effectiveness of increasing vertical separation during intermediate approach 
Vertical separation Pcollision, per approach Pcollision, per year 
0 ft 6.59•10-5 1.00 
500 ft 1.85•10-6 3.09•10-1 
750 ft 2.75•10-8 5.48•10-3 
1000 ft 3.60•10-9 7.20•10-4 
 
Evidently, at least 1000 ft nominal vertical separation is required. A separation of more than 
1000 ft will reduce the risk even further. However, the feasibility of this is rather questionable 
as it probably lowers runway capacity significantly. 
 
 Diverging nominal missed approach tracks, with turns 'as soon as practicable':  
Table 2-4 shows that the risk decreases with a gradually higher rate if the turn altitude 
decreases. A turn altitude above 500 ft may be judged unacceptable. 
 
Table 2-4  Effectiveness of decreasing turn altitude 
Turn altitude Pcollision, per approach Pcollision, per year 
500 ft 3.60•10-9 7.20•10-4 
1000 ft 1.68•10-7 3.30•10-2 
1500 ft 1.84•10-6 3.08•10-1 
2000 ft 4.48•10-6 5.92•10-1 
Table 2-5 shows that the risk decreases with a gradually smaller rate if the angle of divergence 
increases. Worth noticing is that increasing the angle of divergence to more than 20° to 30° 
hardly reduces the collision risk any further. 
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Table 2-5  Effectiveness of increasing angle of divergence between missed approach tracks 
Angle of divergence Pcollision, per approach Pcollision, per year 
0° 4.48•10-6 5.92•10-1 
10° 2.45•10-8 4.89•10-3 
20° 3.75•10-9 7.50•10-4 
30° 3.60•10-9 7.20•10-4 
 
Clearly, at least 20° to 30° angle of divergence is required, with turns 'as soon as practicable', 
and not above 500 ft.  
 
 Staggered parallel runways: 
Table 2-6 shows the risk for three longitudinal distances between runway thresholds, xd , 
where a positive sign indicates that the 'left runway' is located 'farthest away', and a 
negative sign the opposite. The collision risk decreases if xd increases. 
 
Table 2-6  Effectiveness of staggering the parallel runways 
xd Pcollision, per approach Pcollision, per year 
-2000 m 1.38•10-7 2.72•10-2 
0 m 3.60•10-9 7.20•10-4 
+2000 m 1.53•10-11 3.06•10-6 
Parallel runways should, if possible, be built with some - as large as possible - longitudinal 
distance between runway thresholds. Independent parallel approaches must then be performed 
such that the aircraft with the highest located FAP (usually at 3000 ft) approach the runway 
located farthest away. It turns out that all three numerically evaluated measures are effective in 
reducing the collision risk. Besides, although not numerically evaluated, it is reasonable to 
expect that the collision risk decreases if the localizer intercept angle decreases, especially with 
lacking nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach. 
 
2.5.5 Worst case scenario 
The worst case scenario is specified on basis of a large number of numerically evaluated 
scenarios. Besides 1035 m parallel runway spacing, its main characteristics differing from the 
baseline scenario are: 
 Aircraft size: 95.0×80.0×20 m. 
 Traffic density: The time interval between aircraft approaching a runway is 60 s. 
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 Intermediate approach altitudes: The aircraft approaching the adjacent runways are 
expected to fly at equal altitudes of 2000 ft. 
 Climb out gradient: 2.5%. 
 Missed approach tracks: along runway direction (i.e. no turns specified). 
 
Under these worst case operational conditions, the collision probability per approach is  
1.38•10-4, which is definitely unacceptable. A collision is even most likely to occur a couple of 
times per year! Especially the lacking nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach, 
and the insufficient nominal lateral distance during a dual missed approach are responsible for 
this unacceptable high risk of collision. The collision probability is considerable when passage 
occurs near turn on to the localizer (magnitude about 10-4 to 10-3) or, in case of a dual missed 
approach, when passage occurs above about 1000 ft (magnitude about 10-4 to 10-2). 
 
Numerical evaluations show that the collision risk reduces into the defined tolerable area of 
[1×10-9,1×10-8 ] by application of the following two measures: 
 1000 ft nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach; 
 30° angle of divergence between the missed approach tracks, with turns at 500 ft. 
 
Varying the lateral distance between the runways shows that increasing the parallel runway 
spacing is not practicable in reducing the risk under worst case conditions. Increasing the 
runway spacing to 4240 m reduces the collision probability per approach to 1.0•10-8, and 
increasing to 5140 m is necessary for reduction to 1.0•10-9! 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this study a probabilistic risk analysis regarding the risk of collision between aircraft 
performing independent parallel approaches has been described. Two suitable risk metrics 
evolved for the risk analysis of two parallel runways used for landing: the collision probability 
per approach and the collision probability per year, defined with respect to the risk of collision 
between aircraft. Application of two methods for TLS assessment provided TLS-areas, defining 
ranges for the TLS used in this study: 
  
(2-17) 
 
Because of problems arising in assessment and usage of the TLS, it is recommended to examine 
the possibility of broadening the TLS concept. In order to set the TLS and/or broaden the TLS 
concept, policy makers must be consulted. 
 
[ ] [ ]3489 102,102101,101 −−−− ××∈××∈ yearperapproachper TLSorTLS
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A risk model was developed and implemented for determination of the collision risk. 
Application of the risk model to a number of scenarios, with varying parallel runway spacing, 
and under different operational conditions, showed that: 
 The collision probability between two aircraft can be considerable and unacceptable under 
certain conditions, especially near turn on to the localizer and during a dual missed 
approach; 
 Technological improvements and improved operational procedures, leading to an increased 
safety during final approach, do not significantly lower the collision probability per 
approach. 
 
Numerical evaluations showed that the following measures are essential, and must be 
prescribed, for trying to maintain the collision risk at a low and acceptable level: 
 At least 20° to 30° angle of divergence between the nominal missed approach tracks, with 
turns 'as soon as practicable', and not above 500 ft; 
 At least 1000 ft nominal vertical separation during intermediate approach; 
 Some - as large as possible - longitudinal distance between the runway thresholds of the 
parallel runways. Besides, the approaches must then be performed such that the aircraft 
with the highest FAP approach the runway located 'farthest away'. 
 
Provided that these measures are applied and assuming that a TLS from the specified TLS-areas 
is used, independent parallel approaches may be judged adequately safe if the runway spacing is 
greater than 1270 m, and unsafe if the spacing is lower than 930 m. 
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3 Risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on Schiphol 
converging runways 19R and 22 
3.1 Introduction 
The increase in air traffic implies that for busy airports, such as Schiphol, new and advanced 
ATM procedures are being developed. For some proposed ATM procedures, ICAO regulations 
do not exist and a safety assessment incorporating the role of ATC and pilots is required. This 
study concerns a risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on runways 19R and 22, 
where the Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) of runway 22 is proposed to be reduced from 350 
ft to values less than 200 ft. The current OCA of 350 ft has been established as from ILS 
installation in 1993, when a ‘bend’ in the ILS localizer signal just before 200 ft was noted. 
According to Westerveld [46], the ILS localizer signal is of sufficient quality to allow the 
proposed reduction of the OCA. 
 
A reduction of the OCA may allow the use of runway 22 in actual CAT-I weather conditions, 
which will support the optimisation of the arrival scheduling, in particular for forecasted CAT-I 
conditions. However, a reduction of the OCA moves the decision point of making a missed 
approach closer to the runway threshold. This will affect the distance between the prescribed 
missed approach trajectories of runways 19R and 22, which could result in an increase of the 
collision risk. The primary objective of the research can be formulated as follows [40]: 
The quantification and evaluation of the risks of simultaneous missed approach procedures on 
runways 19R and 22, up to and including ILS CAT I circumstances. 
 
The next Section 3.2 describes the currently prescribed (missed) approach procedures for 
runways 19R and 22, including requirements concerning the usage of this runway combination, 
the role of ATC and pilots. Section 3.3 deals with the adoption of a risk criteria framework to 
judge the acceptability of collision risk, including identification of suitable metrics and 
assessment of safety requirements for the collision risk between aircraft. Section 3.4 describes 
the extension of an existing risk model to enable determination of the collision risk. This 
extended model is developed through an integral usage of three NLR tools: ISTaR, TOPAZ, and 
FANOMOS. In Section 3.5, sixteen representative scenarios, with varying operational aspects, 
will be evaluated and the worst case scenario will be identified. The role of ATC monitoring 
and instructions and some possible future procedural changes are investigated, thereby 
examining the necessity of possible risk reducing measures. Based on the numerical results and 
the identified hazards, Section 3.6 contains the safety criticality assessment of the proposed 
reduction of the OCA to values below 200 ft, and some operational feedback concerning the 
necessity of (re)design of the proposed procedures for runways 19R and 22. The conclusions 
and recommendations with respect to the safety of the independent usage of runway 22 as a 
CAT-I ILS runway will be given in Section 3.7. 
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3.2 Identification of requirements and procedures 
 
3.2.1 Schiphol runway combination 19R and 22 
Runway 19R (recently re-numbered to 18C) is one of the primary runways for arriving aircraft. 
The runway 19R is favourable because of noise restrictions and the minimum impact on the 
other runways. Arrivals on runway 22 are not favourable with respect to noise as the approach is 
right across the centre of Amsterdam. Combined use of 19R and 22 is in principle limited to 
inbound peak time periods, and in general not allowed during the night. 
 
19R
01L
01R
27
06
22
 
Figure 3-1  Schiphol runway lay-out (before opening of the Polderbaan) 
 
3.2.2 Aircraft missed approach procedures 
The missed approach procedure for runway 19R is straight ahead on runway track, whereas the 
procedure for runway 22 prescribes a left turn to track 160° MAG, i.e. the required track change 
is 223°-160°=63° [45]. For safety reasons, the turn may only be initiated after completion of the 
initial missed approach phase [32], which comprises an aircraft type dependent task breakdown. 
The manoeuvre during the initial missed approach phase necessitates concentrated attention of 
the pilot especially when establishing climb and changes in configuration, and it is assumed that 
the guidance equipment cannot be fully utilised. No requirements to change the flight direction 
are acceptable in this phase. The initial approach phase may require up to 30-40 seconds (or 1.0 
to 1.8 NM travelled) before at the earliest lateral navigation can be adjusted and the turn 
initiated. Relevant missed approach rulemaking normally covers only a special case for the 
initiation of a missed approach: no visual contact at decision height due to low clouds and/or 
reduced visibility in fog. Although it can be argued that low-visibility is the most critical reason 
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when considering obstacle clearance, there are other missed approach triggering reasons, 
resulting in a variety of possible initiation altitudes from DH to 2000 ft or more [41, 45].  
 
3.2.3 Air Traffic Control procedures 
ATC is responsible for the safe and efficient management of air traffic on and around the airport 
[47, 48]. Tower Control maintains control of the aircraft from the point that the aircraft is 
established on ILS localiser until either the aircraft 
 leaves the runway and is transferred to the ground controller, or  
 initiates a missed approach and is transferred to approach control for new line up for 
landing. 
 
The tasks for the controller focus on final approach sequencing, monitoring of the (missed) 
approach, provision of a landing clearance and the necessary R/T communications. Usually two 
different tower controllers manage the aircraft on the arrivals for 19R and 22, using different 
frequencies for communication with aircraft conducting a missed approach [41]. Pilots will not 
automatically be aware of the other aircraft initiating a missed approach other than from visual 
reference or when being informed by ATC. Although the procedure for runway 19R does not 
prescribe a turn, in reality ATC often instructs aircraft conducting a missed approach on this 
runway to also initiate a turn away from the nominal trajectory for runway 22 [43], and will also 
provide instructions (e.g. “turn right”, “turn left”, “climb to”) to avoid collisions. 
 
3.2.4 Differences between current and proposed procedures 
This study focuses on the situation of runways 19R and 22, where the OCA for runway 22 will 
be reduced from 350 to values below 200 ft. This reduction might allow a DH of 200 ft, 
enabling the use of runway 22 in actual CAT-I weather conditions. The missed approach 
procedure for runway 19R will not be changed, provided that an acceptable level of safety can 
be obtained. It is also not expected that a change in procedure for runway 22 will have an effect 
on ATC tasks / procedures or communication, or will have an effect on the approaches to 
runway 19R. Most important aspect is that the point where a missed approach is initiated, when 
the missed approach is based on visibility conditions or unstabilized approach, moves to a point 
further down the approach for runway 22 (the nominal distance to threshold reduces from about 
1.1 NM to 0.6 NM). The missed approach path for runway 22 will move closer to the missed 
approach path for runway 19R, which is a factor that might increase the risk of collision.  
Runway selection is based on meteorological data that has a resolution of 100ft. The tower 
supervisor will probably decide not to use the runway combination 19R/22 when a broken cloud 
base of 200 ft is reported, since the margin with the 200ft DH is too small. Therefore the lowest 
(forecasted) ceiling for the selection of runway 22 as landing runway will be reduced from a 
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broken cloud base (BKN6) of 400 ft to BKN 300 ft, which is a factor that might influence the 
missed approach rate [41]. 
 
3.3 Risk criteria framework 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Up to now, the most commonly used risk criteria framework for the collision risk between 
aircraft in the airport surroundings include: 
 A single risk metric defined in terms of the collision risk probability per approach; 
 A risk requirement based on the Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach. 
As an example, previous research studies undertaken for the Civil Aviation Authorities 
proposed a risk criteria framework based on a maximum collision risk probability per approach 
of between 10-8 and 10-9 [2, 49]. Research studies for the European Commission and 
Eurocontrol show a tendency to also investigate the possible application of: 
 risk metrics that convey the costs and benefits of possible decisions more clearly, and 
 risk requirements that are based on the As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable approach. 
Risk (or safety) requirements are usually based on the principle that an inverse relationship 
should exist between probability of occurrence and magnitude of its consequences. 
 
3.3.2 Identification of suitable collision risk metrics 
The suitability of risk metrics for the collision risk between aircraft is studied [2, 41, 49]. A 
rationale is developed and applied for evaluating the suitability of possible risk metrics. Two 
suitable risk metrics to regulate and control collision risk around the airport are proposed: 
1. Collision probability per movement (i.e take off or landing): 
Commonly used for evaluation of risk events during the approach and take off part of a 
flight. It fits well within the present safety requirements for air traffic operations, but does 
not take into account an increase in runway capacity. 
2. Collision probability per year (or expected average time interval between 2 risk events): 
This metric takes into account the runway capacity and the steady increase in air traffic. As 
an aid to planning and decision making, it might therefore be more appropriate to use. 
Economic risk might be used as an informative metric to convey costs and benefits of possible 
decisions more clearly [41]. Since economic risk is open to more than one interpretation, this 
metric should not be used for regulation (i.e. no controls should be based on it). 
 
                                                    
6
 BKN denotes the altitude at which the clouds are broken. A BKN 400 ft implies a (forecasted) broken cloud base at 400 ft. 
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3.3.3 Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach 
The TLS approach is based on a division of the risk continuum into two regions, where the TLS 
provides the boundary value between safe and unsafe. A TLS specifies a maximum acceptable 
level of assessed risk (i.e. point estimate). Several methods for TLS assessment have been used 
[49], and methods based on historical accident data – sometimes factored for improvement – are 
most popular. Some existing and proposed TLS in aviation are [41]: 
1. Existing TLS for collision with obstacles (ICAO-OCP): 
Maximum collision probability per approach of 1.0×10-7 . 
2. Existing TLS for mid-air collisions (ICAO-RGCSP): 
Maximum collision risk per flight hour per dimension of 5×10-9 . 
3. Existing TLS for aircraft accidents during all flight phases (ICAO-AWOP): 
Maximum aircraft accident risk of 1.0×10-7 per flight hour or 1.5×10-7 per movement. 
4. Existing TLS for aircraft accidents during approach and landing (ICAO-AWOP): 
Maximum aircraft accident risk of 1.0×10-8 per movement. 
5. Existing TLS for failure conditions of individual aircraft systems (JAR-25): 
Maximum probability of occurrence per flight hour of 1.0×10-9 per system failure 
condition. 
6. Proposed TLS for accidents with an ATM contribution (Eurocontrol-ESARR4) 
Maximum probability of ATM directly contributing to an accident of a commercial air 
transport aircraft of 2.5×10-8 accidents per flight hour or 3.5×10-8 per movement. 
Note that some applications of the TLS concept (e.g. the first and second) provide detailed 
guidelines for the numerical method to be used for assessment of the risk. 
 
3.3.4 As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable (ALARP) approach 
The ALARP approach is based on a banded assessment of decision structure, which contains a 
tolerable region bounded by maximally negligible and minimally unacceptable levels of risk. 
Within the tolerable region the risk must be proven to be ALARP in order to be acceptable [51, 
52]. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method that can be used to demonstrate that any further 
risk reduction in the tolerable region is impracticable. Up to now, ALARP has mainly been used 
in industries other than aviation (e.g. the chemical, offshore, nuclear and some transport 
industries). Recently development of the ALARP approach has been investigated within the 
context of RVSM in European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) countries [51]. It was 
concluded that for aviation there seems to be no case for replacing any accepted TLS with 
ALARP. However, since most practical applications of ALARP use fixed risk criteria like the 
TLS to determine the ALARP region, there appear to be grounds for combining the TLS and 
ALARP for aviation risk management for certain studies. An advantage of ALARP might be 
that it provides a rationale for reduction and mitigation of risks. 
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3.3.5 Adoption of safety requirements 
On behalf of the CAA, it was decided to judge the acceptability of the estimated collision risk 
by a relative comparison of the collision probability per approach of the current and proposed 
situation for runway 22. Moreover, the magnitude of the absolute risk value will be compared 
with the EUROCONTROL proposed TLS for accidents with an ATM contribution [78].  
 
3.4 Risk assessment model 
 
3.4.1 Risk assessment methodology and tools 
For the assessment of the collision risk related to simultaneous missed approaches on Schiphol 
runways 19R and 22, three NLR methodologies and tools are integrated and used: 
 NLR’s Information System for Safety and Risk analysis (ISTaR); 
 NLR’s Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer - Simultaneous Missed 
Approaches toolset (TOPAZ-SMA); 
 NLR’s Flight Track and Aircraft Noise Monitoring System (FANOMOS). 
 
As the basis for the development of the collision risk assessment model use is made of the 
TOPAZ methodology to assess accident risks for ATM operations [53, 58]. Note that the 
TOPAZ-SMA toolset development is described in detail in Blom et al. [42]. TOPAZ supports a 
spiral development cycle that is of the form: 
A. Design of an ATM operational concept. 
B. Assessment of the ATM concept, resulting in a cost-benefit overview. 
C. Detailed analysis of the assessment results, resulting in recommendations to improve the 
ATM concept. 
D. Review of ATM concept development strategy and plan. 
E. Back to A: adapted and/or more detailed ATM concept design using the results from C 
resulting in a new or optimised ATM concept. 
 
The TOPAZ methodology is based on a stochastic modelling approach towards risk assessment 
and has been developed to provide designers of advanced ATM with safety feedback following 
on a (re)design cycle, see Figure 3-2.  
 
During the assessment cycle four stages are sequentially conducted: 
1. Identification of operation and hazards (upper left boxes in Figure 3-2) 
2. Mathematical modelling (right boxes in Figure 3-2) 
3. Accident risk assessment (middle box in Figure 3-2) 
4. Feedback to operational experts (lower left box in Figure 3-2) 
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Figure 3-2  TOPAZ risk assessment cycle 
 
3.4.2 Identification of hazards 
The main issues lie in the fact that, contrary to all other published procedures at Schiphol, the 
missed approach procedure for runway 22 is not a procedure straight ahead on runway track and 
prescribes a left turn to track 160 ° MAG at the Missed Approach Point (MAPt). Humans 
involved (flight crew and ATC) must act according to the published procedures, nevertheless it 
must be considered that the flight crew delays, forgets, or chooses not to initiate a turn early in 
the missed approach. Therefore reasons for not complying with the published procedure were 
identified: 
 The ATCOD incident database of the LVNL [44] was used to derive baseline reasons in 
relation to aircraft conducting a missed approach on runways 19R and 22; 
 For the turning missed approaches, possible hazards as well as the impact of these hazards 
on the aircraft turning track (including location where the turn will be initiated, turn radius, 
and vertical climb performance) were assessed [41]; 
 For the missed approaches straight ahead on runway track, possible hazards were supple-
mented with hazards derived during previous NLR research studies. 
 
A brainstorm session was held, where representatives of NLR, Dutch CAA, and LVNL 
discussed possible hazards that might occur. The following relevant factors were noted [43]: 
 Although the missed approach procedure for runway 19R does not prescribe a turn, in 
reality ATC often instructs aircraft conducting a missed approach on this runway to also 
initiate a turn away from the missed approach turning trajectory for runway 22; 
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 The Jeppesen approach plate 7 for runway 22 might lead to confusion of pilots conducting 
a missed approach. The fact that the ILS plate also contains information for a Non-
Precision Approach (NPA) procedure might lead to pilots interpreting the information 
wrongly, e.g.: 
 The MAPt and required turn can be interpreted as being located before the DH; 
 The visibility criteria may be interpreted as being equal to 1200 m (applicable to the 
NPA procedure) instead of the 1800 m applicable to the ILS procedure; 
 Runway 22 has currently no ILS CAT-I approach and runway lighting, but will be 
equipped with stopbars in the near future. 
 The Jeppesen approach plates for runways 19R and 22 differ from the AIP approach plates 
on significant details, e.g. Jeppesen omits the mentioning of specific procedures that apply 
in case of a missed approach under communication failure. 
 
3.4.3 Missed approach model 
A statistical model for the uncertainties about the missed approach flight phase has been 
developed [41]. This model accounts for the specific nature of the procedures for runways 19R 
and 22, where the latter includes a turning trajectory with turns ‘as soon as practicable’.  
 
Probability distributions for the lateral and vertical deviations 
For the straight missed approaches, the ICAO CRM data is used [31]. However, for the rare 
turning missed approaches, reliable data can not be obtained easily. Therefore, in co-ordination 
with the CAA, it was decided to use FANOMOS turning departure data – together with an 
assessment of the impact of the main differences with turning missed approaches – to represent  
deviations about the turning missed approach path, as being the best feasible modelling option. 
Schiphol departure data has been analysed using ISTaR goodness-of-fit tools [41]. 
 
Probability distribution for the missed approach turning point 
A statistical model for the missed approach turning point, representing a probability distribution 
for the time required before lateral navigation can be adjusted and the turn initiated has been 
developed. This model is based on expert knowledge of (airline) pilots at NLR.  
 
An example of elicited duration times for the task breakdown of the Boeing 737/Airbus A320 is 
given in Table 3-1. Task duration and sequencing depends on aircraft type, therefore similar 
tables have been elicited to represent turn behavior of pilot flying other aircraft approaching 
19R and 22 [41]. 
                                                    
7
 An approach plate is an aeronautical chart that visualizes and explains the approach procedure to a specific airport runway. 
Jeppesen is a company that specializes in aeronautical charting and navigation services, flight planning, pilot supplies. 
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Table 3-1  Boeing 737 / Airbus A320 Missed approach task breakdown 
Task Earliest possible time 50% 
percentile 
95% 
percentile 
End  
time 
1: Decision to initiate missed approach T0 2 seconds 3 seconds T1 
2: Triggering go-around FD mode T1 1 second 3 seconds T2 
3: Thrust change for go-around  T2 6 seconds 9 seconds T3 
4: Adjusting pitch angle T1 + 1 second 4 seconds 8 seconds T4 
5: Raising flaps for climb-out T1 + 2 seconds 6 seconds 10 seconds T5 
6: Raising the gear T4 3 seconds 10 seconds T6 
7: Engaging the autopilot T6 & passed 1000 ft 1300 ft 1600 ft T7 
8: Turn, adjust lateral navigation T6 & passed 400 ft 600 ft 900 ft T8 
9: Level off, adjust vertical navigation passed altitude of 2000 ft 
– (10% of climb rate) 
1700 ft 1900 ft T9 
 
Reasons and altitude for missed approach initiation 
It is assumed that the statistics for the baseline reasons and likely altitude for initiation of a 
missed approach is based on a combination of λDH % at DH and 100-λDH % based on other 
reasons. Table 3-2, which shows the reasons and likely altitude for initiation of a missed 
approach, is used [41, 42]. Note that the columns indicate the type of probability distribution 
used. A Dirac density function is used in case the reason implies a Missed Approach (MA) 
initiation at a specified altitude. For the other reasons, as the MA initiation altitude might vary, a 
uniform distribution is chosen. For the parameter λDH a value of 20% is chosen. 
 
Table 3-2  Reasons and probability density of height for initiation of a missed approach 
Density type Dirac Dirac Dirac Uniform Uniform 
Reason Percentage 100 ft 300 ft 600 ft 600-1200 ft 100-1200 ft 
Runway occupied 27.2% 4.5% 22.7%    
Unstable approach 20.4%  6.8% 4.5% 2.3% 6.8% 
Turbulence 6.8% 4.5%    2.3% 
Flap problems 13.6%   2.3% 4.5% 6.8% 
Wind-shear 22.7% 11.3% 6.8% 2.3% 2.3%  
Weather 2.4%     2.4% 
Other 6.9% 2.3% 2.3%   2.3% 
Percentage 100% 22.6% 38.6% 9.1% 9.1% 20.6% 
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Missed approach rates for runways 19R and 22 
Reliable data on the percentage of executed missed approaches is difficult to obtain, especially 
with respect to particular airports or runways. LVB [45] mentions frequencies in the order of 
0.001 to 0.002 per approach, on the basis of worldwide KLM data. During the brainstorm 
session [43], it was noted that the rate for runway 22 will probably be higher than average, 
because taxiing aircraft have to make a sharp turn when leaving this runway, i.e. the Runway 
Occupancy Time (ROT) is relatively high. Within this study, for the missed approach rates of 
runways 19R and 22 reference values of 0.002 and 0.01 respectively have been chosen. 
 
Probability distribution for the aircraft vertical climb performance 
Since the majority of conflict situations is expected to occur after the aircraft have reached the 
missed approach level altitudes, the following aspects have been analyzed:  
 The elapsed time necessary for different aircraft to climb to final missed approach altitude; 
 The percentages of different aircraft that have climbed to final missed approach altitude as 
a function of distance from runway threshold. 
 
3.4.4 Integration of mathematical models 
For the integration of the mathematical models the Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) 
approach is used. An advantage of this approach is that human factors issues, reaction times of 
involved actors, and system performance can all be modeled and analyzed. A modular system 
engineering type of representation for the double missed approach scenario has been identified 
by taking for each main functionality in the ATM scenario one module, and additionally taking 
for each aircraft in the system a module describing its trajectory. If an ATM module is aircraft 
specific, then such a module is introduced for each of the aircraft. Modules A refer to an aircraft 
individually. Modules B may affect several aircraft. An overview of these modules is: 
 
A1 Level of skill of pilot  B1    Level of skill of Tower controller  
A2    Level of performance of pilot not flying  B2   Level of performance of Tower controller  
A3   Level of performance of pilot flying  B3    Surveillance  
A4    Aircraft module  B4    ATC system  
A5    Aircraft airborne system  B5    Communication, global  
A6    Aircraft landing system  B6    Navigation support, ground  
A7    Cockpit display and computer  B7   Level of maintenance, ground  
A8    Type of weather  B8    Runway degradation   
A9    Navigation equipment aircraft   
A10   Communication, local   
A11   Level of maintenance, aircraft   
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The ATM modules and their interrelations are depicted in Figure 3-3. For the aircraft module a 
RASMAR specific local Petri net representing the aircraft evolution is modelled.  
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Figure 3-3  Functional representation of ATM modules and their interrelations 
 
3.4.5 Collision risk given a double missed approach 
To determine the collision risk given a simultaneous (double) missed approach on runways 19R 
and 22, a Collision Risk Tree (CRT) is constructed. In the following, first the collision risk 
concept is described, taking into account the diversity of different aircraft types that may 
approach runways 19R (mainly Mediums and Heavies) and 22 (Lights and Mediums only). 
 
Collision risk concept 
Let uti := (xit , yit , zit )  and vti := ( ititit zx &&&  , y , ) be the 3D location and 3D velocity of aircraft i, and 
let x, y and z refer to the 3 dimensional axis system. Let utij := uti  - utj   be the distance between 
19R aircraft i and 22 aircraft j at time t and let vtij := vti -  vtj be the relative velocity of 19R 
aircraft i and 22 aircraft  j at time t. Define Dij as the collision area of  {utij}, such that utij ∈  Dij 
means that aircraft i and j have collided.  
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The collision area Dij is a rectangular box, defined as [-dxij, dxij] × [-dyij, dyij] × [-dzij, dzij], 
with ( )
  2 /dd d jcicijc +=
∆
and where the parameters dxi, dyi and dzi represent the size of aircraft i 
respectively. The first incrossing – occurrence of process {utij} entering the area Dij – defines a 
collision. Following Bakker and Blom [50], the risk is expressed as the expected number icE  of 
incrossings, or collisions, between aircraft conducting a simultaneous missed approach on 
runways 19R and 22 in an appropriate time-interval:  
 
∫=
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where ϕij(t) is the incrossing rate between aircraft i and aircraft j, which is defined as  
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In the sequel time Tij is always parametrised such that there is a negligibly small probability that 
the aircraft pair (i,j) collides after final time Tij.  
 
Aircraft type combinations 
Twelve aircraft type combinations κij are considered, consisting of 3 aircraft i on runway 19R 
and 4 aircraft j on runway 22. That is κij = (κi, κj), with κi=1,2,3 and κj=1,2,3,4. The 19R 
aircraft i are heavy and medium weight aircraft, where Boeing 767/Boeing 747 is representative 
for heavy aircraft, and Boeing 737/Airbus A320 and Fokker 50 are representative for medium 
aircraft. The 22 aircraft j are medium and light aircraft, where Boeing 737/Airbus A320 and 
Fokker 50 are representative for medium aircraft, and Swearingen Metro II and Cessna 172 are 
representative for light aircraft. 
 
Conditional incrossing risk 
Expressing the number of incrossings in equation (3-1) as a sum of the risks related to the 
possible aircraft type combinations gives 
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where  ϕκij(t)  is the conditional incrossing rate between aircraft i and aircraft j, defined as  
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The following equation is derived in [42], using [50]:  
 
( )
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
           ,,
,|,,
|,,
3
1
4
1 ,,
0
|
3
1
4
1 0
|
,,
,
,
jiijji
zyxc
ij
c
jiijij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
cvu
ij
c
T
D
ij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
cvu
ij
c
zyxc
ic
PI
Pdtuddvvdupv
dvvdupvE
i j
ijij
tc
ij
t
i j
ij
ij
c c
ijij
tc
ij
t
κκκκκ
κκκκ
κ
κ κ
κ
κ κ τ
κ
=⋅=
=⋅




−+




−=
∑ ∑ ∑
∫
∑ ∑ ∫ ∫ ∫∑
= = =
∞−
= =
∞
=
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3-2) 
 
with 
( ) ( )
( ) dtuddvvdupv
dvvdupvI
ij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
cvu
ij
c
T
D
ij
c
ij
c
ij
c
ij
cvu
ij
c
ij
c
ijij
tc
ij
t
ij
ij
c c
ijij
tc
ij
t




−+




−=
∫
∫ ∫ ∫
∞−
∞∆
0
|
0
|
|,,
|,,
,
,
κ
κκ
κ
τ
κ
 
 
 
 
(3-3) 
 
where ( )⋅ijij
tc
ij
t vu
p
κ|
,
 is the conditional probability density function for the aircraft relative position 
and velocity, Dc is equal to collision area Dij but without the c-th component, and ucij is equal to 
the aircraft relative position utij without the c-th component, c = x,y,z. Also, for an aircraft i on 
runway 19R and an aircraft j on runway 22, stopping times τcij for c=x,y,z are defined as follows 
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The values for the probabilities ( ){ }jiijP κκκ ,=  are derived from statistical FANOMOS data 
giving the percentages of landing heavy/medium/light aircraft on Schiphol runways 19R and 22. 
Note that the TOPAZ evaluations of equation (3-4) will be executed for 16 key scenarios, each 
producing a value for the collision risk given a double missed approach. 
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3.4.6 Determination of collision risk metrics 
Below a description is given of the mathematical procedure to derive the collision probability 
per approach and per year. They are expressed on the basis of collision risk given a double 
missed approach, and other relevant missed approach procedure aspects. These are: 
 Missed approach rates for runways 19R and 22, denoted with r19R and r22 respectively; 
 Dependency factor ρdep , representing the extent to which missed approaches initiation on 
runways 19R and 22 are dependent, where 0 < ρ dep< 1 and ρdep=1 gives full dependency; 
 Probability metrics for the adherence to the published missed approach procedures: 
 Probability that the missed approach on 19R is straight ahead on runway track λ19R ; 
 Probability that the missed approach on 22 is straight ahead on runway track λ22 . 
 
In co-ordination with the Civil Aviation Authorities, 16 scenarios k ∈ {1,2,…,16} have been 
selected. The scenario dependent collision probability per approach, Risk (k), is given by  
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where the occurrence probability of a simultaneous missed approach is given by 
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The probability of a collision per approach is determined by 
 {
}S ; 2219S ; 2219
T ; 2219T ; 2219MA  doubleapproachper    collision 
)1(
)1()1)(1(
SRTR
SRTR
RiskRisk
RiskRiskPP
λλλλ
λλλλ
+−+
−+−−⋅=
 
 
where the subscript of Risk indicates the execution of a straight missed approach (S) or turning 
missed approach (T) on runways 19R and 22 respectively.  
 
To determine the collision probability per approach for a given DH and given missed approach 
level altitudes, therefore 4 scenarios need to be numerically evaluated with regard to the 
collision risk given a double missed approach, using equations (3-1) to (3-4). To quantify the 
current (DH=350 ft) and proposed situation (DH=200 ft), 8 scenarios are required. The next step 
is to determine the collision probability per year, using the runway statistics of runways 19R 
and 22. Combined use of runways 19R and 22 is only applied during peak time periods. Using 
statistics on the total number of approaches, divided into night, peak, and off peak time periods 
[44], the collision probability per year can be determined by (note that N is determined by the 
total number of approaches to runways 19R and 22 [41]). 
 
N
approach per collisionyear  per   collision PP ]1[1 −−=  
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3.5 Collision risk assessment 
 
3.5.1 Definition of key representative scenarios 
In close co-ordination with the CAA and LVNL, 16 key scenarios have been selected. These 
scenarios are determined by four main procedural aspects and are given in Table 3-3. 
 Decision Height at runway 22 200 ft, 250 ft, 300 ft, and 350 ft 
 Final Missed Approach Altitudes (FMAA) 2000 ft and/or 3000 ft 
 Missed Approach Turn on 22 YES (turn as soon as practicable) or NO 
 ATC induced MA Turn on 19R YES (turn as soon as practicable) or NO 
 
Table 3-3  Key representative scenarios 
Scenario MA Turn on 19R DH runway 22 FMAA 19R / 22 MA Turn on 22 
1 YES 350 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
2 YES 300 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
3 YES 250 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
4 YES 200 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
5 NO 350 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
6 NO 200 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
7 YES 350 ft 3000 ft / 3000 ft YES 
8 YES 200 ft 3000 ft / 3000 ft YES 
9 YES 200 ft 2000 ft / 3000 ft YES 
10 YES 200 ft 3000 ft / 2000 ft YES 
11 YES 350 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft NO 
12 YES 200 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft NO 
13 YES 350 ft 3000 ft / 3000 ft NO 
14 YES 200 ft 3000 ft / 3000 ft NO 
15 NO 350 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft NO 
16 NO 200 ft 2000 ft / 2000 ft NO 
 
In the current situation of the Schiphol converging runways 19R and 22, the DH of runway 22 is 
350 ft, whereas in the proposed situation the DH will be reduced to 200 ft. For both the current 
and proposed situation the following cases can be distinguished (see also Table 3-4): 
Straight MA’s  Aircraft approaching 19R and 22 make a straight missed approach; 
Nominal Case Aircraft approaching 22 make a turning missed approach and aircraft 
approaching 19R make a straight missed approach; 
ATC Corrected Case Aircraft approaching 22 make a straight missed approach, and ATC 
instructs missed approaching aircraft on 19R to initiate a turn; 
Turning MA’s Aircraft approaching 22 make a turning missed approach, and ATC 
instructs missed approaching aircraft on 19R to also initiate a turn. 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
66 
 
Table 3-4  Current and proposed scenarios, with final MA altitudes of 2000ft 
 Current  Proposed  
 DH on RWY 22 is 350ft DH on RWY 22 is 200ft 
Straight MA’s scenario 15 scenario 16 
Nominal Case  scenario   5 scenario   6 
ATC Corrected Case scenario 11 scenario 12 
Turning MA’s scenario   1 scenario   4  
 
In addition to these scenarios, eight more scenarios will be evaluated to also support other 
possible changes in the missed approach procedures for runways 22 and 19R. These are: 
 Decision Height on Runway 22 in between 350 ft and 200 ft (e.g. scenarios 2 and 3); 
 Final Missed Approach Altitude on Runway 22 and/or 19R raise from 2000 ft to 3000 ft 
(scenarios 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14). 
 
It was shown that the probability of a collision per approach can be expressed in terms of 
collision risk values given a double missed approach (determined for the 16 scenarios), and in 
terms of parameters which represent relevant missed approach procedure aspects (see Section 
3.4.6). The parameter values chosen are defined in Speijker [41] and given in Table 3-5 below.  
 
Table 3-5  Parameter values for the missed approach procedure aspects8 
MA procedure aspect Symbol Interval Reference 
value 
Worst 
value 
Best 
value 
Pr{MA on 19R is straight} λ19R [0,1] 0.2 0.9 0.1 
Pr{MA on 22 is straight} λ22 [0,1] 0.15 0.5 0.05 
Missed approach rate 19R r19R [1/1000,1/100] 0.002 0.01 0.001 
Missed approach rate 22 r22 [1/200,1/50] 0.01 0.02 0.005 
MA correlation factor ρdep [0,1] 0.05 0.1 0.005 
 
The collision probability per approach and per year will be determined for the reference value, 
worst value and best value case, where it is assumed that these values are equal for the current 
(DH = 350 ft) and proposed situation (DH = 200 ft). Subsequently a sensitivity analysis is 
performed for the missed approach procedure parameters, where each of the parameter values is 
varied between the best and worst values as given in Table 3-5. 
 
                                                    
8
 The first two rows indicate occurrence probabilities per missed approach. The third and fourth row both indicate occurrence 
probabilities per approach. The fifth row assumes that a simultaneous missed approach on runways 19R and 22 is initiated. 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
67 
 
3.5.2 Collision risk given a double missed approach 
The collision risk given a double missed approach is determined for all 16 key representative 
scenarios, through 16 fold execution of the 3 step-procedure: 
1. Determination of conditional incrossing risk for each of the 12 aircraft type combinations; 
2. Determination of incrossing risk for each of the 12 aircraft type combinations;  
3. Determination of collision risk given a double missed approach. 
 
Step 1: Determination of conditional incrossing risk 
Equation (3-4) is numerically evaluated using the TOPAZ-SMA toolset [42]. This leads to an 
assessment of the risk that a missed approaching aircraft on runway 19R collides with aircraft 
conducting a missed approach on runway 22. For the nominal case scenarios 5 (with DH = 350 
ft) and 6 (with DH = 200 ft) the numerical results for each of the possible aircraft combinations 
are given in Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 (these tables provide estimates for the conditional 
incrossing risk (calculated using equation (3-1)). Similar tables have been determined for the 
other scenarios. 
 
Table 3-6  Conditional incrossing risk values for scenario 5 
Scenario 5     Missed Approach Straight on 19R; Missed Approach Turn on 22; 
                       Final Missed Approach Altitudes are 2000 ft; DH runway 22 is 350 ft 
Conditional  
Incrossing risk 
Heavy 767/747  
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 
on RWY 19R 
Medium F50 
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 on 22 9.3×10-8 2.0×10-8 1.6×10-8 
Medium F50 on 22 7.0×10-8 1.5×10-8 1.1×10-8 
Light SW II on 22 2.5×10-6 9.3×10-7 6.9×10-7 
Light C172 on 22 1.7×10-6 5.7×10-7 4.0×10-7 
 
Table 3-7  Conditional incrossing risk values for scenario 6 
Scenario 6     Missed Approach Straight on 19R; Missed Approach Turn on 22; 
                       Final Missed Approach Altitudes are 2000 ft; DH runway 22 is 200 ft 
Conditional 
Incrossing risk 
Heavy 767/747 
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 
on RWY 19R 
Medium F50 
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 on 22 1.4×10-7 3.2×10-8 2.5×10-8 
Medium F50 on 22 1.1×10-7 2.2×10-8 1.8×10-8 
Light SW II on 22 3.2×10-6 1.1×10-6 8.4×10-7 
Light C172 on 22 2.3×10-6 7.8×10-7 5.1×10-7 
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The above tables show that the collision risk varies considerably for different types of aircraft 
combinations approaching the runways 19R and 22. It appears that the collision risk increases in 
case of light aircraft conducting a missed approach on runway 22. This is caused by the fact that 
light aircraft climb quicker than heavy aircraft. In relation with the specific configuration of the 
two runways 19R and 22, this implies that the 'vertical overlap probability' is much higher for 
the case with light aircraft (e.g. SW II or C172) conducting a missed approach on runway 22. 
 
Step 2: Determination of incrossing risk 
The values for the probabilities ( ){ }jiijP κκκ ,= , representing the probabilities that each of 
the possible twelve aircraft type combinations occur, are derived from the statistical data for the 
percentages of landing heavy/medium/light aircraft on runways 19R and 22 as obtained from 
FANOMOS. The results are presented in Table 3-8. 
 
Table 3-8  Probability distribution of the twelve aircraft type combinations 
Aircraft type combination 
probabilities 
Heavy 767/747 
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 
on RWY 19R 
Medium F50 
on RWY 19R 
Medium 737/320 on 22 0.0935 0.166 0.166 
Medium F50 on 22     0.0935 0.166 0.166 
Light SW II on 22     0.0165 0.029 0.029 
Light C172 on 22     0.0165 0.029 0.029 
 
The incrossing risk values for each of the twelve possible aircraft type combinations can now be 
determined by taking the entry-wise product of Table 3-8 with the conditional incrossing risk 
values (e.g. Tables 3-6 and 3-7 for the nominal cases). The numerical incrossing risk value 
tables for all 16 key scenarios are given in Blom et al. [42].  
 
Step 3: Determination of collision risk given a double missed approach 
The collision risk given a double missed approach can now be determined by using equation (3-
4). Below the numerical results are presented according to the following procedural aspects: 
 Variations in Decision Height (DH) on runway 22; 
 Variations in turning versus straight missed approaches on 19R and 22; 
 Variations in missed approach altitudes. 
 
Variations in Decision Height on runway 22  
Table 3-9 and Figure 3-4 show the probability of a collision given a double missed approach for 
the scenarios with turning missed approaches on both runways as function of Decision Height 
(DH values are 200, 250, 300 and 350ft) with FMA altitude equal to 2000ft (i.e. scenarios 1-4). 
The results shows that the risk decreases only slightly for an increasing value of the DH.
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Table 3-9  Impact of Decision Height of Runway 22 on conditional collision risk 
Scenario  DH on Runway 22  Collision risk  
1 350 ft 9.0×10-9 
2 300 ft 9.3×10-9 
3 250 ft 1.0×10-8 
4 200 ft 1.1×10-8 
 
200 250 300 350
0.5
1
1.5
x 10-8  risk per double MA , both turning, level 2000ft
DH22 (ft)
 
Figure 3-4  Impact of DH runway 22 on conditional collision risk 
 
Variation in turning versus straight missed approaches on 19R and 22  
 
For the four cases in Table 3-4 the collision risk given a double missed approach with final MA 
altitudes of 2000 ft are given in Table 3-10. As expected, the risk is highest with straight missed 
approaches on 19R and 22, and lowest with turning missed approaches on 19R and 22. The 
latter can be seen in Table 3-11 with final MA altitudes of 3000ft. 
 
Table 3-10  Conditional collision risk with final MA altitudes of 2000ft 
 Current  Proposed  
 DH on RWY 22 is 350ft DH RWY 22 is 200ft 
Straight MA’s 3.6×10-3 3.6×10-3 
Nominal Case  1.7×10-7 2.3×10-7 
ATC Corrected Case 1.2×10-7 1.2×10-7 
Turning MA’s 9.0×10-9 1.1×10-8 
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Table 3-11  Conditional collision risk with final MA altitudes of 3000ft 
 Current  
DH on RWY 22 is 350ft 
Proposed  
DH on RWY 22 is 200ft 
Straight MA’s - - 
Nominal Case  
- - 
ATC Corrected Case 1.2×10-7 1.2×10-7 
Turning MA’s 9.0×10-8 1.1×10-8 
 
The above two tables show that – for each of the 4 cases - the impact of the proposed reduction 
of the DH from 350 ft to 200 ft on the conditional collision risk given a double missed approach 
is relative low. The numerical results also show the following: 
 The collision risk attains an unacceptably high level when the approaching aircraft both 
make a straight missed approach, and ATC does not intervene (straight MAs); 
 The impact of ATC instructions – “turn right!” – to aircraft missed approaching runway 
19R in case of a preceding9 straight missed approach on runway 22 is considerable, and 
can be seen as a very efficient collision risk reducing measure (ATC corrected case); 
 The impact of ATC instructions – “turn right!” – to aircraft missed approaching runway 
19R in case of a preceding turning missed approach on runway 22 is noticeable, and can 
be seen as a measure to further reduce the collision risk, if necessary (Turning MA’s); 
 The impact of raising both final missed approach altitudes from 2000 ft to 3000 ft is – with 
the exception of the Turning MA’s low, and may be seen as a risk neutral change. 
 
Variation in final missed approach altitude 
 
Table 3-12 below shows the conditional collision risk given a double missed approach for the 
turning MA scenarios with proposed DH of 200 ft, and with varying final MA altitudes. 
 
Table 3-12  Conditional collision risk with DH 22 is 200 ft, and varying final MA altitudes 
 
Scenario 
 
MAA 19R / 22 
Collision risk with 
Turning MA on 19R and 22 
4 2000 ft / 2000 ft 1.1×10-8 
8 3000 ft / 3000 ft 1.1×10-8 
9 2000 ft / 3000 ft 3.0×10-10 
10 3000 ft / 2000 ft 8.8×10-11 
                                                    
9
 A preceding missed approach on runway 22 implies that the missed approach on 19R is initiated shortly after initiation of a 
missed approach on runway 22 (simultaneously and before the aircraft on runway 22 reaches it final missed approach altitude). 
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It turns out that the impact of increasing one of the final missed approach altitudes from 2000 ft 
to 3000 ft lowers the collision risk significantly, and may therefore be implemented safely. The 
collision risk is comparable in case the missed approach level altitudes of 19R and 22 are equal. 
 
3.5.3 Collision risk per approach and per year 
The collision risk per approach and per year are calculated for the current DH (350 ft) and the 
proposed DH (200 ft), with final missed approach altitudes of 2000 ft, through execution of the 
procedure described in section 3.4.6. Three values are provided – based on sensitivity analysis – 
showing the uncertainty about the calculated reference risk value. 
 
Table 3-13  Collision risk per approach 
 Current DH22 = 350ft Proposed DH22 = 200ft 
Reference Value 1.3×10-8 1.3×10-8 
Worst Value 6.4×10-8                 6.3×10-8 
Best Value 3.2×10-9                 3.2×10-9 
 
Table 3-14  Collision risk per year 
 Current DH22 = 350ft Proposed DH22 = 200ft 
Reference value 1.3×10-4 1.3×10-4 
Worst value 6.4×10-4 6.3×10-4 
Best value 3.2×10-5 3.2×10-5 
 
Subsequently a sensitivity analysis is performed for the missed approach parameters, where 
each of the parameter values is varied between best and worst values as given in Table 3-5, 
while keeping the other parameters in accordance with the reference values. 
 
The above tables and the sensitivity analysis show that the collision risk per approach and per 
year are comparable for the current DH (350 ft) and proposed DH (200 ft). This is due to the 
fact that the distance between the points of closest approach during a double missed approach is 
more or less the same for the current and the proposed procedure. This implies that a reduction 
of the OCA to values below 200 ft is risk neutral within a broad spectrum of changes.  
 
3.5.4 Impact of the assumptions 
Some model assumptions have been adopted. To assess the impact of all assumptions on the 
calculated collision risk, a qualitative analysis of the expected direction and magnitude of the 
impact of the assumptions has been undertaken. The overall conclusion of the analysis is that 
most assumptions have a negligible effect on the calculated risk. Assumptions that do have a 
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noticeable impact (i.e. major or significant) are pessimistic, i.e. due to the model assumptions in 
reality the collision risk is smaller than that calculated. Noteworthy pessimistic assumptions are 
that Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is switched off and that pilots do not use see-
and-avoid. The first has a major impact, whereas the second has a significant impact under good 
visibility conditions and a negligible impact in actual CAT-I weather conditions. 
 
Besides the model assumptions, a number of parameters have been used to represent relevant 
missed approach procedure aspects. Most important parameters are:  
 Missed approach rates for runways 19R and 22, denoted with r19R and r22 respectively; 
 Probability metrics for the adherence to the published missed approach procedures: 
 Probability that the missed approach on 19R is straight ahead on runway track α19R ; 
 Probability that the missed approach on 22 is straight ahead on runway track α22 . 
From the calculated worst, reference, and best value for the collision risk – as given in section 
3.5.3, Tables 3-13 and 3-14 – it is concluded that these parameters have a significant impact. 
 
The conclusion can be drawn that the magnitude of the collision probability per approach is 
less than the reference value calculated, provided that the following conditions are satisfied: 
 The missed approach rate for runways 19R is less than 0.2 %; 
 The missed approach rate for runway 22 is less than 1.0 %; 
 The probability that the missed approach on runway 19R is straight ahead is less than 0.2; 
 The probability that the missed approach on runway 22 is straight ahead is less than 0.15. 
 
Note that – following Westerveld [46] – it is assumed that the ILS of runway 22 functions well 
below 350 ft. The risk of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is therefore not considered. 
 
3.6 Safety and operational feedback 
 
3.6.1 Safety criticality assessment 
To judge the acceptability of the collision risk, it was decided to execute a two-fold comparison 
of the reference value for the collision probability per approach: 
 A relative comparison of the current and proposed situation for runway 22; 
 An absolute comparison with the EUROCONTROL proposed TLS for accidents with an 
ATM contribution, i.e. 3.5×10-8 accidents per movement 
 
It was shown that a reduction of the DH of runway 22 from 350 ft to 200 ft is risk neutral, and 
that moreover the absolute value of risk is less than the EUROCONTROL proposed TLS. The 
conclusion can be drawn that – provided that certain conditions are satisfied – the independent 
use of runway combination 19R / 22 in actual CAT-I weather conditions is adequately safe. 
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This conclusion is also valid for the possible future situation, where the final missed approach 
altitude is raised from 2000 to 3000 ft and/or the wind criteria for the use of runway 
combination 19R / 22 is changed toward 20/7 knots. The latter is expected to have a negligible 
impact on the collision risk between aircraft approaching the runway combination 19R and 22. 
 
3.6.2 Key safety bottlenecks and criticalities 
It is clear that – provided that certain conditions are satisfied – the proposed reduction of the 
OCA of runway 22 to 200 ft may be judged adequately safe. From a safety perspective, of 
importance is to also locate the factors that contribute most to the collision risk. This might 
allow for further safety improvements if appreciated. The key safety bottlenecks are those that 
might lead to either a missed approach executed straight ahead on track of runway 22 or might 
lead to aircraft not conducting an ATC induced turn on runway 19R: 
1. Reasons for aircraft conducting a straight missed approach on runway 22; 
2. Reasons for aircraft not conducting an ATC induced missed approach turn on runway 19R; 
3. Reasons for aircraft not conducting an ATC induced missed approach climb. 
Investigation of the related causal factors could provide additional insight into the criticalities. 
 
3.6.3 Measures to improve and monitor safety 
Although the proposed reduction of the OCA from 350 ft to values less than 200 ft is risk 
neutral, the following recommendations are provided to further improve the level of safety:  
 
Design the new AIP approach plates in such a way that current possible confusion of pilots on 
the position of the Missed Approach Point, required turn, and visibility criteria is alleviated:  
 Turning missed approach: 
For a missed approach following a precision approach, turns may be prescribed at a 
designated Turning Point (TP) or altitude/height or ‘as soon as practicable’ [32]. For non-
precision approaches a MAPt must be specified, and turns must commence at a designated 
TP (i.e. the MAPt) or at a specific altitude/height. The present approach plate identifies a 
turning point for the LOCalizer (LOC) Glide Slope unserviceable (GS u/s) approach. No 
specific guidelines are given for turn initiation for the ILS approach, it may be assumed 
that the turn should be initiated ‘as soon as practicable’. Noteworthy is that the LOC GS u/s 
MAPt lies before the point where the Decision Altitude (DA) is crossed on a full ILS 
approach. It is recommended that: 
 The words ‘as soon as practicable’ are added for the MA following an ILS approach; 
 To avoid possible confusion, the MAPt for the LOC GS u/s approach should lie 
behind the point where the ILS GS intersects the DA. With a DH of 195 ft, this means 
that the MAPt for the LOC u/s should lie not earlier than 0.6 NM before the runway 
threshold. 
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 Required visibility: 
Presently, the required visibility for the ILS procedure is higher than for the LOC GS u/s 
approach. This might lead to confusion for pilots in marginal visibility conditions. It is 
recommended to either decrease the required visibility for the ILS approach or, just to 
avoid this confusion, increase the required visibility for the published non-precision 
approach. 
 
Monitor the FMS missed approach coding by different database manufacturers 
Missed approach segments are routinely coded in the Flight Management System (FMS) to aid 
lateral navigation in a missed approach segment. The coding of the missed approach may pose 
some problems for database manufacturers because ‘as soon as practicable’ is not easily 
translated into a FMS waypoint. Because of the potential criticality of the initiation point of the 
missed approach from runway 22, the CAA is encouraged to specifically monitor the FMS 
implementation of the published missed approach procedure by the different database 
manufacturers. 
 
Monitor the reasons and circumstances related to missed approaches 
The reasons and circumstances that may lead to aircraft initiating a missed approach as well as 
the missed approach rate are aspects that are relatively uncertain. It is therefore recommended 
that ongoing safety monitoring activities – such as the ATCOD data base of Air Traffic Control 
the Netherlands (the LVNL) – are continued, possibly to be extended with the following:  
 Information about position of missed approach initiation (altitude / distance to threshold); 
 Information about the position of initiation of a turn (time after initiation of missed 
approach or altitude or distance from / passed threshold) 
 Information about the reason for initiation of a missed approach. 
 
Furthermore, the LVNL may explicitly request aircraft executing a missed approach from 
runway 22 to submit a company report, which can then be analyzed. 
 
3.7 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
3.7.1 Conclusions 
A probabilistic safety assessment of the collision risk related to simultaneous missed approaches 
on Schiphol converging runways 19R and 22 has been carried out, focusing on the proposed 
reduction of the OCA of runway 22 from 350 ft to values less than 200 ft. This reduction will 
allow a DH of 200 ft, enabling the use of runway 22 in actual CAT-I weather conditions. 
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Two suitable risk metrics – collision probability per movement and per year – have been 
identified. On basis of a review of safety requirements, some guidelines on how to judge the 
acceptability of collision risk results have been given. An existing risk model has been extended 
to enable determination of the collision risk between aircraft simultaneously conducting a 
missed approach on runways 19R and 22. This model is developed through an integral usage of 
3 NLR tools: ISTaR, TOPAZ, and FANOMOS. Application to 16 scenarios showed that: 
 The collision risk may attain an unacceptably high level under certain conditions, e.g. 
when aircraft on 19R and 22 both make a straight missed approach, and ATC does not 
intervene; 
 ATC monitoring and instructing – “turn right!” or “climb to!” – to aircraft conducting a 
missed approach on runway 19R in case of a preceding straight missed approach on 
runway 22 is required. It is explicitly stated that such ATC instructions are not necessary 
in case of a preceding turning missed approach on runway 22. 
 
Provided that the identified risk reducing measures are applied, the proposed reduction of the 
OCA of runway 22 to 200 ft is risk neutral within a broad spectrum of missed approach 
procedural aspects, and may be judged adequately safe. This conclusion is also valid for the 
situation where the final missed approach altitude is raised from 2000 to 3000 ft. 
 
3.7.2 Recommendations 
Although the proposed reduction of the OCA from 350 ft to 200 ft is risk neutral, the following 
recommendations are provided to further improve the level of safety:  
1. Design the new AIP approach plates in such a way that current possible confusion of pilots 
on the position of the MAPt, required turn, and visibility criteria is alleviated; 
2. Monitor the FMS missed approach coding by different database manufacturers; 
3. Monitor the reasons and circumstances in relation to missed approaches on 22, e.g. through 
yearly inspection of the ATCOD incident database of the LVNL. 
 
It is also recommended that Dutch interest groups discuss internally and agree upon a risk 
criteria framework to regulate and control collision risk around Dutch airports.  
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4 Probabilistic safety assessment of wake vortex separation 
distances for single runway arrivals 
4.1 Introduction 
During the last four decades overall system safety (e.g. accident risk per flight hour) of the 
United States National Airspace Systems (NAS) and the European Air Transport System has 
improved despite the growth in number of operations conducted [59, 63]. This has been 
achieved primarily through the introduction of improved technology in the cockpit and in Air 
Traffic Control which has improved safety at a rate in excess of the rate of growth in operations 
[74]. Researchers have concluded that as the air transportation system reaches its capacity 
limits, the introduction of new technology to improve overall network system safety yields 
diminishing returns. Instead the next lever to improve safety is through improving airspace 
“flow” safety in the presence of increased volume and complexity. 
 
The evaluation of the safety of the airspace flow involves the evaluation of the accident risk in a 
system that exhibits stochastic behavior. For example, analysis of safe wake vortex separation 
distances for the procedures proposed by NASA and the FAA [66] require the analysis of the 
effect of wake vortex, generated by lead aircraft, and encountered by trailing aircraft for a given 
arrival (departure) procedure. The analysis requires inclusion of stochastic models of wake 
vortex evolution, wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot response. The analysis must be 
conducted for a heterogeneous mix of aircraft under different weather conditions flying flight 
paths with statistical variations [68]. Traditional quantitative safety methods, designed for 
evaluation of technologies/products, such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), are not easily applied due the dynamic stochastic nature of the 
system behavior, and the absence of historic data for rare-events [57, 70]. Qualitative safety 
methods, such as Hazard Analysis, provide a first estimate of risk prediction, but are inherently 
based on the assessments of experts. As a consequence, evaluation of wake vortex separation 
distances have historically been conducted using three approaches: (1) experimental flight test 
data, (2) historic operational data, and (3) analytical models [11]. 
 
NLR has developed a quantitative method for wake vortex safety analysis (WAVIR), which is 
based on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). Analysis and simulation of the airspace flow 
safety is conducted through Monte Carlo simulations of rare-events that are precursors to 
accidents. WAVIR has been used by NLR to evaluate wake vortex separation standards for the 
European S-Wake research program [10, 62]. WAVIR is also being used in the European 
projects for ground based wake vortex prediction and detection (ATC-Wake) (Section 5) and 
cockpit instrumentation for wake vortex detection and avoidance (I-Wake) (Section 6).  
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Figure 4-1  Wake vortices generated by a Boeing 747 aircraft 
 
This study describes the WAVIR tool for evaluation of wake vortex separation distances 
between fleets of heterogeneous aircraft approaching a single runway under different 
operational, weather, and wind conditions. Section 4.2 provides an overview of wake vortex 
separation procedures during approach and landing. Section 4.3 provides a historic account of 
how separation distances have been determined in the U.S. Section 4.4 presents the newly 
proposed wake vortex risk requirements and illustration of the method to derive safe and 
appropriate separation minima. Section 4.5 describes the WAVIR tool. Section 4.6 provides the 
main results from the probabilistic safety assessment as carried out in the S-Wake project. A 
comparison of the main results with incident/accident data obtained at Heathrow airport is 
included in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 provides the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
4.2 Wake vortex separation standards 
Wake vortices are a natural by-product of lift generated by aircraft and can be considered (or 
viewed) as two horizontal tornados trailing after the aircraft. A trailing aircraft exposed to the 
wake vortex turbulence of a lead aircraft can experience an induced roll moment that is not 
easily corrected by the pilot or the Autopilot. ATC separation standards, designed for the worst-
case scenario, have been introduced to ensure operation without a wake vortex hazard.  During 
application of these static separation standards during Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations, 
no fatal accidents have been reported in the U.S. [65]. Wake vortex separation standards have a 
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significant impact on airport departure and arrival capacity especially at the busiest hub airports 
[67]. For this reason the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), as well as several European agencies have been developing 
technologies and procedures for increased arrival and departure flows at airports through 
reduced separation standards without an impact on safety [66].  
 
 
Figure 4-2  Wake vortices generated by a Boeing 727 aircraft 
 
Reduced separation standards are largely made feasible by increased understanding of the 
impact of ambient weather conditions on wake vortex transport and decay. Modern models of 
wake vortex behavior show that with calm winds and no atmospheric turbulence, wake vortices 
last significantly longer than vortices in high atmospheric turbulence conditions [71]. Currently 
three concepts of operation are under consideration by NASA and the FAA [66, 67] to improve 
runway flow capacity by reducing separation distances under certain conditions. The near-term 
procedure involves modification of the rules associated with closely spaced parallel runways 
[55] to enable dependent parallel runway arrival operations with parallel runways separated by 
less than current standard (2500 ft) under weather conditions that favor reduced wake vortex 
separation. Mid-term procedures involve modification of separation distances for departures 
under weather conditions that favor reduced wake vortex separation. Long-term procedures and 
systems to execute dynamic separation distances are based on measurements of existing weather 
conditions [60, 69, 71, 97]. 
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4.3 Determining wake vortex separation 
 
4.3.1 History of wake vortex separation minima in the United States 
Prior to the introduction of large wide-body jets, wake vortex upsets or turbulence encounters 
by a trailing aircraft were considered to be “prop-wash” or “jet wash” and not considered a 
flight hazard. The introduction of large wide-body turbojet aircraft with increased weight and 
wingspan in the late 1960’s changed this perception and initiated the detailed analysis of wake 
vortices and their impact on trailing aircraft. In mid 1969 a series of flight test experiments were 
conducted by Boeing and the FAA to generate detailed information on the wake vortex 
phenomenon [65]. By using smoke towers and probing aircraft (Boeing 737-100, Sabre F-86, 
NASA CV-990) the wake vortices of a Boeing 747 and a Boeing 707-320C were characterized. 
This data provided the basis for wake vortex separation rules adopted by the FAA: 
 VFR rules – following aircraft remain above of the flight path of the leading aircraft, and 
 IFR rules – minimum radar-controlled wake vortex separation distances were established 
for the following aircraft based on the weight of the lead and follow aircraft. 
 
Although under IFR rules aircraft were categorized by weight, the data from these studies 
identified that a more technically correct way to establish categories of aircraft is by wingspan 
of the trailing aircraft [73, p. 8]. This was considered impractical to implement and was dropped 
in favor of categorization by weight. With a few exceptions, weight exhibits relatively good 
correlation with wingspan. Several adjustments to the wake vortex separation distances have 
been made during the 1980’s and 1990’s. It should be noted that separation distances have 
usually been increased with as main exception a reduction from 3 NM to 2.5 NM spacing for 
similar sized aircraft and short runway occupancy times. 
 
4.3.2 Current practice regulations for single runway arrivals 
In current ATC operations, there is no exchange of information concerning wake vortices 
between aircrew and ATC. Control practices are based on ICAO recommendations and national 
regulation. ICAO separation minima between aircraft are based on Maximum Take-Off Weight 
(MTOW) of the involved aircraft, distinguishing categories Light, Medium, and Heavy. 
National regulation exists in USA and United Kingdom (UK). Different provisions governing 
wake turbulence separation minima are published by ICAO, and depend on the wake turbulence 
category of the leading aircraft and the equipment available to them to provide separation [32, 
79, 103]. ICAO makes a clear distinction between normal IFR separation minima and wake 
turbulence induced separation minima. According to the ICAO Air Traffic Services Planning 
Manual [103], wake vortex separation minima are to reduce the wake vortex hazard. Figure 4-3 
provides the ICAO wake vortex separation minima for single runway arrivals. 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
80 
 
 
Figure 4-3  ICAO Separation Minima for Single Runway Arrivals 
 
These separation minima should be applied to aircraft in the approach and departure phases of 
flight in the circumstances when an aircraft is operating directly behind another aircraft at the 
same altitude or less than 300 m below; or both aircraft are using the same runway or parallel 
runways separated by less than 760 m. Wake turbulence separation is not provided to Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR) arrivals, nor to IFR on visual approach. In these cases it is up to the pilot to 
provide adequate spacing from preceding arriving or departing aircraft. 
 
4.3.3 Classical Methodologies for Determining Separation Distances  
Three methodologies have been used to define safe separation standards [65]:  
 Experimental Flight Test 
 Historic Operational VFR data analysis 
 Analytical modelling. 
 
Experimental Flight Test 
The original separation distances for IFR were established based on the “worst case” wake 
vortex turbulence measurements from the flight test described above, at high altitude with low 
ambient turbulence [65]. Due to the expectation that the increased ambient turbulence would 
disrupt the wake vortices, the actual distances were slightly reduced versions of these “worst 
case” distances. 
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Historic Operational (VFR) Data Analysis 
The approach uses the fact that safe operations were consistently conducted between 1976 and 
1994 by aircraft pairs operating under “see-and-avoid” VFR separation rules at separation 
distances below the IFR separation distance regulations. This data was used as the basis for the 
reduction of the separation distance between aircraft lighter than the B757 to 2.5 NM. 
 
Analytical Modeling 
An alternative procedure for determining safe separation distances was developed during the 
1980’s using a probabilistic approach for a pair of aircraft used as a normalizing condition [65]. 
First, a wake vortex hazard model was used to assess the threshold strength of a vortex that is 
hazardous for a trailing aircraft.  Second, vortex decay measurements were processed to give an 
empirical model for vortex decay expressed as a probability of the vortex strength remaining 
above a given value as a function of wake vortex age. Finally, data from these two models were 
combined to determine the probability of a hazardous encounter for a given separation time.  
If the separation distance for the most commonly occurring aircraft pairs can be considered to 
be “safe” (based on historic data from 1976 to 1994), then safe separation distances of other 
aircraft pairs can be computed using these models. This method is distinct from the other two, 
because it accepts that a zero encounter probability is unrealistic and therefore resorts to 
establish a probabilistic level of safety. As the aviation system reaches the capacity limits 
induced by current separation standards, the importance of understanding the impact on safety 
risk of different separation standards and procedures must be addressed. There are several 
fundamental questions that must be resolved: 
1. What is the safety level of the current standards? 
2. Are the standards overly conservative? 
3. Can the standards safely be reduced? 
 
These questions cannot be answered with previous models and require more comprehensive 
models and analysis than can be provided by the approaches listed above.  
 
4.4 Newly proposed wake vortex risk based policy making 
 
4.4.1 Wake vortex risk requirements 
WAVIR is developed as a safety management tool for regulating and controlling wake vortex 
induced risk on the basis of incident/accident risk probability assessment followed by a 
comparison with risk criteria. This requires the development of a probabilistic relation between 
the occurrence of wake vortex encounters and the severity of accidents and incidents. For incident 
and accident investigation purposes, ICAO consequence definitions are: accident, serious 
incident, non-serious incident, and non-determined incidents. For safety assessment purposes, 
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the JAA has defined severity classes for adverse conditions: catastrophic, hazardous, major, and 
minor. These two classification schemes have been combined into a classification of wake vortex 
induced consequences as follows: 
1. Catastrophic accident: aircraft encountering a wake hits the ground, resulting in loss of life; 
2. Hazardous accident: the wake vortex encounter results in one or more on-board fatalities or 
serious injuries (but no crash into the ground); 
3. Major incident: the wake vortex encounter results in one or more non-serious injuries, but no 
fatality, on-board the encountering aircraft; 
4. Minor incident: encounter results in inconvenience to occupants or increase in crew workload. 
 
A method to derive safe and appropriate separation minima for different operational and 
weather/wind conditions is now introduced. This method is based on: 
 Risk metrics in terms of incident / accident probabilities per movement; 
 Risk requirements derived on the basis of historical incident data from Heathrow airport. 
 
Risk requirements based on the Target Level of Safety (TLS) approach are proposed. It should 
be noted that the use of the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) approach was also 
considered. However, the usage of ALARP is not recommended for considering the issue of 
wake vortices because it is a small proportion of the overall landing risk. The approach followed 
in reference 4 is largely based on historical data, resulting in the proposed TLS values for the 
risk event probabilities per queued movement given in Table 4-1. Note that the TLS value for 
catastrophic accidents is based on the assumption that 2% of the landing risk is due to wake 
vortices and that about 50% of landing movements are queued.  
 
The usage of the concept of queued landings is proposed. This concept is defined as a pair of 
aircraft with the following aircraft separated from the leading aircraft by a distance less than the 
appropriate wake vortex minima for the pairing plus 3 NM. This definition can be used for 
airports with single runway operations (e.g. London Gatwick), independent parallel operations 
(e.g. London Heathrow), and closely spaced dependent parallel runways (e.g. Frankfurt airport). 
 
Table 4-1  Risk requirements (per queued aircraft movement) 
             Risk event Proposed Target Levels of Safety 
             Catastrophic Accident 0.9 × 10-8 
             Hazardous Accident 3.0 × 10-7 
             Major Incident 1.0 × 10-5 
             Minor Incident 5.0 × 10-4 
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The method proposes that all four risk requirements are to be satisfied, i.e. the most stringent 
requirement will determine the required separation minima. This approach supports two 
commonly accepted rationales for acceptance of a newly proposed wake alleviation system (or 
procedure) by involved interest groups (i.e. pilots, controllers, regulators), namely by showing 
that the number of wake vortex induced risk events: 
 does not exceed some pre-defined, and agreed upon, risk requirement; 
 does not increase with the introduction of a new ATM procedure. 
 
4.4.2 Illustration of method to derive safe separation minima 
Figure 4-4 illustrates the proposed risk based policy making procedure to derive safe and 
appropriate separation distances for different operational and weather conditions. It is proposed 
that the most stringent of the four requirements determines the required separation minima [10]. 
Note that the derived separation minima (as determined with WAVIR) currently refer to the 
minimum separation distance along the entire arrival path. Airports might relate the required 
separation minima to specific points (e.g. the threshold or the Outer Marker). 
 
Figure 4-4  Risk management procedure to derive safe and appropriate separation minima 
 
4.5 WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) tool 
The WAVIR tool was developed by NLR [3, 4, 10, 72] specifically to improve the ability to 
address the issues outlined at the end of the section above. In view of the probabilistic nature of 
aircraft arrival and departure flows, the wake vortex phenomena, and pilot’s response to wake 
vortex encounters, WAVIR uses a probabilistic approach. This approach enables an assessment 
of the safety level related to different separation distances and under various operational, 
procedural, weather and wind conditions. The modules are incorporated in the WAVIR toolset 
as in the screenshot shown in Figure 4-5 [10] (see Appendix A for the mathematical details).  
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
84 
 
The WAVIR toolset is composed of the following 4 modules: 
 Flight Path Generation; 
 Wake Vortex Evolution; 
 Wake Vortex Encounter; 
 Separation Distance Prediction. 
 
Flight Path Generation (FLIGHT_PATH):  
This module generates the lateral and vertical flight path trajectories, and airspeed, for the lead 
and trailing aircraft on arrival and approach. The flight path trajectories are computed using 
samples from probability distributions. The computation also takes into account profiles and 
speeds associated with the published arrival procedures, ATC speed control, aircraft dependent 
Final Approach Speeds. This module also computes actual separation distance and time as 
function of the longitudinal position. It generates input data that is used by the Wake Vortex 
Evolution and the Wake Vortex Encounter models  
 
Wake Vortex Evolution (VORTICES):  
This module performs Monte Carlo simulations of the evolution of a wake vortex pair generated 
by the lead aircraft. The wake vortex is computed in a 2D crossplane or ‘gate’ (perpendicular to 
the flight track) at several locations along the flight path. The computation takes into account 
probability distributions of the lead aircraft position and speed (from FLIGHT_PATH 
Generation) as well as probability distributions of wind and weather conditions. Using the 
actual separation information (from FLIGHT_PATH), the wake vortex data is analysed at the 
time the trailing aircraft sequences the gates (i.e. the same longitudinal position). 
 
Wake Vortex ENCOUNTER: 
This module combines the wake vortex data (from VORTICES) and probability distributions of 
the trailing aircraft position and speed (from FLIGHT_PATH). Monte Carlo simulations are 
performed with the Wake Vortex Encounter model. Computed metrics for encounter severity 
are roll control ratio, maximum bank angle, and loss of height. The encounter classification is 
currently based on maximum bank angle and encounter altitude. 
 
Separation Distance Prediction (RISK):  
This module computes separation minima on basis of maximum acceptable level of risk. The 
WAVIR tool currently identifies potential wake vortex risk events as follows:  
 Minor Incident;  
 Major Incident; 
 Hazardous Accident;  
 Catastrophic Accident.  
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Wake Vortex encounters that result in a loss of height larger than the initial altitude of encounter 
are considered to be Catastrophic Accidents. All other encounters are classified in one of the 
other three potential risk events. 
 
W E A T H E R
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Figure 4-5  Screenshot of WAVIR tool (SPINEware [75] provides middleware) 
 
How to Use WAVIR 
WAVIR has been used in the European S-Wake project to assess the safety level of current 
practice single runway flight operations. A safety assessment is carried out in nine steps: 
1. Define the “Gates” on the Flight Path: To represent the wake induced risk along the 
aircraft flight path, a set of relevant longitudinal positions along the proposed aircraft flight 
path x is determined, where the instantaneous risk will be evaluated. In each of these 
‘gates’, the wake evolution and wake encounter simulations will be performed. 
2. Initialize Flight Path Evolution Generator: Samples of aircraft (lateral and vertical) 
position and speed in the selected gates (see Figure 4-6) are obtained with the flight path 
evolution model. Speed profiles representing the aircraft movements are also needed as 
input for this model (Figure 4-7 represents the aircraft speed profiles at Heathrow airport). 
3. Initialize the Wake Vortex Generator: The input parameters for the probabilistic wake 
vortex evolution model are specified. These consist of deterministic stochastic parameters. 
The stochastic parameter distributions are based on empirical data and/or state-of-the-art 
literature. Crosswind and headwind needs to be specified, as well as the atmospheric 
conditions (through the Eddy Dissipation Rate and Brunt-Väissällä frequency). Figures 4-8 
and 4-9 represent the atmospheric conditions at Heathrow. 
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Figure 4-6  Approach glide path safety corridor with an example selection of gates 
 
 
Figure 4-7  Aircraft speed profiles 
 
 
Figure 4-8  Frequency distribution of Eddy Dissipation Rate at various height levels 
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Figure 4-9  Frequency distribution of Brunt-Väissällä frequency at various height levels 
 
4. Run Wake Vortex Generator: Monte Carlo simulations are run with the wake vortex 
evolution model for the case that the wake vortex is generated when the leading aircraft 
has longitudinal position x. Lateral and vertical positions, strength, and core radius of the 
vortices are computed as a function of time. The results are analyzed at the time instant 
when the vortices have the same longitudinal co-ordinate as the follower aircraft. This time 
instant has been computed with the flight path evolution model, which incorporates the 
wind speed in longitudinal direction (i.e. influence of head- / tailwind on aircraft ground 
speed). The time instant also depends on the prescribed separation distance or time. This 
analysis is repeated for the various prescribed separations (distances or times). 
5. Compute Wake Vortex Flow Field for Lead Aircraft at Each of the Gates: Using a 
dedicated probability density fitting procedure that accounts for dependencies between the 
lateral and vertical position, the strength, and the core radius of the wake vortex pair, the 
joint distribution of the wake vortices position, strength, and core radius is obtained in each 
of the gates. This step is repeated for each separation standard to be evaluated, and 
provides the probabilistic wake vortex flow field behind the lead aircraft at all the gates. 
6. Compute Wake Vortex Encounter: Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to simulate the 
wake vortex encounter. In this step the joint distribution from step 5 is used and 
distributions of the position of the follower aircraft are used. Samples of the follower 
aircraft (lateral and vertical) position and speed in the selected gates are obtained with the 
flight path evolution model. Encounter metrics such as maximum bank angle, altitude of 
encounter and loss of height are obtained. This step provides the encounter severity 
probabilities in the different gates (for each of the specified separations). The simulated 
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encounters are classified into four categories: Weak, Moderate, Severe, and Extreme, 
according to the attained maximum bank angle versus encounter altitude. 
 
Figure 4-10  Encounter severity classification scheme 
 
 
Figure 4-11  Example wake encounter simulation results 
 
7. Compute Incident/Accident Risk Curves: The wake-induced incident/accident risk due to a 
wake vortex that is generated when the leading aircraft was at position x is evaluated. This 
step provides the instantaneous risk curves (minor incident, major incident, hazardous 
accident and catastrophic accident) showing the risk to trailing aircraft along the proposed 
aircraft flight track. As an example, Figures 4-12 – 4-15 show – for each of the defined risk 
events, i.e. minor incident, major incident, hazardous accident, and catastrophic accident 
– the instantaneous risk as a function of distance from the runway threshold (in average 
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weather conditions). The results clearly show that - for single runway arrivals - the highest 
risk occurs near the runway threshold. 
 
 
Figure 4-12  Instantaneous minor incident risk along the glide slope 
 
 
Figure 4-13  Instantaneous major incident risk along the glide slope 
 
8. Compute Incident/Accident Risk Per Movement: The wake-induced incident/ accident risk 
is obtained by integrating over x the risk obtained in Step 7. This step, which is repeated 
for different prescribed separation standards, provides the four incident/accident risk 
curves as functions of the separation distance. 
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Figure 4-14  Instantaneous hazardous accident risk along the glide slope 
 
 
Figure 4-15  Instantaneous catastrophic accident risk along the glide slope 
 
9. Assess Minimum Required Separation Distance: Application of a risk management 
procedure – based on the requirement that all four TLS values should be fulfilled – 
provides the required separation minima under different operational, weather and wind 
conditions. Figure 4-4 illustrates such end results obtained for a Boeing 737 landing behind 
a Boeing 747. 
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4.6 Wake vortex risk assessment of single runway arrivals 
 
4.6.1 Description of scenarios 
For a variety of wind conditions, the wake vortex induced risk has been analyzed. The impact of 
crosswind, head- and tailwind has been assessed for a variety of leader and follower 
combinations. The aircraft are assumed to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide path 
intercept to touchdown. The lateral and vertical deviation from the nominal flight path is based 
on the ICAO-CRM. Nominal aircraft speed profiles are specified by (see also Table 4-2): 
 the airport dependent speed at the Outer Marker (OM) that is prescribed by ATC; 
 from OM to the Deceleration Point (DP), the speed is linearly decreasing to the aircraft 
dependent Final Approach Speed (FAS); 
 from DP until touchdown, aircraft dependent speed is constant and equal to the FAS. 
 
Table 4-2  Aircraft types for single runway arrivals 
# Name IC
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1 Large jumbo jet H 245000 60.0 150 
2 Wide body jet H 130000 45.2 135 
3 Medium jet M 60000 36.0 138 
4 Regional jet M 34000 30.0 128 
5 Medium turbo prop M 20000 30.0 106 
6 Light turbo prop L 4000 14.0 100 
 
  
Figure 4-16  Nominal approach speed profiles 
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Analysis of wake induced risk is done in a number of longitudinal positions up to about 7.5 NM 
from the runway thresholds, i.e. up to about 2500 ft height (see Table 4-3).  
 
Table 4-3  Longitudinal positions where wake vortex severity is evaluated and their relation 
between distance to runway threshold and height along the glide path 
Label x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 X7 
Distance (m) 0 200 400 1000 2000 7408 13813 
Distance (NM) 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.54 1.08 4.00 7.46 
Height (m) 16 26 37 68 121 404 740 
Height (ft) 52 86 120 223 395 1324 2425 
 
Position x6 and x7 correspond to the OM and FAP at London Heathrow. The other points are 
taken close to the runway threshold, since the expectation is that the wake vortex induced risk is 
highest near the runway threshold. 
 
Especially a combination of cross- and tailwind is expected to be dangerous. Strong headwind 
will be beneficial for the relative vertical position of encountering aircraft and the wake vortex. 
Tailwind has an opposite effect: vortices will be transported in the same direction as the 
follower aircraft is flying thereby decreasing the vertical distance between vortex and aircraft. 
There is no need to analyse strong tailwind conditions, since runways are usually approached 
with headwind conditions. Wind scenarios are given in Figure 4-17. 
Figure 4-17  Investigated head- and crosswind scenarios 
 
Frequency distributions of Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) and Brunt- Väissällä frequency at 
various height levels have been determined using London Heathrow meteorological data from 
UK Met Office [10]. The EDR data comes from processed Flight Data Recordings (FDR) data 
(also collected in S-Wake) and the Brunt-Väissällä frequency data is obtained with a model 
representing the London Heathrow climatology. Figures 4-8 and 4-9 show the frequency 
distribution of the Eddy Dissipation Rate and the Brunt-Väissällä frequency at various height 
levels along the approach glide path. This has been used in the Sarpkaya wake evolution model. 
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Note that two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) 
and the Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM). The aircraft dependent parameters that are 
required by the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. 
In the current study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the 
maximum bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model.  
 
4.6.2 Risk assessment results 
An initial safety assessment showed that the impact of ATM procedural aspects on wake vortex 
risk is relatively small [10]. This is due to the fact that the largest risk contribution evolves from 
possible encounters near to the runway threshold (with consequently a small impact of e.g. 
different glide path angles, different glide slope intercept altitudes). This implies that changes in 
ATM procedures at present will not allow safe reduction of wake vortex separation distances 
without the use of new wake vortex avoidance systems. The results also indicate that to enhance 
capacity, weather and wind conditions favourable to reduce risk in the runway threshold area 
should be exploited. An extended safety assessment was made, focusing on impact of weather 
with the atmospheric conditions according to the weather climatology of Heathrow (see Figures 
4-8 and 4-9). This safety assessment was further focused on the impact of wind conditions. 
Different head-, tailwind and crosswind conditions were considered. Results are given below. 
 
Safe separation distances behind a Large Jumbo Jet 
The wake vortex induced risk for four different types of follower aircraft: a Large Jumbo Jet, a 
Medium Jet, a Regional Jet, and a Light Turbo Prop is determined. Application of the S-Wake 
risk management framework provides safe separation distances under different wind conditions. 
The Figures 4-18 to 4-21 show the safe separation distances for a Large Jumbo Jet, Medium Jet, 
Regional Jet, and a Light Turbo Prop (all behind a Large Jumbo Jet). Note that the yellow line 
indicates the current prescribed wake vortex separation minima for the aircraft combination 
under consideration. The purple line indicates the radar separation minima (always 2.5 NM). It 
appears that the situation with a small crosswind of 1 m/s is most unfavourable. As can be seen, 
in addition to crosswind (drifting of the vortices out of the flight corridor), also strong 
headwinds are efficient in reducing the risk to follower aircraft. For most scenarios, the results 
show that the current separation minima are sufficient. 
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Figure 4-18  Safe separation distance for a 
Large Jumbo Jet behind Large Jumbo Jet 
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Figure 4-19  Safe separation distance for a 
Medium Jet behind Large Jumbo Jet 
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Figure 4-20  Safe separation distance for a 
Regional Jet behind Large Jumbo Jet 
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Safe separation distance overview for Light turbo prop behind a Large jumbo jet
under different crosswind and head/tailwind combinations
 
Figure 4-21  Safe separation distance for a 
Light Turbo Prop behind Large Jumbo Jet
 
Safe separation distances behind a Medium Jet 
The wake vortex induced risk for four different types of follower aircraft: a Large Jumbo Jet, a 
Medium Jet, a Regional Jet, and a Light Turbo Prop (all behind a Medium Jet) is determined. 
Application of the risk management framework provides safe separation distances under 
different wind conditions. The risk analysis showed that radar separation can be applied for 
Medium Jet and Large Jumbo Jet follower aircraft under all wind conditions. The Figures 4-22 
and 4-23 show the safe separation distances for a Regional Jet and a Light Turbo Prop 
respectively. Again, in addition to crosswind, strong headwinds are also very efficient in 
reducing the risk to follower aircraft. In general, the results show that the current separation 
minima are sufficient. 
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Safe separation distance overview for Regional jet behind a Medium jet
under different crosswind and head/tailwind combinations
 
Figure 4-22  Safe separation distance for a 
Regional Jet behind Medium Jet 
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Safe separation distance overview for Light turbo prop behind a Medium jet
under different crosswind and head/tailwind combinations
 
Figure 4-23  Safe separation distance for a 
Light Turbo Prop behind Medium Jet
 
Most unfavourable wind conditions 
To analyse the wake vortex induced risk related to unfavourable wind conditions in more detail, 
Figures providing the safe separation distances for specific unfavourable wind conditions are 
given below. A variety of follower aircraft behind two leader aircraft have been analysed. Note 
that the green crosses in the Figures below indicate the prescribed wake vortex separation 
between the aircraft combination under consideration. Most unfavourable is a combination of 
small crosswind (1 m/s) with a negligible to small headwind (of 2 m/s). More specifically, it 
appears that without crosswind and with negligible head- or tailwind, the current ICAO 
separation minima behind the Large Jumbo Jet might not suffice. 
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Figure 4-24  Safe separation distance for a 
small crosswind of 1 m/s 
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Figure 4-25  Safe separation distance for a 
crosswind of 1 m/s and a headwind of 2 m/s
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Favourable wind conditions 
To analyse the wake vortex induced risk related to favourable wind conditions in more detail, 
Figures providing the safe separation distances for specific favourable wind conditions are 
given below. A variety of follower aircraft behind two leader aircraft have been analysed. Most 
favourable are a crosswind higher than 2 m/s and/or a strong headwind of more than 10 m/s. 
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Figure 4-26  Safe separation distance for a 
crosswind of 2 m/s 
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Figure 4-27  Safe separation distance for a 
headwind of 10 m/s and no crosswind 
 
Unfavorable Wind Conditions for Reduced Wake Vortex Separation 
Figures 4-24 and 4-25 provides the safe separation distances for a light crosswind of less than 
2 m/s (3.7 knots). The WAVIR computed safe separation distance is also shown in each cell in 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 with the ICAO standard in parentheses. 
 
Table 4-4  Safe separation distances for a small crosswind of 1 m/s and no head- or tailwind. 
WAVIR computed safe separation distance (ICAO standard separation distance) 
Lead 
Follow  
Large Jumbo Jet Medium Jet 
Large Jumbo Jet 4.25 NM  
(4.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Medium Jet 6.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Regional Jet 5.0 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
3.25 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Light Turbo prop 6.5 NM 
(6.0 NM) 
3.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
97 
 
Table 4-5  Safe separation distances for small crosswind of 1 m/s and headwind 2 m/s.   WAVIR 
computed safe separation distance (ICAO standard separation minima) 
Lead 
Follow  
Large Jumbo Jet Medium Jet 
Large Jumbo Jet 4.5 NM 
(4.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Medium Jet 6.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Regional Jet 6.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
3.0 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Light Turbo prop 6.5 NM 
(6.0 NM) 
3.75 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
 
It appears that the WAVIR computed safe separation distance increases slightly with a small 
headwind as compared to the situation without head- or tailwind. This is due to the fact that the 
vortices rebound in the area close to the ground. With a small headwind, the rebounding 
vortices will move closer to into the flight path of the follower aircraft. The situation with a 
small tailwind of 1 m/s is not shown, but the WAVIR computed safe separation distances are 
more or less the same as the safe separation distances shown in Table 4-5. 
 
Favorable Wind Conditions for Reduced Wake Vortex Separation 
Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 provide the safe separation distances for a sufficiently strong crosswind 
(larger than 2 m/s, 3.7 knots) and for a strong headwind of at least 10 m/s (18.5 knots) 
respectively. Note that the safe separation distance computed by WAVIR is much lower than 
those in Figures 4-24 and 4-25. 
 
Table 4-6  Safe separation distances for a crosswind of 2 m/s (3.7 knots). WAVIR computed 
safe separation distance (ICAO standard separation distance) 
Lead 
Follow  
Large Jumbo Jet Medium Jet 
Large Jumbo Jet 2.5 NM  
(4.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Medium Jet 2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Regional Jet 2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Light Turbo prop 2.5 NM 
(6.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
98 
 
Table 4-7  Safe separation distances for a headwind of 10 m/s (18.5 knots) and no crosswinds. 
WAVIR computed safe separation distance (ICAO standard separation distance)  
Lead 
Follow  
Large Jumbo Jet Medium Jet 
Large Jumbo Jet 2.5 NM  
(4.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Medium Jet 2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Regional Jet 2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(3.0 NM) 
Light Turbo prop 2.5 NM 
(6.0 NM) 
2.5 NM 
(5.0 NM) 
 
4.6.3 Initial estimate for the minimum required separation distance 
The results of the quantitative safety assessment of the current practice are also visualized in 
Figure 4-28. A Large jumbo jet and Medium jet as Leader AirCraft (LAC) were combined with 
Large jumbo jet, Medium jet, Regional jet, and Light turbo prop as Follower AirCraft (FAC). 
Crosswind was varied between 0, 1, 2, and 4 m/s at 10m altitude, assuming a logarithmic profile 
with height. Evaluated separation distances (at the runway threshold) were 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0NM. 
 
Figure 4-28  Overview of WAVIR assessed separation minima for single runway arrivals 
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In case reduced wake vortex separation would be applied to all aircraft combinations, Table 4-8 
indicates safe separation minima for certain crosswind intervals. Please note that these are 
indicative numbers that do not take into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety 
margins and other factors that may influence safety. Also, it is assumed that these separations 
may only be applied in case the ATC-Wake system (and operation) is used, and the system 
components meet certain performance requirements (see Speijker et al. [13, 15]). 
 
Table 4-8  Indicative separation per crosswind interval for single runway arrivals 
 Proposed separation (the largest value in a row applies) 
Crosswind 
interval 
Wake vortex induced 
separation minima 
Radar separation 
minima 
Runway Occupancy time 
(ROT) minima 
uc ≤ 2 m/s ICAO 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
4 m/s ≤ uc 2.0 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
 
4.7 Comparison with wake encounter data 
NATS has been collecting voluntary pilot reports since 1972. However, it is not known how 
close the reported rate of encounters is to the actual rate of encounters. In addition, only limited 
information is available from the reported encounters on the severity of the encounters. As a 
result, these data are not reliable enough for a comprehensive assessment of the current wake 
vortex safety levels around major airports. S-Wake therefore also aimed at developing, 
implementing and validating an algorithm for the automatic processing of Flight Data 
Recordings (FDRs) from all incoming British Airways (BA) aircraft at London Heathrow [62]. 
This algorithm was developed by NLR and is now known as WAVENDA. An initial validation 
of this Wake Vortex Encounter (WVE) detection algorithm was performed by NATS, which 
shows that it can successfully identify WVEs from flight data. Subsequently, an extensive data 
collection was performed for incoming flights at London Heathrow. It covered a one-year 
period from September 2001 to August 2002. A detailed overview of this data collection 
activity is provided in De Bruin [62], but it included: 
 The collection of segments of FDR data from flights of BA aircraft into London Heathrow.  
In total 30,000 FDR flight segments were successfully gathered. 
 The application of WAVENDA to the collected FDR data segments in order to: 
a) create a limited set of parameters (including meteorological data along the flight path) 
for each successfully processed FDR output segment; 
b) detect the occurrence of WVEs in the processed FDR output segments (about 210) 
and, in that case, store a more extended set of parameters for further analysis. 
 The storage of all these data in the Heathrow Data Base (HDB). This enables correlation 
between FDR meteorological data and ground based meteorological data, determination of 
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actual radar separations between trailing aircraft and identification of the wake generating 
aircraft and the local atmospheric conditions when a WVE is detected.  
 
The WVE results from the statistical analysis of FDRs, which were conducted by NATS using 
the HDB database, focused on investigation of relationships between vortex encounter 
parameters and situational parameters such as time separation and wind vector. As an example 
of the preliminary WVE results, Figure 4-29 shows a plan-view of the London Heathrow area 
(covering all four approach corridors) with the locations of the WVEs detected by WAVENDA 
(light purple dots). The radar tracking locations of the WVE aircraft are shown as well (dark 
blue dots). Clearly, WVEs occur both along the ILS flight path and along flight segments 
joining onto the ILS path. 
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Figure 4-29  Top view of London Heathrow area, with radar flight tracking (dark dots) and WVE 
positions detected by WAVENDA from FDR data analysis (light dots) 
 
Analysis of voluntary pilot reports 
The additional analysis of voluntary pilot reports for WVEs, as performed in S-Wake [62], did 
produce two interesting results useful as comparison with the above risk assessment results: 
Result 1: The rate of WVEs appears to increase rapidly (see Figure 4-30) when aircraft are 
spaced more than 10 to 15 seconds below the separation minimum. The likelihood of an 
encounter is relatively constant when the separation is above the minimum. The precise weather 
conditions (e.g. level of turbulence) for all these encounters are unknown but the crosswinds are 
generally below 3 - 4 m/s for heights below 4,000 ft (see Result 2 below). Result 1 does 
therefore confirm that the current separations (expressed in terms of time) have been set at 
appropriate levels, at least for the meteorological conditions in which WVEs are reported.  
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Indeed the separation is insufficient to eliminate WVEs completely even for separations much 
larger than the ICAO minima. This suggests that the current ICAO minima might not always 
suffice in certain meteorological conditions. Result 1 does not, however, exclude the possibility 
that significantly smaller (but safe) separations are possible under certain weather conditions: 
see Result 2 for example. 
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Figure 4-30  Relative WVE Rates (WVE rate for nominal separations normalised to 1) for 
Voluntary Reported Encounters 
 
Result 2: For leader and follower aircraft established on the glide slope, the rate of WVEs is 
considerably reduced when the crosswind is above a critical level (about 3 to 4 m/s). Figure 
4-31 shows the distributions of crosswinds at encounter and also the overall crosswind 
climatology at Heathrow as derived from the FDR data. As far as possible, the reported 
encounters relate solely to incidents where both leader and follower aircraft were established on 
the ILS at heights less than 4,000ft. Although some caution must be applied to the information 
from voluntary pilot reports, Figure 4-31 clearly shows that the size of the crosswind seen at 
Heathrow is higher than the crosswind experienced at encounter for much of the time. Result 2 
also supports one of the main conclusions i.e. that separations can potentially be reduced 
substantially for crosswinds above a critical level (because vortices would be transported out of 
the approach corridor). Section 4.6 suggests that the critical level may be as low as 2m/s. If 
vortices are to be avoided for distances further away from threshold (where the approach 
corridor is wider) greater crosswinds will be required (as the statistical data analysis suggests).  
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Figure 4-31  Crosswind Distribution for Voluntary Reported Encounters compared with the 
London-Heathrow crosswind climatology 
 
In the ‘WAke Vortex Evolution and wake vortex ENCounter’ (WAVENC) project, a statistical 
analysis of the European Turbulent Wake Reporting Log (ETWIRL) reported wake encounters 
was made [104, 105]. Exploring the ETWIRL data-base (with about 120 reported cases) enabled 
a preliminary statistical analysis to be made of the conditions during wake encounter. As shown 
in Figure 4-32, most encounters occur during the approach phase (at reasonable low altitude) 
and/or in light cross-wind conditions. Combining this information with the other statistical data 
leads to the conclusion that WAVENDA detects few encounters at low altitudes [S-Wake, 62]. 
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Figure 4-32  Statistical analysis of ETWIRL data-base (120 samples) with flight data recordings 
of wake vortex encounters (Source: [104, 105]) 
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4.8 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
4.8.1 Conclusions 
With the steady increase in air traffic, there is an urgent need to use existing and newly 
proposed technologies in an efficient way. This study describes work undertaken in WP4 
“Probabilistic Safety Assessment” of the project S-Wake for the European Commission. The 
study comprises a quantitative safety assessment of wake vortex induced risk related to single 
runway approaches under current practice flight regulations. A probabilistic approach has been 
followed to evaluate wake vortex induced risk related to different separation distances between 
landing aircraft on a single runway. The model used is based on a stochastic framework that 
incorporates sub models for wake vortex evolution, wake encounter, and flight path evolution, 
and relates severity of encounters to possible risk events (incidents/accidents) that might occur.  
 
The Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology has been applied to study, 
for single runway approaches, procedural aspects and the impact of weather and wind 
conditions. An extensive risk assessment – with different aircraft landing behind a Large Jumbo 
Jet and a Medium Jet – has been carried out. The impact of weather and wind conditions (e.g. 
turbulence, stratification, crosswinds and head- and tailwinds) and procedural aspects (e.g. glide 
slope intercept altitudes, navigation performance, glide path angles, steep descent approaches) 
on incident/accident risk has been evaluated. The risk assessment results show that the largest 
runway capacity improvement might be achieved through exploiting favourable wind 
conditions, in particular in the area close to the runway threshold, where wake vortex risk 
mitigation measures are most effective. The results also show that procedural changes that only 
have an effect further along the glide slope (e.g. steeper approaches for smaller aircraft, 
different glide slope intercept altitudes, increased or decreased navigation performance) are not 
sufficiently effective to reduce the wake turbulence risk related to single runway approaches.  
 
A risk management framework (consisting of risk events, risk metrics, and risk requirements) 
has been proposed. The risk requirements are based on the Target Level of Safety approach, and 
are derived using historical incident data on actual wake encounters. The framework has been 
reviewed by the FAA and EUROCONTROL within the frame of their Action Plan 3 "Air traffic 
modelling for separation standards", and has been used in the ATC-Wake project as well. 
 
4.8.2 Recommendations 
From a safety and capacity perspective, it is of importance to locate those factors that contribute 
most to the incident/accident risk related to wake turbulence. For this reason, a sensitivity 
analysis has been carried out, and the major findings are: 
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 The highest wake vortex induced risk is clearly located near the runway threshold. This 
implies that - to reduce the risk - weather based prediction, monitoring and warning 
systems should focus on weather and wind effects near the runway threshold. 
 The risk is most sensitive to wind conditions. This implies that an increase of runway 
capacity might be possible if reliable and stable predictions of wind conditions over a time 
period of 20 minutes or more (necessary from an operational point of view to allow 
scheduling for approach with prescribed separation minima) can be made. In this respect, 
crosswind and strong headwinds are most favourable to increase runway capacity. 
 
With respect to validation, it is recommended to analyse the data collected within the Heathrow 
Data Base (HDB) in more detail. So far, only partial sets of encounter data have been analysed 
and compared with the results from the probabilistic safety assessment. Further validation 
activities shall focus on specific elements of the individual sub-models (e.g. wake evolution in 
ground effect), thereby taking into account validity, applicability and limitations of these sub-
models (e.g. the wake encounter models do also not perform well close to the ground). The 
relation between encounter severity (bank angle versus loss of height) and the four risk events is 
a key element that needs to be further validated with actual encounter data as well, possibly 
using a validated aircraft performance model as developed for Eurocontrol [87]. 
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5 Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures 
5.1 Introduction 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under continuous pressure to increase aircraft 
handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the wake vortex separation distances 
between aircraft at take-off without compromising safety. The ATC-Wake project aims to 
develop and build an integrated system for Air Traffic Control (ATC) that would allow variable 
aircraft wake vortex separation distances, as opposed to the fixed times presently applied at 
airports. The present separation of two to three minutes between departing aircraft is designed to 
counter problems aircraft may encounter in the wake of large aircraft. For airports with ATC-
Wake in use, the aim is to reduce the time separation between aircraft departing at single 
runways to 90 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient crosswind.  
 
The overall objective of this study is to quantify the possible safety implications of using the 
ATC-Wake system and to assess the required crosswind values for which the “ATC-Wake 
mode”, with reduced aircraft separation during departures, can be applied (for a safety 
assessment of the ATC-Wake single runway arrival operation, see reference 115). The wake 
vortex induced risk between a variety of leader and follower aircraft, departing under various 
wind conditions, will be evaluated. For the risk assessment of the ATC-Wake departure 
operation with reduced separation, three main issues have to be considered: 
 The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
 If an ATC-Wake system component provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
 The actual (real) separation time at start of roll will usually not be exactly the same as the 
separation time advised by the ATC-Wake system. 
 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without showing that 
minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. This will be supported by a quantitative safety 
assessment, based on the WAVIR methodology and toolset (see Appendix A and Section 4). 
The effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system and hazards related to the ATC-Wake operation 
will be investigated in a qualitative way, with the assumption that failure and/or hazard 
conditions with severe consequences must be extremely improbable [78].  
Section 5.2 describes the ATC-Wake single runway departure operation. Section 5.3 describes 
the risk assessment methodology. Section 5.4 contains a description of the simulation scenarios. 
Risk assessment results are presented Section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents the conclusions and 
recommendations. Appendix A provides the mathematical model used for the risk assessment. 
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5.2 Single runway departure operation 
 
5.2.1 Current practice regulations and recommendations 
In current ATC operations, there is no exchange of information concerning wake vortices 
between aircrew and ATC. Control practices are based on ICAO recommendations and national 
regulation. ICAO separation minima between aircraft are based on Maximum Take-Off Weight 
(MTOW) of the involved aircraft, distinguishing categories Light, Medium, and Heavy [32, 79, 
103]. National regulation exists in the USA and UK. ICAO non-radar separation minima for 
take off, as applied to aircraft operating behind larger aircraft are presented in Table 5-1. The 
separation is 3 minutes in case the take off is from an intermediate position on the runway. In all 
cases, it is up to the pilot to decide whether or not to initiate the take off (start of roll). 
 
Table 5-1  ICAO non-radar separation minima 
Aircraft category Non-radar separation minima 
Leading aircraft Following aircraft Departing 
MEDIUM  2 minutes HEAVY  
LIGHT  2 minutes 
MEDIUM LIGHT  2 minutes 
 
Separation minima of 3 minutes for departing aircraft apply in case of: 
 take-off from an intermediate part of the same runway; or 
 take-off from an intermediate part of a parallel runway separated by less than 760 m, see 
Figure 5-1 below. 
 
 
Figure 5-1  Three minutes separation for departing aircraft 
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5.2.2 The ATC-Wake departure operation 
The objective of the ATC-Wake project was to develop and build an innovative platform with 
the aim of optimizing safety and capacity. The platform serves as a test bed to assess the 
interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems currently used at various 
European airports, to assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by 
applying the system in airport environments, and to evaluate its operational usability and 
acceptability by pilots and controllers [12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 54]. The ATC-Wake operation 
consists of two phases that can be summarised as follows [54]: 
 Planning Phase or Sequencing: wake vortex prediction information is used together with 
aircraft separation rules to establish the departure sequence; 
 Tactical Phase: wake vortex detection information is used to prevent wake vortex 
encounter during the take-off phase (up to the end of the initial climb). 
 
In the ATC-Wake operation for single runway departures, two separation modes are defined: 
 The baseline mode with ICAO wake vortex separation minima; 
 The ATC-Wake separation mode with (reduced) separation minima that depend on the 
weather conditions but do not depend on aircraft wake vortex category. 
 
For departures, ATC-Wake operations will start at the beginning of the taxi phase and finish at 
the end of the initial climb phase, including the initiation of the first turn. Wake vortex 
prediction and detection will cover those areas where the risk of encountering a wake vortex is 
expected to be relatively high, see Table 5-2. For departures this concerns the area 
encompassing rotation points (second half of the runway) (Figure 2-2) and the area 
encompassing the first turn in the climb phase (note that noise abatement procedures might be 
applicable). 
 
Table 5-2  Wake vortex prediction and detection areas 
Type of Area Description Position and Size 
Departure Area 1 Area encompassing rotation points  
 
Position: 2nd half of the runway 
Length: 2000m 
Height: 100 ft 
Departure Area 2 Area encompassing first turn in 
climb phase, e.g. noise abatement 
procedures 
Position: at 10 NM from runway 
Length: To be determined 
Height: 3000 – 6000 ft 
 
The risk of wake vortex encounters exists if the aircraft have the same rotation point or if the 
second aircraft takes off after the rotation point of the first aircraft. The case that a light or 
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medium aircraft encounters a wake vortex generated by the departure of a heavy aircraft can for 
instance occur when an intermediate runway take-off is performed by a medium or light aircraft. 
Important wake vortex detection and prediction areas that are to be considered are listed in 
Table 5-2. The detection is performed along the extension of the runway axis and approximately 
up to a distance of 10 NM from the runway. 
 
Heavy Aircraft
Light Aircraft
 
Figure 5-2  Departure rotation points and climb profiles 
 
This initial concept assumes that the first turn takes place at about 10 NM from the runway, 
mainly due to noise abatement procedures. As noise abatement procedures are airport 
dependent, so is this location where the first turn can be initiated. Furthermore, this location 
may vary per Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and depend on the aircraft climb rate.  
 
The ATC-Wake departure operation will influence the roles and responsibilities of the involved 
actors. Identified actors are ATC supervisor, the Ground Controller, Tower Controller and the 
aircrew. Table 5-3 presents an overview of these actors with their current responsibility and 
their specific and/or additional role in the ATC-Wake single runway departure operation. 
 
Table 5-3  Overview of human actors in the ATC-Wake departure operation 
Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC– Wake 
ATC supervisor Monitors ATC tower and 
ground operations. 
Decision on arrival and departure rate to be applied. 
Ground Controller 
(GND) 
Sequences departures 
according to landings. 
Use wake vortex detection information to optimise 
departure sequencing. 
Tower Controller 
(TWR) 
In charge of final approach, 
landing and takeoff phases. 
Uses wake vortex detection information (now cast) to 
monitor safe separations between aircraft in the 
departure phase (up to the first turn) using a vortex 
vector (display of wake vortex). On basis of wake 
detection information, the aircraft separation time 
between departures can be increased. 
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Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC– Wake 
Aircrew Overall responsible for a safe 
and efficient flight. 
Judges ATC instructions and, if considered safe, will 
attempt to comply, taking into consideration all factors 
that may influence the safe continuation of the flight. 
In case of incompliance, the pilot should file a report 
to explain his rationale. 
 
Note that an initial climb out profile is chosen by the aircrew from various options. Noise 
abatement procedures do not overrule the climb out profiles as this would have a direct effect on 
the safe operation of the flight. It is assumed that ATC-Wake mode is only applied for 
departures if radar identification of aircraft is available at less than 1 NM from the runway. 
When the ATC-Wake separation mode is in operation, a separation of 90 seconds (wake vortex 
transport out of runway area confirmed by detection) between two departures is envisaged. This 
separation time should take into account the possibility of intersection take-offs. The following 
chronological order can be identified for the ATC-Wake operation for single runway departures: 
1. Based on meteorological conditions and runway configuration, the ATC-Wake system will 
advise the ATC supervisor about applicable separation mode for a certain runway and 
associated validity period. 
2. The ATC supervisor decides on the separation mode, also taking into account runway 
configuration and conditions. In case of ATC-Wake mode, the ATC supervisor decides on 
the separation time between two consecutive departures. 
3. The Ground Controller determines the departure sequence taking into account Air Traffic 
Flow Management (ATFM) slots, departure routes, climb out speeds, and in addition wake 
vortex prediction information.  
4. The Tower Controller uses wake vortex detection information (now cast) to monitor safe 
separations between aircraft in the departure phase (up to the first turn) using a vortex 
vector (display of wake vortex). On basis of wake vortex detection information separation 
time between departures can be increased. 
W ind
T ypica l Dis tance : 10  N M
 
Figure 5-3  Example of vortex vectors for departures 
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The ATC-Wake system will include four main specific (functional) components (see Table 5-4 
and Figure 5-4), which will also interface with several existing ATC system components. 
 
Table 5-4  ATC-Wake System Components 
ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode 
Planner 
Determines applicable separation mode (ICAO or ATC-Wake mode) 
and advises about minimum aircraft separation distance. The advisory 
includes expected time for future mode transitions, and an indication of 
the aircraft separation minimum applicable 
ATC-Wake 
Predictor 
Predicts for individual aircraft the WV behaviour (“Wake Vortex Vector”) 
in the pre-defined departure area(s). The Wake Vortex Vector (WVV) is 
part of the critical area potentially affected by the wake vortex. 
ATC-Wake Detector Detects for individual aircraft WV position, extent (“vortex vector”) and –if possible – also its strength in the critical area.  
ATC-Wake 
Monitoring and 
Alerting 
Alerts ATCO in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction 
information which raises the risk of WV encounter 
• failure of one or several WV components 
 
The ATC-Wake system will interface with existing ATC systems, as shown in Table 5-5. 
 
Table 5-5  Existing ATC Systems interfacing with ATC-Wake components 
ATCO HMI Provides the traffic situation picture and automated support for various ATCO tactical roles (Approach, Tower). 
Flight Data 
Processing System 
Keeps track of flight information and updates, in particular flight plan, 
the trajectory prediction, ETA and ETD, aircraft type and equipment 
Surveillance System Provides and maintains the air traffic situation picture using all available detection means (radars, air-ground data links) 
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Figure 5-4  ATC-Wake Operational System and its functional flow during the departures 
 
5.3 Risk assessment methodology 
Evaluation of wake vortex separation distances has historically been conducted using three 
approaches: (1) experimental flight test data, (2) historic operational data, and (3) analytical 
models. As the ATC-Wake system and operation is still in the design phase, this study follows 
the third approach. The intention is to build sufficient safety confidence, enabling the decision 
makers to decide on operational testing and implementation. A probabilistic safety analysis is 
conducted for a traffic mix of aircraft departing under different weather conditions flying flight 
paths with statistical variations, taking into account stochastic models of wake vortex 
generation, wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot and controller responses. For the risk 
assessment of the ATC-Wake departure operation, three main issues have to be considered:  
 The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
 If an ATC-Wake system component provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
 The actual (real) separation time at start of roll will usually not be exactly the same as the 
separation time advised by the ATC-Wake system. 
 
This study considers the first two main issues (the third issue is recommended for follow-up 
research, see also reference 107). The risk assessment is performed in two (sequential) steps:  
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1. Assess wake vortex induced risk in the case of failure of the ATC-Wake system. The 
WAVIR methodology is used to determine indicative separation minima dependent on 
crosswind conditions. In this worst case situation, no wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre is 
performed by the aircraft/pilot. The uncertainty in flight path and speed of involved aircraft 
are modeled in the flight path evolution model. The nominal flight trajectories are based on 
the EUROCONTROL Base of Aircraft Data (BADA, Revision 3.6) [106]. The uncertainty 
about the flight trajectories is based on statistical analysis of aircraft departing at Schiphol 
airport. The resulting probability distributions of aircraft speed and position are used in the 
Monte Carlo simulations with the wake vortex evolution and wake encounter models. The 
resulting probabilities of an encounter in a predefined encounter severity class are used by 
the risk prediction model to come up with incident/accident risk probabilities. The predicted 
risk associated for each of four pre-defined risk events (minor incident, major incident, 
hazardous accident, and catastrophic accident) is the end-result of a WAVIR assessment for 
a specific scenario. These risk numbers can then be compared with risk requirements to 
judge whether or not an evaluated scenario is safe. Risk event definitions and risk 
requirements have been defined during the S-Wake project (Section 4). The assessment of 
the wake vortex induced risk is carried out with the risk assessment model described in 
Appendix A.  
2. Investigate the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system. As the indicative 
separation minima determined in Step 1 do not yet account for crosswind uncertainty and 
the effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system, a qualitative analysis of ATC-Wake system 
failures is performed. Requirements can be determined under the assumption that failure 
conditions with severe consequences must be extremely improbable and minor failure 
conditions may be probable [78].  
 
5.4 Description of scenarios 
The setup of the simulation scenarios focuses on wake vortices generated during departures, 
such that the vortices of the leader aircraft are transported into the flight path of the follower 
aircraft. Basically, only the first 10 NM after take off is considered, without initiation of a turn 
within this area. A scenario is defined by all the parameters and variables in the WAVIR tool-
set. Basically, the scenarios only differ in the so-called 'assessment parameters': 
• Generator – follower aircraft combination; 
• Crosswind; 
• Lift off point; 
• Initial aircraft separation time. 
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Table 5-6  Assessment parameters for the Single Runway Departure (SRD) operation 
    Assessment Scenarios   
  
  1 through 96 97 through 192 193 through 288 
Leading A/C LAC1 LAC3 LAC7 
Follower A/C FAC1, 4, 5, 8 FAC1, 4, 5, 8 FAC1, 4, 5, 8 
Lift Off Point LAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late 
Lift Off Point FAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late 
(Cross)wind [m/s] 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
Separation [s] 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 
 
Table 5-7  Aircraft characteristics (from EUROCONTROL BADA, Revision 3.6) 
# Name 
IC
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 C
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V
 stall
 (C
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V
 stall
 (C
AS)
,
 
Initial
 Clim
b
 [kts]
 
1 Large jumbo jet H 372000 300000 60 186 140 149 
2 Wide body jet (1) H 287000 208700 60 157 117 125 
7 Wide body jet (2) H 181400 150000 45 164 122 136 
3 Medium jet M 68000 58000 36 168 125 131 
4 Regional jet M 43090 38000 30 148 110 110 
5 Med turbo prop M 20820 18000 30 132 86 92 
8 Light Business Jet  L 6025 6000 16 122 90 90 
6 Light Turbo Prop L 4700 4100 14 123 79 83 
 
The rotation points for the different aircraft types depend on several factors, including take off 
weight, engines, wind, air temperature and pressure, runway characteristics, and thrust settings. 
A de-rated take off, using the extra available length of a runway, is often applied by the pilot to 
minimize the load on the engines (to increase their life time). The following is assumed (see 
also Table 5-8): 
 The Minimum Lift Off Point is smaller than the Take Off Length, and estimated for a non 
de-rated take off using expert opinion. 
 The Maximum Lift Off Point of an aircraft departing is estimated using expert opinion, i.e. 
operational expert interviews. 
 The Take Off Position of leader and follower are both equal to the Runway Threshold.  
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Table 5-8  Estimated lift off points of different aircraft types (at Schiphol runway 24) 
# Name CAT Take Off Length 
Early Lift Off Point 
(non-derated take off) 
Late Lift Off Point 
(e.g. using intersection 
take off or derated) 
1 Large Jumbo Jet H 3320 2100 3000 
2 Wide Body Jet (1) H 2925 2000 2700 
7 Wide Body Jet (2) H 2700 1900 2500 
3 Medium Jet M 2500 1500 2300 
4 Regional Jet M 1715 1200 2200 
5 Medium turbo prop M 940 700 1800 
8 Light Business Jet L 727 600 1600 
6 Light Turbo Prop L 506 400 1400 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the vertical profile for different types of aircraft, where the longitudinal axis 
specifies the distance from threshold. It is assumed that the aircraft follow a 'nominal' climb 
profile, as specified in BADA 3.6, i.e. in reality the climb rate could be higher or lower than 
used. The aircraft speed profiles and climb rates are generated using the BADA, which provides 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Take Off Length, True Air Speed (TAS) and rate of climb 
for a specified flight level. Combining these numbers, one can compute height and longitudinal 
position as a function of time for different kinds of aircraft performing a departure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5  Vertical profiles of departing aircraft types based on the BADA database 
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The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modeled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the wingspan, 
weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is modeled 
according to Corjon & Poinsot [76, 77]. This includes image vortices and secondary vortices 
making the vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. The decay function 
as defined by Sarpkaya [80] is used. Input parameters are Brunt-Väissällä frequency N and 
Eddy Dissipation Rate EDR. Simulations are performed for a two-dimensional data set of 
Brunt-Väisälä frequencies and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at 
different height levels. Information on this climatology was provided by UK Met Office [9, 10]. 
 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) and the 
Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM) (see Appendix A). The aircraft dependent parameters for 
the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. In this 
study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the maximum bank 
angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model. Wind is simulated 
assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000 ft. Above 1000 ft the wind is 
assumed to be constant (this is more or less in line with a logarithmic wind profile). The surface 
roughness is 0.03 m, which is representative for a generic airport environment. The wind value 
is specified at 10 m altitude. Analysis of wake induced risk is done in a number of longitudinal 
positions up to 10 NM from the runway threshold, with a focus on the critical areas: the area 
close to the ground and the area encompassing the first turn in the climb phase. 
 
5.5 Risk assessment 
5.5.1 Qualitative risk assessment 
Table 5-9 provides an assessment of the effect of the ATC-Wake system component failures. 
The individual classifications are in accordance with the risk classification scheme provided in 
reference 6 and are based on the assumption that other failure conditions do not occur. A 
simultaneous failure of two system components could aggravate the situation. Failure conditions 
with severe consequences must be extremely improbable and minor failure conditions may be 
probable [78]. A potential safety issue is that shortly after take off, at low altitudes, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision of up-to-
date meteorological now-casting information to ATCOs is crucial in order to support the pilot to 
prepare for a potential wake encounter in case of a sudden change of wind. From the individual 
classifications in Table 5-9, it appears that the most severe failure conditions are related to the 
functioning of the Monitoring and Alerting system and the Meteorological Now-casting systems 
These systems are crucial and sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. 
Additionally, it is noted that controllers should be made very aware that a timely warning to the 
pilots is also crucial (safety training might help to increase the awareness). 
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Table 5-9  Effect of main ATC-Wake system/operation failure conditions 
Description Effect Classification Comment 
Pilot/aircraft not able to turn 
timely:  
The pilot/aircraft is not able to 
timely perform an avoidance 
maneouvre, after it is 
requested by the controller. 
This could occur in case of a 
warning when the aircraft is 
still in initial take off, i.e. 
limitations in bank angle will 
apply. 
An unfavorable change of 
weather (not enough 
crosswind) is passed on by 
the controller to the pilot. The 
pilot is prepared for a potential 
severe wake encounter, and 
may be able to control the 
situation. Nevertheless, 
control problems in close 
proximity to ground could 
occur for light aircraft. 
MAJOR –  
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds separation will 
result in more severe 
consequence than in 
ICAO Mode. The pilot 
is prepared for a Wake 
Vortex Encounter. 
Controller does not provide 
a timely warning to the 
pilot:  
ATCo does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot, for 
example because he does not 
hear an aural warning or 
misses a visual warning. ATC-
Wake provides an alert, but 
ATCo is not aware of it and 
does not ask the pilot to 
initiate a turn. 
An unfavorable change of 
weather (not enough 
crosswind) is not passed on to 
the pilot. The pilot will be 
unprepared for severe 
turbulence, i.e might 
experience control problems 
in close proximity to the 
ground. 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations.  
Loss of Monitoring and 
Alerting Function:  
The ATC-Wake Monitoring 
and Alerting system is not 
operational and provides no 
function. The controllers, not 
being aware of it, are 
expecting the system to warn 
in case of a discrepancy 
between prediction and 
detection information. 
The controllers will not receive 
an alert in case ATC-Wake 
separation is no longer 
suitable. The aircraft may 
encounter severe turbulence 
which may lead to control 
problems in close proximity to 
the ground. 
 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Faulty or Inaccurate WV 
Model Estimation:  
The predictions of wake 
vortex locations and/or 
strengths made by the WV 
Model, on the basis of aircraft 
data and meteorological data 
are inaccurate/wrong.  
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
Wake Vortex Vector will be 
wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of 
false information. There will 
be an increase of workload. 
SIGNIFICANT –
MAJOR  
INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and 
detection information 
(unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working). 
Faulty or Inaccurate Air 
Traffic Situation 
The air traffic situation 
provided by the surveillance 
systems is wrong or 
inaccurate. The controllers will 
most likely not be aware that 
the wrong leader aircraft type 
(or associated data) is used in 
the ATC-Wake Predictor and 
on the HMI. 
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
Wake Vortex Vector will be 
wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of 
false information. Most likely a 
transition will be made to the 
ICAO Separation Mode. There 
will be an increase of 
workload of ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
The ATC-Wake 
separation Mode is 
based on a worst case 
combination of a 
Heavy leader aircraft 
and a Light follower 
aircraft.  
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Faulty or Inaccurate Meteo 
Now-casting Information:  
The now-cast meteorological 
conditions are inaccurate or 
wrong. The controllers will 
most likely not be aware of a 
sudden unfavorable change of 
the wind.  
Incorrect information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Predictor, causing improper 
functioning. The predicted 
transport of the vortices is 
wrong. An unfavorable 
change of weather (not 
enough crosswind) is not 
detected. The aircraft may 
encounter severe turbulence, 
which could lead to control 
problems close to ground 
SERIOUS  
INCIDENT 
The wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with 90 
seconds (i.e. reduced) 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Wake Vortex outside 
Detection Range and/or 
Scanning Volume: The wake 
vortices generated by the 
leader aircraft are not 
detected, when they are 
outside the scanning volume 
of the ATC-Wake Detector. As 
the WV detection information 
suddenly disappears, there is 
an indication and ATCos will 
be informed of the failure. 
No wake vortex information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Detector, causing improper 
functioning. As the ATC 
supervisor and the air traffic 
controllers will likely become 
aware quickly that there will 
not be an alert, a transition will 
be made to the ICAO 
Separation Mode. There will 
be an increase of workload of 
ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT  
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO 
Mode is made. The 
aircraft already lined up 
for departure will 
receive their take off 
clearance later. 
Faulty or Inaccurate 
Detection of the Wake 
Vortices:  
The wake vortices generated 
by the leader aircraft are 
inaccurately or not detected, 
because of a failure of the 
ATC-Wake Detector. 
Incorrect information is used 
by ATC-Wake Detector, 
causing improper functioning. 
Wake Vortices are not or 
inaccurately detected. There 
will be an alert if the Wake 
Vortex Vector generated by 
the ATC-Wake Predictor 
indicates a potential wake 
encounter. There will be an 
increase of workload. 
SIGNIFICANT  -  
MAJOR  
INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and 
detection information. 
This is unlikely to occur 
at low altitudes if 
Meteo Nowcasting and 
Predictor are working. 
 
The operational hazards associated with the ATC-Wake operation have been identified in detail 
with the NLR Qualitative Safety Assessment (QSA) methodology. Identified potential safety 
bottlenecks for ATC-Wake departure operations are e.g. [17]: 
 Supervisors may not follow the advice of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner and 
tend to deviate to the unsafe side, for example for efficiency reasons; 
 Controllers may not comply with the prescribed separation and give a take-off clearance 
too early, for instance due to a timing error; 
 Controllers may not pay sufficient attention to the visualisation tool and react properly on 
an alert, because tower controllers are used to work based on their outside view. 
 
A more extensive description of all the safety bottlenecks related to the ATC-Wake operation 
together with further recommendations for risk mitigation is provided in references 15 and 113. 
 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
 
  118 
 
5.6 Quantitative risk assessment 
 
5.6.1 Wake vortex induced risk 
Figure 5-10 shows the wake vortex induced risk, in terms of incident/accident probability per 
departure, for a separation time of 90 seconds (with no head- or tailwind). Note that LAC 
denotes the leader aircraft and FAC denotes the follower aircraft (the numbering is in 
accordance with Table 5-7). Risk assessment results for cross wind conditions of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 m/s are provided in Figures 5-11 until 5-16 [15]. Initial aircraft separation times of 60, 90, 
120, 150, and 180 seconds are all evaluated. A very important departure specific and aircraft 
dependent parameter is the lift-off point. Therefore, it is noted once more that in the assessment 
a distinction has been made between early and late lift-off of the aircraft. Logically, a variation 
of lift-off points results in a variation of departure tracks. When the follower aircraft lifts off 
early behind a leader aircraft that lifts off late, the departure path of the follower aircraft well 
exceeds that of the leader aircraft, and as a consequence the associated risks are low. To stay on 
the conservative side, the risk results are maximized over the variation in lift-off points of the 
different departing aircraft types before deriving the wake vortex induced risk results provided 
in this Section 6. The full details of the quantitative safety assessment are provided in Speijker 
et al. [84], in which the impact of the lift off point on risk is also analysed. In this study, the aim 
is to derive safe separation times for departures, i.e. therefore the worst case combination of 
leader and follower lift off points is considered. An interesting finding is the fact that e.g. Light 
Business Jets behind a Large Jumbo Jet could always be separated with just 60 seconds (see e.g. 
Figure 5-17, in Section 5.6.2). This is explained by the fact that this aircraft usually takes off 
earlier, which implies that its flight path well exceeds that of the leading Large Jumbo Jet. 
 
As an example, Figures 5-6 until 5-9 present the incident/accident risk curves for a Regional Jet 
departing under different crosswind conditions (no head- or tailwind) behind a Large Jumbo Jet. 
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Figure 5-6  Risk with crosswind 0 m/s 
 
Figure 5-7  Risk with crosswind 1 m/s 
 
Figure 5-8  Risk with crosswind 2 m/s 
 
Figure 5-9  Risk with crosswind 3 m/s 
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Figure 5-10  Overview of risk results in case of 90 seconds separation 
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Figure 5-11  Overview of risk results in case of 0 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-12  Overview of risk results in case of 1 m/s crosswind 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
 
  123 
 
 
Figure 5-13  Overview of risk results in case of 2 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-14  Overview of risk results in case of 3 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-15  Overview of risk results in case of 4 m/s crosswind 
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Figure 5-16  Overview of risk results in case of 5 m/s crosswind 
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5.6.2 Initial estimate of the minimum required aircraft separation time 
An initial estimate of the minimum required separation times for various leader and follower 
aircraft combinations and for various crosswind conditions is provided in Figure 5-17 on the 
basis of the quantitative risk assessment results sketched in Section 5.6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17  Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for the SRD operation 
 
Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake Mode should be applied to all aircraft combinations, 
Table 5-10 indicates safe separation minima for certain crosswind intervals (these are indicative 
numbers that do not take into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins 
and other factors that may influence safety). These separations may only be applied in case 
ATC-Wake is used, and the system meets performance requirements that follow from Table 5-9. 
Reduced separation of 90 seconds may be applied when crosswind exceeds 3 m/s, while 60 
seconds separation can be applied with crosswind above 5 m/s. 
 
Table 5-10  Indicative separation per crosswind interval 
Crosswind interval Proposed wake vortex separation 
0 ≤  uc ≤  2 m/s ICAO 
2 ≤  uc ≤  3 m/s 120s 
3 ≤  uc ≤  5 m/s 90s 
5 m/s ≤  uc 60s 
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5.7 Capacity improvements 
To derive the potential benefits of the ATC-Wake SRD operation at an airport with average 
(wind) conditions, the statistical data on the occurrence of crosswind at an airport, the ATC-
Wake SRD separation schemes as function of crosswind, and the results from an analytical 
study [112, 114] are combined. Expected throughput is provided in Table 5-11. 
 
Table 5-11  Expected throughput for the ATC-Wake SRD operation 
 ATC-Wake Single Runway Departure operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[aircraft/hour] 
Probability of 
crosswind in interval 
10)
 
Throughput per 
crosswind interval 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1 ICAO 37.8 0.080 3.0 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2 ICAO 37.8 0.208 7.9 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3 ICAO 37.8 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4 90s 38.9 0.164 6.4 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5 90s 38.9 0.118 4.6 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6 60s 40.0 0.081 3.2 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8 60s 40.0 0.053 2.1 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 40.0 0.090 3.6 
Expected throughput [aircraft/hour] 38.6 
Change compared to ICAO reference situation 2.1% 
 
Runway throughput improves when the ATC-Wake system/operation is used. Depending on the 
occurrence of favorable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway throughput is estimated at 
about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation at a generic airport with average wind conditions. 
 
5.8 Conclusions and recommendations 
With the steady increase in air traffic, airports are under continuous pressure to increase aircraft 
handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the wake vortex separation distance 
between aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety. The European 
Commission Information Society Technologies project ATC-Wake has designed an integrated 
system for Air Traffic Control that would allow variable aircraft separation distances, as 
opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports.  
 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without providing 
sufficiently validated evidence that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied.  
                                                    
10)
  A crosswind climatology based on about 400,000 observations at about 10 m altitude at 3 large European airports is used. 
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Therefore, this study has quantified the possible safety implications related to installation of 
ATC-Wake. This includes an assessment of required crosswind values for which reduced 
aircraft separation can be applied. The wake vortex induced risk between a variety of leader and 
follower aircraft, departing under various wind conditions, has been evaluated with the Wake 
Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology and toolset [83]. For the ATC-Wake 
departure operation with reduced separation, two main issues have been considered: 
 The controller working with ATC-Wake will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
encounter, in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised. 
 If an ATC-Wake system component provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the 
presence of severe wake vortices. Consequences might even be catastrophic when reduced 
separation is applied and a light aircraft encounters a severe wake of a heavy aircraft. 
 
The present separation of two to three minutes between departing aircraft is designed to ensure 
that aircraft will not encounter wake vortices of large aircraft. For airports with ATC-Wake in 
use, the present study indicates that the time separation between aircraft departing at single 
runways might be reduced to 90 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient 
crosswind. Indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these separation minima do not yet account for crosswind uncertainty, the 
setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system components was further investigated. This 
was done through a qualitative analysis of the effect of failures of the ATC-Wake system. It 
appears that the most severe failure conditions are related to the functioning of the Monitoring 
and Alerting system and the Meteorological Nowcasting systems. These system components are 
crucial and sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. Additionally, it is noted that 
controllers should be made very aware that a timely warning to the pilots is also crucial (safety 
training might help to increase awareness). A sufficiently validated aircraft performance and 
dynamics model for departures is not yet available. It is therefore recommended to extend the 
well known AMAAI toolset (developed for EUROCONTROL) for the analysis of in trail 
following aircraft during arrivals with a module dedicated to departure operations [86, 87]. A 
further issue to be investigated is the fact that the actual (real) separation time at the start of roll 
of the aircraft will usually not be exactly the same as the advised separation time. 
 
A full Safety Case for ATC-Wake departures shall also account for the local weather 
climatology and ATC/pilot procedures for wake vortex mitigation. In view of this, actual 
implementation of the ATC-Wake operation at European airports is not envisaged in the short 
term. It is recommended to involve airport authorities and ATC centers for gathering the 
required data to build the Safety Case. Follow-up research is foreseen to be performed as part of 
the CREDOS project, which is a logical successor to the ATC-Wake project. 
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6 Safety assessment of a single runway arrival procedure for 
aircraft equipped with a wake vortex detection, warning and 
avoidance system 
6.1 Introduction 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. The EC project 
I-Wake has designed an on-board wake vortex detection, warning and avoidance system for the 
flight crew, which helps to minimize the probability that an aircraft encounters a wake vortex.  
The I-Wake system is proposed as a safety net in support of ATC decided reduced separation, 
intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept. The I-Wake system is 
therefore foreseen as safety net in combination with ATC decided reduced separation [116]. 
 
The main objective of this study is to provide the I-Wake system with an assessment of wake 
induced risk levels for the approach phase when reduced aircraft separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM 
between all aircraft) is applied. Such analysis will be performed for different aircraft types and 
various wind conditions for reduced separation. Although it is foreseen to use I-Wake as safety 
net in combination with ATC decided reduced separation, this study assumes that a WV DWA 
is used as a standalone system. A specific objective is to support the setting of requirements for 
the use of a WV DWA. Aspects to be considered are e.g. the time for caution and alert and WV 
DWA system capabilities and the initiation of a missed approach. 
 
For a quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to a WV DWA single 
runway arrival procedure with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider: 
 If one or more WV DWA system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
catastrophic, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case a WV DWA 
warning/alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away 
from the wake vortices detected by the WV DWA system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases. 
 
Section 6.2 describes the WV DWA single runway arrival procedure, for which an assessment 
of wake vortex induced risk levels will be provided. Section 6.3 describes the risk assessment 
methodology, which is based on integration of the ‘classical’ WAVIR methodology with a 
missed approach model and a causal model for the WV DWA system failure probability. The 
simulation scenarios are specified in Section 6.4. Risk assessment results are presented and 
discussed in Section 6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 provides the conclusions and recommendations. 
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6.2 I-Wake system and main functionalities 
The primary purpose of the I-Wake system is to minimise the probability that an aircraft 
encounters a wake vortex. The system has a tactical and a strategic function. The tactical Wake 
Vortex Detection, Warning and Avoidance (WV DWA) function is to provide a caution and/or 
alert to the flight crew for impending encounters (e.g. within 30 seconds) with hazardous wakes. 
This is achieved by recognising atmospheric disturbance patterns for wake vortices using 
onboard sensors. The crew is alerted by both visual and aural cues when a wake hazard is 
detected. The strategic WV DWA function is to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness 
of local wake hazards. Hazards are predicted and their severity estimated with a mathematical 
model on-board aircraft. This model uses current weather data, actual aircraft positions and 
aircraft characteristics such as weight and wingspan of surrounding aircraft. Information about 
possible wake hazards is displayed on the navigation display in the cockpit (see Figure 6-1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1  Schematic representation of the main functions of the WV DWA system 
 
A schematic representation of the tactical WV DWA function is shown in Figure 6-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2  Schematic representation of the tactical wake vortex DWA function 
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The fundamental part of the wake vortex detection within the tactical function is a sensor that 
physically and independently measures disturbances in the atmosphere. The sensor for wake 
vortex detection will be a pulsed Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) system, fixed to the 
lower part of the fuselage at the front of the aircraft. The initial I-Wake system design proposes 
a LiDAR detection range for wake vortex induced atmospheric disturbances between 800 and 
2400 meters. The LiDAR will scan a volume of air in front of the aircraft with an adjustable 
angle of regard. The field of view of the scanning is proposed to be about 6° wide and about 
1.5° high. The signals received from the sensor are processed to determine if there is a possible 
wake vortex within the scanning volume. This process uses attitude and airspeed information 
from the own aircraft. The strength of a wake vortex will be estimated. Fifteen seconds or less 
prior to encountering a severe wake (i.e. a wake that exceeds the predetermined warning 
severity threshold) the flight crew will receive a visual and an aural WARNING alert. The 
visual warning will be displayed on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The initial I-Wake 
system design proposes that a CAUTION alert will be provided between 15 and 30 seconds 
before encountering a wake vortex that has an estimated strength that is in excess of a 
predetermined caution threshold. CAUTION alerts are also given both visually (on the PFD) 
and aurally by a synthetic voice. Alerts can be cancelled or inhibited on the master warning 
panel. A schematic representation of the strategic WV DWA function is shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3  Schematic representation of the strategic wake vortex DWA function 
 
The strategic wake vortex DWA function is based on a wake vortex model, which is contained 
in the prediction and estimation module. The wake vortex model requires information about the 
wake generating aircraft, such as position, trajectory, airspeed, weight and wingspan. It also 
requires meteorological data to determine transport and decay characteristics of the wake 
vortex. Both aircraft data and meteorological data need to be data-linked to the aircraft. In 
rinciple all wake hazards that are relevant to the aircraft are made available on the Navigation 
Display (ND) in the cockpit. Information that can be retrieved is the calculated location of the 
wake, and the estimated wake severity. The time-to-threat of the wake vortex is displayed on the 
PFD. The system shall indicate its operational state. In particular, the Wake Vortex DWA 
system will show if it is switched on or switched off. It will also indicate known system failures, 
at least those of the detection unit. I-Wake is foreseen as safety net in combination with ATC 
decided reduced separation [116]. 
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6.3 Risk assessment methodology 
 
6.3.1 General approach 
This Section provides the risk assessment methodology for assessment of wake induced risk 
levels for the WV DWA single runway arrival operation with reduced aircraft separation (2.0 or 
2.5 NM between all aircraft) is applied. Such analysis will be performed for different aircraft 
types and various wind conditions for reduced separation. A further objective is to support the 
setting of requirements for the I-Wake system. Aspects to be considered are e.g. the time for 
caution and alert, the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the angle of regard, the wake vortex 
detection range and the minimum wake vortex severity threshold for initiation of a missed 
approach. 
 
For a quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to the WV DWA single 
runway arrival operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider: 
 If one or more I-Wake system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there will 
be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
CATASTROPHIC, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an I-Wake warning/ 
alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away from the 
wake vortices detected by the I-Wake system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases. 
 
The risk assessment methodology will integrate the ‘classical’ WAVIR methodology (see also 
Appendix A) with a missed approach model and a causal model for the I-Wake system failure 
probability. The 'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake [9, 10], is used 
to assess wake vortex induced risk in the case of a failure of one or more of the I-Wake system 
components. In this case, no wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre is performed by the 
aircraft/pilot and a ‘worst case’ assessment of the incident/accident risk is obtained.  
 
6.3.2 Wake vortex detection, warning, and avoidance probability 
De Jong et al. [88] provides a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) of the I-Wake system used 
in conjunction with a ground based ATC-Wake system during the approach phase of flight. The 
FHA revealed a number of possible consequences of (failures) of the I-Wake system: 
 Unexpected encounter of a wake vortex; 
 Inappropriate ATC-Wake separation mode; 
 Attempt to operate at the edge of safety; 
 Crew confusion; 
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 Initiation of an unnecessary evasive action; 
 Incorrect crew awareness of wake vortex hazards; 
 Crew disregarding the wake vortex DWA system. 
 
Of these possible consequences, the only event classified as MAJOR (with a potentially even 
more severe consequence in case of a very small aircraft flying at low altitude behind a large 
aircraft) is the “unexpected encounter of a wake vortex”. This event will be used as basis for the 
construction of a causal model to assess the on-board WV DWA system failure probability. The 
core of this causal model is based on a failure of one or more of the WV DWA system 
components. In addition to the failure probabilities of the WV DWA system components, the 
performance of the on-board LiDAR system itself is incorporated. The resulting causal model, 
explaining the dependencies between the main influencing factors, is sketched in Figure 6-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4  Causal model for the I-Wake system/operation 
 
The nodes in this causal model have the following explanation: 
− I-Wake DWA Failure (11): represents the probability distribution of aircraft/pilot not able to 
perform the I-Wake detection, warning and avoidance manoeuvre when required. 
− Aircraft/Pilot not able to initiate missed approach (10): represents the probability of an 
aircraft/pilot not able to initiate an evasive action (missed approach) when needed. 
− I-Wake Monitoring and Alerting Failure (9): represents the probability of not providing a 
timely warning to the flight crew when one should be given. As a result, no evasive action 
is possible and the pilot reacts later to a wake encounter when one should occur. 
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− Loss of WV DWA Tactical Function (8): represents the probability of loss of the WV DWA 
tactical function. There are 2 possibilities: 1) detected loss: crew is aware (there is a clear 
indication of DWA function loss) and the pilot will likely increase separation, and 2) 
undetected loss: crew is not aware (there is no clear indication of DWA function loss). 
− Improper Model Prediction (7): represents the probability that the predictions of Wake 
Vortex locations and strength, as used in the I-Wake system, are inaccurate/wrong. 
− Faulty/Inaccurate Aircraft Data (6): represents the probability that the aircraft data, as used 
in the I-Wake system, is inaccurate/wrong. As a result, incorrect information is used, 
causing improper functioning of the I-Wake system. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty WV Model Estimation (5): represents the probability that the WV 
model locations and/or strengths predictions, as used in the I-Wake system, are wrong/ 
inaccurate. As a result, incorrect information is used, causing improper functioning. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty Meteo Nowcasting (4): represents the probability that the 
meteorological nowcasting data, as used in the I-Wake system, is inaccurate or wrong. As a 
result, incorrect information is used, causing improper functioning of the I-Wake system. 
− Improper Detector Performance (3): represents the probability that the on-board WV 
detection system (LiDAR) performs significantly less than the flight crew expects (while 
they are not aware of the inaccuracies). As a result wrong (or even no) alerts are given. 
− Wake Vortex Outside Detection Range/Scanning Volume (2): represents the probability that 
the on-board WV detection system (LiDAR) does not detect the wake vortices of the 
leading aircraft, because these are outside the scanning volume of air ahead of the aircraft. 
− Inaccurate or Faulty Detection of Wake Vortices (1): represents the probability that the on-
board WV detection system (LiDAR) does not detect wake vortices of the leading aircraft, 
when these are inside the planned scanning volume of air ahead of the aircraft. 
 
6.3.3 Aircraft flight trajectory model 
The aircraft intercept their localizer at the Intermediate Fix (IF). From the IF, the aircraft are 
expected to fly along runway direction. During intermediate approach the flight trajectory is 
kept horizontal. From the Final Approach Point (FAP), an aircraft descends with a glide path 
angle of about 3°. Several reasons may cause an aircraft to initiate a missed approach at any 
altitude between the FAP and Decision Height (DH). The WV DWA single runway arrival 
operation assumes that prior to encountering a severe wake, the flight crew will receive an I-
Wake warning/alert, after which the pilot may decide to initiate a missed approach. The purpose 
of such manoeuvre is to increase the vertical distance between (severe) wake vortices generated 
by the leader aircraft and the follower, thereby minimizing the probability that an aircraft 
encounters a wake vortex. The missed approach path consists of a curved part and a climb out 
part. From the Climb Out Point (COP), the aircraft climb under a constant climb out gradient. 
Important are the determination of the (maximum) altitude loss during the curved part of a 
missed approach and the time needed from initiation of a missed approach to the COP. 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
 
  136 
 
Initiation of the missed approach involves execution of several tasks by the crew, during which 
the aircraft first loses height and then as a consequence of adjustments of the flight controls 
attains an ascending trajectory. The height loss (and gained) during a missed approach is 
determined with a model based on the dynamic relation between the flight path angle γ and the 
pitch angle θ . This dynamic relation can be expressed as the following transfer function [110]: 
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where g is the gravitational acceleration and ν is the True Air Speed (TAS) of the aircraft. The 
normal acceleration sensitivity, nα , is defined as the "steady state normal acceleration change 
per unit change in angle-of-attack at constant air speed" [110]. It can be approximated by: 
 
L
L
C
C
n αα =          (6-2) 
where CLα is the lift curve slope and CL is the lift coefficient. During rectalinear flight, the latter 
is equal to:  
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where ρ  is the air density, m is the mass, and S is the wing area of the aircraft. 
 
The pitch angle θ depends on the elevator deflection δe  , according to the following transfer 
function (constant speed, short period approximation) [111]: 
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where ω and ζ are the short period frequency and the damping coefficient in the dynamic 
missed approach model respectively. Other new parameters are the pilot (pitch) gain (KQ), static 
margin (MS ), dimensionless inertial radius (IR ), and the mean aerodynamic chord ( c ). 
 
The time needed to adapt the initial pitch angle (θMAP ) to final pitch angle (θCOP ) is estimated by 
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where the commanded pitch rate (q) is assumed constant during the full curved part of the 
missed approach. This formula can also be used to estimate the distance flown until the COP. 
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6.3.4 Risk assessment model and toolset 
Define talert  and tcaution  as the time of alert and the time of caution for a potential wake vortex 
hazard respectively. The associated positions along the flight track are denoted by xalert   and 
xcaution . The LiDAR detection distance is specified by ]  x,  [ maxmin DETDETx , where DETxmin denotes the 
minimum detection distance and DETmaxx  denotes the maximum detection distance. Define the I-
Wake system detection capabilities further via the following three parameters: 
 yFOV  LiDAR horizontal field of view; 
 zFOV  LiDAR vertical field of view; 
 ZAOR  LiDAR angle of regard. 
 
In the detection phase, where ]  x,  x[ maxminit DETDETx∈  and an alert may be provided on the basis of 
wake detection information, the 'scan window'  is determined via the position of the aircraft and 
the I-Wake system detection capabilities. In the prediction phase, where a caution may need to 
be provided, there is some uncertainty because no actual wake vortex detection information is 
available. It is assumed that this uncertainty is dealt with by defining a 'caution bounding box' 
as a percentage (larger than 100%) of the size of the scan window at t = talert .  
 
Due to potential failure conditions of the I-Wake system components, it can not be assumed that 
the I-Wake system will always be functioning. Define the failure probabilities for the I-Wake 
subsystem components as constants, which are specified by setting requirements for the 
maximum allowable failure probabilities to be verified during the I-Wake system life cycle. 
 PFAD  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) aircraft data 
 PFWV  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) wake vortex model estimation 
 PFNC  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) meteorological now-casting data 
 PFD  Failure probability for I-Wake inaccurate (or faulty) detection of wake vortices 
 PLTF  Failure probability for loss of the overall wake vortex DWA tactical function 
 
Assume now that the caution procedure is operational in case: 
 The Correct Aircraft Data is used (i.e. PFAD = 0 ); 
 The Wake Vortex Model Estimation is correct (i.e. PFWV = 0 ); 
 The Meteorological Now-casting system is working correctly (i.e. PFNC = 0 ). 
 
Assume furthermore that the alerting procedure is operational in case: 
 The on-board LiDAR detection system is working correctly (i.e. PFD  = 0 ); 
 There is no loss of the overall wake vortex DWA function (i.e. PLTF = 0 ); 
 The wake vortex is inside the scanning volume of the on-board LiDAR system. 
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It is assumed that the pilot reaction time, in case of an alert, depends on the fact whether or not a 
caution has been given. In case of a previous caution, the pilot will react quicker to an alert. 
After an alert, the pilot may decide to initiate a missed approach, but only in case the actual 
height of the aircraft is above the Decision Height (DH). The pilot may also decide not to 
initiate a missed approach depending on e.g. the prediction of the wake vortex strength. 
 
The WV DWA single runway arrival operation to be followed implies the following: 
1. If the follower aircraft position is predicted to be within the wake vortex bounding box of 
(at least one of) the vortices and the caution procedure is operational, a caution is given. 
2. If the follower aircraft detects a wake vortex (i.e. at least one of the vortices is within the 
LiDAR scanning volume) and the alerting procedure is operational, an alert is given.  
3. If an alert is given and the aircraft is above DH, a missed approach may be initiated. The 
reaction time of the pilot depends on the fact whether or not a caution has been given.  
4. If a missed approach is initiated, the aircraft first loses height and then as a consequence of 
adjustments of the flight controls attains an ascending trajectory. The height loss (and 
gained) is determined with the missed approach model described in detail in section 6.3.3. 
 
The risk assessment model is integrated within the NLR WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment 
(WAVIR) toolset. Figure 6-5 provides a result from the execution of the VORTICES module. 
The scanning window is used to estimate the probability of an alert and a missed approach. 
 
Figure 6-5  Simulated wake vortex positions and strengths, 90 % confidence interval about the 
aircraft position (circle) and scanning window at the gate where alert should be given 
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Figure 6-6 shows the WAVIR Graphical User Interface (GUI) dedicated to the specification of 
the parameters for the assessment of the WV DWA single runway arrival operation. The LiDAR 
detection system parameter setting (and the continuous update thereof) is shown in the Figure in 
the top-right of the GUI. Note that other parameter settings (e.g. for the VORTICES, the 
ENCOUNTER, and the RISK PREDICTION modules) are specified in other GUIs, which are 
not described in detail this thesis (an up-to-date WAVIR User Manual is available via NLR). 
 
 
Figure 6-6  WAVIR Graphical User Interface for the specification of I-Wake parameters 
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6.4 Description of scenarios 
 
6.4.1 General description 
I-Wake aims at final approach operations with separation distances below current ICAO wake 
turbulence radar separation minima in favourable weather conditions. It is an aim of the current 
study to determine conditions under which reduced wake vortex separation of 2.5 NM (or even 
2.0 NM) is feasible in terms of acceptable wake vortex risk and acceptable missed approach 
rate. These conditions imply the setting of requirements for the WV DWA system and 
operation. This will be done on the basis of final approach scenarios for the combination of a 
large jumbo jet followed by a medium jet, regional jet, and a medium turbo prop. The 
identification of conditions under which 2.5 NM (or even 2.0 NM) minimum separation may be 
feasible is based on a sensitivity analysis for selected assessment parameters in the model of the 
WV DWA single runway arrival operation. The generic scenario considers the final approach of 
a leader and follower aircraft, both descending along the ILS path from Final Approach Point 
(FAP) to Runway Threshold (THR). A missed approach is only initiated, at any height above 
200 ft, after the WV DWA system detects a potentially dangerous wake vortex. 
 
6.4.2 Set up of the simulation scenarios 
The set up and results of the quantitative risk assessment of the I-Wake operation are obtained 
using the quantitative risk assessment methodology described in Section 6.3. The assessments 
have been performed for the situation without the use of an I-Wake system, and also for the 
proposed I-Wake operation. Basically, the focus is on the setting of the requirements for the I-
Wake system. Therefore, the scenarios differ in the 'assessment parameters' listed in Table 6.1. 
In total, 24 scenarios have been assessed. Three different follower aircraft are considered: a 
Medium Jet (FAC 3), a Regional Jet (FAC 4), and a Medium Turbo Prop (FAC 5). A Large 
Jumbo Jet (LAC 1) is simulated as wake vortex generator aircraft. Separation distances of 2.0, 
2.5, 3.0, and 4.0 NM (between all aircraft) have been considered. The crosswind is varied 
between values of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 m/s (measured at 10 m altitude with no head- or tailwind). 
 
The aircraft are assumed to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide path intercept to 
touchdown. The glide path intercepts the runway 300 m beyond the runway threshold 
(corresponding to a Reference Datum Height (RDH) of 52 ft). From previous quantitative 
studies for single runway arrivals, it appeared that the risk is highest close to the runway 
threshold, i.e. close to the ground. It is expected that this will also be the case for the I-Wake 
operation and it is therefore that the safety assessment will focus on the last 4 NM of the 
approach. A simulation scenario is further defined by all the parameters and variables in the 
WAVIR toolset (including the extension with the missed approach model from Section 6.3.2). 
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Table 6-1  Assessment Parameter Matrix (1) 
Scenario LAC FAC Vert. Angle Lat. Angle Angle of Regard Detection distance Time of Alert Failure probabilities Bounding box
1 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
2 1 3 3.0 6.0 0 400 - 2400 10 0.001 100
3 1 3 1.5 3.0 -1.5 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
4 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 3200 20 0.001 100
5 1 3 3.0 3.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
6 1 3 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
7 1 3 3.0 6.0 -1.5 200 - 3200 7 0.001 100
8 1 3 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 20 0.001 100
9 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 150
10 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 200
11 1 3 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 Nil 100
12 1 3 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 Nil 100
13 1 4 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
14 1 4 1.5 6.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
15 1 4 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
16 1 4 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 0.001 150
17 1 4 3.0 12.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.01 150
18 1 4 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.1 100
19 1 5 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
20 1 5 1.5 6.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.001 100
21 1 5 1.5 6.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100
22 1 5 3.0 12.0 -3.0 800 - 4800 15 0.001 150
23 1 5 3.0 12.0 -3.0 200 - 2400 7 0.01 150
24 1 5 1.5 6.0 -1.5 800 - 2400 15 0.1 100
 
 
As mentioned before, the aircraft are planned to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide 
path intercept to touchdown. The lateral and vertical deviation from the nominal flight path is 
based on the ICAO-CRM. Nominal aircraft speed profiles are specified by (see Figure 6-7): 
 the airport dependent speed at the Outer Marker (OM) that is prescribed by ATC; 
 from OM to the Deceleration Point (DP), the speed is linearly decreasing to the aircraft 
dependent Final Approach Speed (FAS); 
 from DP until touchdown, aircraft dependent speed is constant and equal to the FAS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7  Nominal approach speed profiles 
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Analysis of wake vortex induced risk is done in the longitudinal positions listed in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2  Longitudinal and corresponding vertical nominal positions for arrivals 
Longitudinal positions for the arrival operation
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
x [m] 0 -300 -900 -2000 -3000 -4000 -5000 -6000 -7408 -10000
[NM] 0,0 -0,2 -0,5 -1,1 -1,6 -2,2 -2,7 -3,2 -4,0 -5,4
Vertical positions for the arrival operation
z [m] 16 31 63 121 173 225 278 330 404 540
[ft] 52 103 206 395 567 739 911 1083 1325 1771
 
 
Initiation and execution of a missed approach 
The I-Wake operation is based on the initiation of a missed approach in case an I-Wake 
warning/alert is raised. After missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and 
follower increases (note that for wake vortex safety reasons a missed approach is not 
recommendable at altitudes below 200 ft). 
 
Table 6-3  Aircraft and missed approach parameters 
 Light 
Turbo 
Prop 
Medium 
Turbo 
Prop 
Regional 
Jet 
Medium 
Jet 
Wide 
Body 
Jet 
Large 
Jumbo 
Jet 
Mass 4000 20000 34000 60000 130000 245000 
Wingspan 16 30 30 36 45 60 
Root chord 3.70 3.40 5.00 6.50 11.40 17.00 
Tip chord 0 0 0 0 2.70 0 
Wing Area 29.60 51 75 117 317.25 510 
Mean Aero Chord 1.85 1.70 2.50 3.25 7.05 8.50 
Initial pitch angle -1 -1 0 2 2 3 
Final pitch angle 15 15 15 18 18 18 
Pitch rate  2 2 2 2 2 2 
Lift curve slope 5.5 6 5.7 5.7 5.0 5.9 
Static margin 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Inertial pitching moment 24000 330000 1700000 3000000 10530000 42000000 
Inertial radius 1.324 2.389 2.828 2.176 1.277 1.540 
 
Pilot reaction time 
It is assumed that the pilot initiates a missed approach after receiving a WARNING alert from 
the I-Wake system. No action will be taken by the pilot after receiving a CAUTION alert. The 
reaction time of the pilot on a WARNING alert, leading to initiation of a missed approach, is 
2 seconds in case a prior CAUTION was given and 3 seconds in case no CAUTION is given. 
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Fixed and actual separation 
The separation is assumed to be fixed at the runway threshold. Separation distances of 2.0, 2.5, 
3.0, and 4.0 NM will be evaluated (this separation applies to all aircraft combinations). Due to 
differences in speed profiles, actual separation along the flight path will vary.  
 
Wake vortex evolution model parameters 
The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modelled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the wingspan, 
weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is modelled 
according to Corjon & Poinsot. This includes image vortices and secondary vortices making the 
vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. Parameters concerning 
secondary vortices are:  
 strength of the secondary vortices as a fraction of the strength of the primary vortices; and 
 rebound height 
A secondary vortex appears as soon as the primary vortex has decreased to a certain altitude: the 
rebound height. For the rebound height a fixed value of 0.6×b0 will be used, where b0  (= dyi ) is 
the wingspan of aircraft i. The strength of the secondary vortex is a fraction of the strength of 
the primary vortex. This fraction is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.3 and 0.7.  
 
Meteorological input parameters 
• Brunt-Väisälä frequency (N) 
• Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) 
Simulations have been performed for a two-dimensional data set of Brunt-Väisälä frequencies 
and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at different height levels. 
Information on this climatology was provided by UK Meteorological Office (UK MO). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8  Frequency distributions for the London Heathrow climatology 
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Decay model 
The decay function as defined by Sarpkaya will be used. Input parameters are the Brunt-Väisälä 
frequency N and the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR).  
 
Wind input parameters 
 Wind velocity   
 Altitude of measurement 
 Roughness coefficient  
Wind will be simulated assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000ft. Above 
this altitude the wind is constant. The surface roughness is 0.03 m which is representative for an 
airport environment. The wind value is specified at 10 m altitude. In this study , it is assumed that 
there is no head- or tailwind (i.e. only the crosswind velocity is specified).  
 
Wake encounter model parameters 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) and the 
Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM). The aircraft dependent parameters that are required by 
the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. In the 
current study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the maximum 
bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model.  
 
WV DWA causal model parameters 
The following failure probabilities for the nodes in causal model are to be specified: 
− Inaccurate or faulty aircraft data 
− Inaccurate or faulty wake vortex model estimation 
− Inaccurate or faulty meteorological now-casting data 
− Inaccurate or faulty detection of wake vortices 
− Loss of overall wake vortex DWA tactical function 
In this study, it is mostly assumed that all the failure probabilities are equal to 10-4, though 
values like 10-2 or even 10-1 are also considered. A more detailed analysis of the impact of these 
failure probabilities on the overall I-Wake Detection, Warning, and Avoidance probability is 
provided in Angeles Morales [107]. 
 
Risk prediction model parameters 
To obtain incident/accident probabilities for a given time separation between leader and 
follower aircraft, the risk prediction model developed within S-Wake is used. This model 
includes a definition of risk events (Minor Incident, Major Incident, Hazardous Accident and 
Catastrophic Accident), a probability transition matrix from encounter severity classes to risk 
events, and the associated risk requirements (Target Level of Safety). 
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6.5 Risk assessment 
 
6.5.1 Overview of the risk assessment results 
The next sub-sections present the risk assessment results for each of the 24 scenarios defined in 
Table 6-1. To analyse the impact of the assessment parameters and to assess the lowest possible 
risk achievable for a WV DWA single runway arrival operation, it is firstly assumed that missed 
approaches may be initiated at any height. This provides a best possible estimate for the lowest 
risk achievable with a WV DWA system. Results for the case where missed approaches are not 
initiated below 200 ft are discussed later on in section 6.5.6. 
 
Risk assessment results for a Medium Jet landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet under crosswind 
conditions of 0, 1, 2, and 3 m/s (with no head- or tailwind) are provided in Figures 6-9 until 6-
12. Separation distances of 2, 2.5, 3, and 4 NM, with different crosswind conditions, are 
evaluated. Results without a WV DWA system are provided in grey, whereas the colours 
provide the incident/accident risk estimates in case a WV DWA system is used. Note that the 
scenario (in accordance with Table 6-1) is indicated on the horizontal axis. Figures 6-13 and 6-
14 provide the incident/accident risk estimates, under different crosswind conditions, for a 
Medium Jet behind a Large Jumbo Jet with 2 and 2.5 NM separation distance respectively. The 
incident/accident risk estimates for a Regional Jet (scenarios 13 – 18) and a Medium Turbo Prop 
(scenarios 19 – 24), both approaching and landing with 2 and 2.5 NM separation behind a Large 
Jumbo Jet, are provided in Figures 6-15 and 6-16 respectively.An initial estimate for the 
minimum required separation distances for a Medium Jet landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet is 
given in Figure 6-17. An initial estimate for the minimum required separation distances for a 
Regional Jet (scenarios 13 – 18) and a Medium Turbo Prop (scenarios 19 – 24), both landing 
behind a Large Jumbo Jet, is given in Figure 6-18. Note that the coloured bars denote the 
crosswind (at 10 m altitude).  
 
The intermediate results of the above incident/accident risk assessments are discussed in Section 
6.5.5. It is important to realize that after timely detection of a dangerous wake vortex, the pilot 
may initiate a missed approach. However, one should realize that a missed approach is usually 
not appreciated from a capacity point of view as the aircraft will have to approach the airport 
once more. Therefore, a requirement might need to be set on the maximum allowable missed 
approach rate (e.g. 0.01 or 0.001), for example by only initiating a missed approach in case the 
vortex strength exceeds a certain threshold. Such threshold can be placed on e.g. the vortex 
strength, the roll control ratio, or the maximum attained bank angle. The relation between these 
factors is estimated using the Extended Roll Control Ratio (ERCR) model, see Appendix A. The 
impact of not initiating a missed approach below the Decision Height (usually 200 ft) on the 
lowest achievable wake vortex induced incident/accident risk is analysed also in section 6.5.5.  
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6.5.2 Wake vortex induced risk for different crosswind conditions 
 
 
Figure 6-9  Risk in case of 0 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1-12 
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Figure 6-10  Risk in case of 1 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 6-11  Risk in case of 2 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 6-12  Risk in case of 3 m/s crosswind for scenarios 1 – 12 
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6.5.3 Wake vortex induced risk with reduced aircraft separation 
 
 
Figure 6-13  Risk in case of 2 NM separation for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 6-14  Risk in case of 2.5 NM separation for scenarios 1 - 12 
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Figure 6-15  Risk in case of 2 NM separation for scenarios 13 - 24 
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Figure 6-16  Risk in case of 2.5 NM separation for scenarios 13 - 24 
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6.5.4 Initial estimate of the minimum required aircraft separation distances 
An initial estimate for the minimum required separation distances for a Medium Jet landing 
behind a Large Jumbo Jet is given in Figure 6-17. An initial estimate for the minimum required 
separation distances for a Regional Jet (scenarios 13 – 18) and a Medium Turbo Prop (scenarios 
19 – 24), both landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet, is given in Figure 6-18.Note that the coloured 
bars denote the crosswind (at 10 m altitude). Results without I-Wake are provided in grey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-17  Minimum required separation distances with I-Wake (scenarios 1 - 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-18  Minimum required separation distances with I-Wake (scenarios 13 - 24) 
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6.5.5 Discussion of the results 
The incident/accident risk assessment results provided in the previous sub-sections lead to the 
following observations: 
 There is almost no decrease in risk in scenarios 3 and 7, due to small alerting time of 7 
seconds. This implies that about 15 seconds is indeed preferred as I-Wake time of alert. 
 There is a large decrease in scenario 12 risk, due to the large lateral angle of the I-Wake 
detection system. This implies that a wide lateral angular view is very beneficial. 
 Reducing the failure probabilities of the I-Wake system components further than 10-4 (e.g. 
compare scenario 11 with scenario 1) has almost no effect. Apparently it suffices to design 
the I-Wake system components such that a maximum failure probability of 10-4 is 
achieved.  
 When comparing scenarios 13 - 18, the largest risk decrease occurs in scenario 16. Again 
this is most likely due to the large lateral angle. Note that the same angle is used in 
scenario 17, but here in combination with an alerting time of 7 seconds, which – apparently 
– is too low for timely wake avoidance. The same holds for scenario 23 as compared to 
scenario 22.  
 The detection probabilities are relatively high near the threshold and lower further away 
from the threshold. Note that high detection probabilities will certainly imply high missed 
approach frequencies which are unacceptable from an airport efficiency point of view. 
 Scenarios 1 to 12 (Medium Jet landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet) would need to provide 
the same results, when looking at the results without using the I-Wake system. The 
variation in the grey symbols therefore represents the uncertainty inherent to WAVIR 
calculations. 
 
WAVIR assessed safe separation distances when using I-Wake system never exceed the results 
without using I-Wake. The largest reduction is observed in: 
 Scenario 6. This is probably due to the combination of angle of regard (-3 degrees) and 
lateral angle (6 degrees) resulting in a risk reduction also further away from the threshold. 
 Scenario 8. This is probably due to the combination of angle of regard (-3 degrees) and 
lateral angle (6 degrees ) resulting in a risk reduction also further away from the threshold 
as well as a alerting time of 20 seconds which provides more time to avoid the vortices. 
 Scenario 12. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
 Scenario 16. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
 Scenario 22. This is due to the large lateral detection angle (12 degrees). 
 
Aspects to be considered for the setting of requirements for the WV DWA single runway arrival 
operation are, besides the minimum crosswind for reduced separation, e.g. the time for caution 
and alert, the horizontal and vertical scanning view, angle of regard, wake vortex detection 
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range and the minimum wake vortex severity threshold for initiation of a missed approach. 
However, before these aspects can be dealt with, a second assessment is made in order to 
analyse the impact of not initiating a missed approach below 200 ft. This is discussed next. 
 
6.5.6 Refined assessment and discussion of results 
 
In a second, refined, assessment the parameters in Table 6-4 have been chosen such that the I-
Wake system capabilities provide the lowest risk without setting un-realistic and non-achievable 
requirements on the I-Wake system development. It is also assumed that a missed approach is 
not initiated below the Decision Height of 200 ft. 
 
Table 6-4  Assessment parameter matrix (2) 
Scenario LAC FAC Vert. Angle
Lat. 
Angle
Angle of 
Regard
Detection 
distance
Time of 
Alert
Failure 
probabilities
Bounding 
box
Vortex 
threshold
25 1 3 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 70
26 1 4 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 40
27 1 5 1.5 12.0 -3.0 800 - 2400 15 0.001 100 30
 
 
Figure 6-19 presents an initial estimate for the minimum required separation distances for a 
Medium Jet, Regional Jet, and a Medium Turbo Prop (all landing behind a Large Jumbo Jet), in 
case this optimal I-Wake setting is used. Note again that the coloured bars denote the crosswind 
(at 10 m altitude). Results with I-Wake are provided in grey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-19  Minimum required separation distances with optimal I-Wake system setting 
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Figure 6-19 shows the major impact of not initiating a missed approach below the Decision 
height of 200 ft. In fact, the use of a WV DWA seems to reduce the wake vortex induced risk 
only slightly as compared to the current practice. The main reason for this is the fact that the 
largest risk during single runway arrivals occurs near the runway threshold. Therefore, WV 
DWA use would be most beneficial at low altitudes, where the probability of encountering a 
(rebounding) wake is highest. Unfortunately, for wake vortex safety reasons initiation of a 
missed approach is not recommendable at low altitudes. Therefore, the operational use of a WV 
DWA seems to have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced risk during single runway 
arrivals. This confirms that a WV DWA system is mainly applicable as safety net in support of 
ATC decided reduced separation (in line with its intended use). 
 
6.6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means the 
interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. The EC project 
I-Wake has designed an on-board wake vortex detection, warning and avoidance system for the 
flight crew, which helps to minimize the probability that an aircraft encounters a wake vortex.  
An I-Wake system, which is intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept, 
could be very useful as a ‘safety net’ in case reduced wake vortex separation is applied in the 
airport environment. A single runway arrival procedure for aircraft equipped with a WV DWA 
system assumes that a missed approach is initiated after the flight crew receives an alert 
indicating that the aircraft will likely encounter a severe wake vortex. This Section has now also 
quantified wake vortex risk through the use of the WAVIR methodology, extended with an 
aircraft/pilot missed approach model and a causal model for DWA system failure probability.  
 
The assessment of wake induced risk levels for the approach phase when reduced aircraft 
separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM between all aircraft) is applied has been performed for different 
aircraft types and various wind conditions. Aspects considered are e.g. the time for caution and 
alert and the I-Wake system capabilities (such as the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the 
angle of regard, the wake vortex detection range). Further main factors considered are: 
 If one or more WV DWA system components provide a wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might be 
CATASTROPHIC, in case reduced aircraft separation (e.g. 2.0. or 2.5 NM) is applied. 
 The pilot has to initiate a wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case a WV DWA 
warning/alert is raised. Usually, the pilot will initiate a missed approach and/or turn away 
from the wake vortices detected by a WV DWA system on-board the aircraft. 
 The separation distance between leader and follower varies along the approach, and after 
missed approach initiation the vertical distance between leader and follower increases.  
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The use of a WV DWA seems to reduce the wake vortex induced risk only slightly as compared 
to the current practice. The main reason for this is the fact that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the runway threshold (see Section 4). Therefore, WV DWA use 
would be most beneficial at low altitudes, where the probability of encountering a (rebounding) 
wake vortex is highest. However, for wake vortex safety reasons the initiation of a missed 
approach is not recommendable at low altitudes. Therefore, the operational use of a WV DWA 
system seems to have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced risk during single runway 
arrivals. This confirms that a WV DWA system is mainly applicable as safety net in support of 
ATC decided reduced separation. 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 General overview 
With the steady increase in air traffic, the aviation system is under continuous pressure to 
increase aircraft handling capacity. The introduction of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
(RVSM) above ‘Flight Level 290’ implied that the capacity bottleneck within the air transport 
system has changed from en-route towards the Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) around 
busy airports. The diversity of airport operations (departures, approaches, missed approaches) 
and risk events (e.g. collision risk, wake turbulence risk, third party risk, runway incursion) 
implies that the safety assessment of newly proposed ATM systems and flight procedures in the 
airport environment is quite complex. New safety assessment methods are needed to assess 
safety. In this respect, the two most capacity limiting risk events, addressed in this Report, are 
wake vortex encounters and the collision risk between aircraft.  
 
Various new ATM systems and flight procedures have been proposed to increase airport 
capacity while maintaining the same (required) level of safety. Newly proposed systems to cope 
with wake turbulence and allow a reduction of wake vortex separation minima include the 
ground based ATC-Wake system (for air traffic controllers) and the on-board I-Wake system 
(for pilots). An increase in runway capacity may also be achieved by using parallel runways 
more effectively or by designing new and advanced flight procedures. For all the new air traffic 
operations evaluated in this Report, ICAO standards and best practices do not exist and new 
safety assessment methodologies, incorporating the roles of the Air Traffic Controllers and 
pilots, are developed and applied. Introducing and/or planning changes to the air transport 
system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. 
This thesis therefore not only deals with the safety assessment process itself, but also with the 
setting of risk requirements for the newly proposed ATM systems and flight procedures.  
 
The approach taken was to apply risk based decision making to support the introduction of new 
air traffic operations and systems for reduced aircraft separation in the airport environment. As 
worldwide quantitative risk requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations have not 
yet been established, the question arises how to assess the level of risk which may be considered 
acceptable. Evidently, a zero incident/accident risk can not be realized and therefore risk criteria 
have been developed. There are several fundamental questions that have been resolved: 
 What is the safety level of the current air traffic operations? 
 Are the separation minima for the current air traffic operations overly conservative? 
 Can the current separation minima safely be reduced?  
 What are the requirements for the newly proposed air traffic operations and systems? 
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These questions require more comprehensive risk assessment models and risk criteria than 
currently available. Therefore, to answer these questions, several methodologies for the setting 
of risk criteria are developed and applied to the following safety studies:  
 Collision risk analysis of the usage of parallel runways for landing; 
 Collision risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on converging runways; 
 Wake vortex safety assessment of single runway approaches; 
 Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures; 
 Safety assessment of the WV DWA single runway operation with reduced separation. 
 
7.2 Main contribution to knowledge 
The main focus has been the development of safety assessment methodologies with the aim to 
reduce aircraft separation minima. Historically, such methods are based on experimental flight 
tests and operational data analysis. This report has contributed with new methods based on 
mathematical modelling and risk based decision support, where the risk criteria for the risk 
events have been expressed in suitable incident/accident risk metrics based on historical data. 
 
Collision risk analysis studies 
To increase airport capacity, the FAA has proposed use of the Precision Runway Monitor 
(PRM) system during independent parallel approaches [27, 28, 39]. Although safety analyses of 
the PRM system have provided operational recommendations and requirements, collision risk 
during a double missed approach was not previously quantified or assessed. To fill this gap, this 
thesis has developed and applied new collision risk assessment models. It has been shown that 
the collision risk between aircraft conducting a simultaneous missed approach can indeed be 
considerable, and needs to be addressed to ensure that safety is not jeopardized. A limitation of 
the modelling approach is that the possibility of intervention when blunders occur was not taken 
into account. Therefore, to be able to also cope with such human factors issues (e.g. ATC 
monitoring and instructions and pilot reactions), the TOPAZ methodology has been extended 
and applied for analysis of the collision risk during simultaneous missed approaches to 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol converging runways 19R (now indicated as 18C) and 22.  
 
Collision risk analysis of the usage of parallel runways for landing 
An increase in runway capacity may be achieved by using existing parallel runways more 
effectively or by building additional parallel runways. In order to evaluate the risks related to 
independent parallel approaches, insight into the collision risk during all approach flight phases, 
including intermediate approach, final approach, and missed approach, is necessary. Section 2 
describes a probabilistic risk analysis of the collision risk between aircraft conducting 
independent parallel approaches under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), thereby 
using Instrument Landing System (ILS) procedures. A suitable risk metric and a Target Level of 
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Safety have been adopted. Various scenarios with varying runway spacing and different 
operational conditions have been evaluated. The main conclusions from the risk analysis are: 
 The collision risk probability can be considerable and unacceptable under certain 
conditions, especially near turn on to the localizer and during a dual missed approach. 
 Technological improvements and operational procedures focusing on increased safety 
during final approach only do not significantly lower the overall collision risk between 
aircraft conducting independent parallel approaches. 
Independent parallel runway approaches may be judged acceptably safe if the runway spacing is 
greater than 1270 m and unsafe if the spacing is less than 930 m, provided that there is: 
 At least 20 to 30 degrees angle of divergence between the nominal missed approach tracks, 
with turns to be executed ‘as soon as practicable’ and not above 500 ft; 
 Some longitudinal distance between the parallel runway thresholds, where the aircraft with 
the highest Final Approach Point approaches the runway located ‘farthest away’. 
 
Collision risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on converging runways 
Section 3 concerns a risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on Amsterdam Schiphol 
converging runways 19R and 22, where the Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) of runway 22 
was proposed to be reduced from 350 ft to 200 ft. This allows the use of runway 22 during 
actual Category I weather conditions, and supports optimization of the arrival scheduling. A 
collision risk model has been developed for assessment of various missed approach procedures 
on runway 22, with possibly a left turn after completion of the initial missed approach phase. 
 
Numerical evaluations show that the collision risk may attain an unacceptably high level under 
certain conditions, especially when approaching aircraft on runways 19R and 22 both make a 
straight missed approach, and ATC does not intervene. For trying to maintain the collision risk 
at a low and acceptable level, some risk reducing measures are identified. In particular, ATC 
monitoring and instructing – turn right! or climb to! – to aircraft conducting a missed approach 
on runway 19R in case of a previous straight missed approach on runway 22 is required. 
Provided that these identified measures are applied, the proposed reduction of the OCA of 
runway 22 to 200 ft is risk neutral within a broad spectrum of missed approach procedural 
aspects, and may be judged adequately safe. This conclusion is also valid for the possible future 
situation, where the final missed approach altitude is raised from 2000 to 3000 ft. 
 
Wake vortex risk analysis studies 
Wake vortex research has generally focused on analysis of wake vortex behaviour in different 
weather conditions and on analysis of the impact on wake encountering aircraft. Wake vortex 
safety related to proposed operations for reduced separation was not previously quantified or 
assessed in terms of incident/accident risk probabilities. To fill this gap, a Wake Vortex Induced 
Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology was developed and applied. WAVIR has received 
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significant interest worldwide, and other organisations have followed with similar methods. The 
Airspace Simulation and Analysis for Terminal Instrument Procedures (ASAT) tool, which is 
used by the FAA, has been extended to assess the probability of a wake encounter behind a 
variety of leader aircraft and under different weather conditions. Airbus has now developed a 
Vortex Encounter Severity Assessment (VESA) tool, which allows assessment and comparison 
of aircraft reactions and effects of vortex encounters behind various aircraft. DLR has 
established the WakeScene (Wake Vortex Scenarios Simulation) Package to assess the relative 
encounter probability behind different wake vortex generating aircraft. However, so far, the 
WAVIR methodology is still the only method that enables explicit modelling of the role of both 
pilots and air traffic controllers working with new systems for reduced aircraft separation. 
 
Wake vortex safety assessment of single runway approaches 
Both in Europe and in the United States, the feasibility of increasing runway capacity through 
reduced wake vortex separation distances between aircraft in the arrival and departure flows is 
being investigated. Traditionally three methods have been used to determine safe wake vortex 
separation distances: (i) flight test experiments, (ii) historic operational data, and (iii) analytical 
models. Section 4 describes the development the Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment 
(WAVIR) methodology and its application, within S-Wake, to assess the safety of single 
runway wake vortex separation distances.  The main results of the S-Wake project show that an 
increase in runway throughput might be achieved through exploiting favorable wind conditions 
(sufficiently strong crosswind and/or strong headwind). It is further motivated that this can only 
be achieved through the use of new and advanced concepts of operations with appropriate 
decision making tools for air traffic controllers and pilots. Both in Europe and the United States, 
such proposed Concept of Operations for reduced wake vortex separation depends heavily on 
the use of wake vortex prediction and detection information, with explicit roles and 
responsibilities for the pilots and controllers working with such wake avoidance systems. This 
has therefore led to the design of the ground based ATC-Wake system and the on-board I-Wake 
system, the topics of Sections 5 and 6 of this report respectively. 
 
Safety assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures 
One potential approach to reduce the wake vortex separation distance between aircraft at take-
off is by utilizing the ATC-Wake system and operational concept designed to allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports. 
Section 5 has quantified the possible safety implications related to installation of ATC-Wake 
and use during the departure phase of flight. This includes an assessment, with the WAVIR 
tool-set, of required crosswind values for which reduced aircraft separation can be applied. For 
the ATC-Wake departure operation with reduced separation, two more issues have been 
considered: 1) the air traffic controller will warn the pilot about a potential wake vortex 
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encounter in case an ATC-Wake alert is raised, and 2) if an ATC-Wake system component 
provides wrong advice, there is a higher risk on the presence of severe wake vortices. 
Consequences might be catastrophic in case of a light aircraft following a heavy aircraft. 
 
For airports with ATC-Wake in use, Section 5 indicates that the present separation of two to 
three minutes between aircraft departing at the same runway might be reduced to 120, 90, or 
even 60 seconds for all aircraft types in the presence of sufficient crosswind. As these indicative 
separation minima, dependent on crosswind conditions, do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system components was further 
investigated. This was done through a qualitative analysis of the effect of failures of ATC-Wake 
system. It appears that the most severe failure conditions are related to the functioning of the 
Monitoring and Alerting system and Meteorological Now-casting systems. These system 
components are crucial and sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. Additionally, 
it is noted that controllers should be made very aware that a timely warning to the pilots is also 
crucial (safety training might help to increase the awareness).  
 
Safety assessment of the WV DWA single runway operation with reduced separation 
Another potential improvement of wake vortex safety in the airport environment is through 
installation and use of a wake vortex detection, warning, and avoidance system on-board 
aircraft. The fundamental part is a pulsed Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) sensor system 
that measures disturbances in the atmosphere and enables real-time forewarning of turbulent 
conditions. Section 6 presents an investigation of wake vortex safety under reduced separation 
(2.0 or 2.5 NM between all aircraft) during the approach and landing phases of flight when 
using such I-Wake system on-board aircraft. 
 
The I-Wake system is proposed as a safety net in support of ATC decided reduced separation, 
intended for protection along the glide path from ILS/GS intercept. The WV DWA single 
runway arrival procedure assumes that a missed approach is initiated, after the flight crew 
receives an alert indicating that the aircraft will likely encounter a severe wake vortex.. This 
study has quantified wake vortex induced incident/accident risk through the use of the WAVIR 
methodology, extended with an aircraft/pilot missed approach model and a causal model for the 
WV DWA system failure probability. The assessment of wake induced risk levels for the 
approach phase when reduced aircraft separation (2.0 or 2.5 NM between all aircraft) is applied 
has been performed for different aircraft types and various wind conditions. Aspects that have 
been considered are e.g. the time for caution and alert and the WV DWA system capabilities 
(such as the horizontal and vertical scanning view, the angle of regard, and the wake vortex 
detection range). 
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The use of a WV DWA seems to reduce the wake vortex induced risk only slightly as compared 
to the current practice. The main reason for this is the fact that the largest risk during single 
runway arrivals occurs near the runway threshold. Therefore, WV DWA use would be most 
beneficial at low altitudes, where the probability of encountering a (rebounding) wake vortex is 
highest. However, for wake vortex safety reasons the initiation of a missed approach is not 
recommendable at low altitudes. Therefore, the operational use of a WV DWA system seems to 
have only minor impact on the wake vortex induced risk during single runway arrivals. This 
confirms that a WV DWA system is mainly applicable as safety net in support of ATC decided 
reduced separation. 
 
7.3 Impact of the main results 
The new mathematical methods all support two common rationales for acceptance of a newly 
proposed air traffic operation, namely by showing that the number of risk events does not 
exceed some pre-defined, and agreed upon, risk requirement and furthermore  also does not 
increase with the introduction of the new operation. The developed risk assessment models are 
based on risk metrics in terms of incident/accident probabilities per movement, with risk 
requirements derived on the basis of historical incident/accident data. It has been shown that the 
current wake vortex aircraft separation minima, which depend on the aircraft weight, are indeed 
overly conservative under certain conditions. Introduction of variable wind dependent aircraft 
separation rules will enable increase of airport capacity, while maintaining safety. Aircraft 
separation can be reduced safely, provided that new wake vortex prediction, detection and 
avoidance systems - such as ATC-Wake (for air traffic controllers) and I-Wake (for pilots) - are 
implemented for operational use. It has been shown that specific missed approach procedures, 
which take into account local airport runway layout, will lead to an increase of airport capacity. 
 
The safety assessments have built sufficient confidence in the operational use of the new 
proposed ATM systems and flight procedures for the application of reduced aircraft separation 
in the airport environment. The results from the collision risk analysis studies have been used 
directly by the Dutch Civil Aviation authority and Air Traffic Control Centre, and were brought 
forward successfully to the ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel. The results from the wake vortex 
risk analysis studies have been used directly for the design and the setting of requirements for 
the ATC-Wake and I-Wake systems and their associated concepts of operation. It has been 
shown that both are promising concepts for increasing aircraft handling capacity in the airport 
environment. As a result of the wake vortex safety studies, new concepts of operations for 
reduced wake vortex separations are now being validated in Europe (under co-ordination of 
EUROCONTROL) and the United States (under co-ordination of the FAA and NASA). Trials 
at European airports are foreseen as the ideal way forward for gathering the required data to 
complete the local Safety Cases realize the reduction of the wake vortex separation minima. 
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Appendix A WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) 
A.1 Introduction 
To determine the probability of occurrence of each of the defined wake vortex induced risk 
events (see Section 4.4.1), a safety assessment model is required. In view of the uncertainties 
and the difficulties in understanding of the wake vortex phenomena, it is proposed to follow a 
probabilistic approach. This probabilistic method should enable evaluation of wake vortex 
safety under various operational and weather conditions. It should also be possible to evaluate 
the current practice as well as promising new concepts, such as new operational improvements, 
aerodynamic aircraft designs, or weather related separation minima. The approach should be 
able to handle both single runway and dual or closely spaced parallel runways. Considering 
these requirements, three probabilistic sub models are integrated within a stochastic framework: 
 Wake vortex evolution model  
 Wake encounter model 
 Flight path evolution model 
 
For the evaluation of wake vortex induced risk, it is necessary to develop a mathematical model 
to characterise wake vortex induced incident/accident probabilities. This is done as follows. In 
section A.2, an overview is given of the safety modelling relations and dependencies. Section 
A.3 introduces the main notations. In subsection A.4, a stochastic model for the wake vortex 
severity prediction is presented. Subsequently, in subsection A.5, this model is extended with a 
stochastic wake encounter model to predict the roll and loss of height of the following aircraft, 
resulting in an assessment of encounter severity (see Section A.6). Section A.7 presents a 
stochastic dynamical incident/accident prediction model to assess the selected risk metrics. 
 
A.2 Overview of the modelling relations and dependencies 
The incident/accident risk, in terms of minor incident, major incident, hazardous accident, and 
catastrophic accident probability, provides the information necessary for regulatory authorities 
to judge the acceptability of risk. However, pilots/crew and passengers will have a different 
perception of safety (in relation to actual encounters with wake vortices). Therefore, to also 
support the acceptability of risk assessment results by pilots/crew and passengers, the concept of 
encounter severity is introduced. Clearly, the more “severe” the encounter, the larger the 
incident/accident risk. The issue of appropriate encounter severity metrics (or hazard criteria) 
has been studied for many years [9, 64, 65, 85, 94, 98, 99]. The following two metrics have 
been chosen to classify individual encounters: 
 Maximum attained bank angle; 
 Encounter altitude. 
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To assess the numerical values of the selected risk metrics (in terms of risk event probabilities 
per aircraft movement (e.g. per approach or per departure), an incident/accident prediction 
model is proposed (see Section A.7). It describes and characterises the probabilistic relation 
between individual (simulated) encounters and the risk of an incident or accident. The relations 
and dependencies between the different sub-models are visualised in Figure A-1. 
 
Figure A-1  Overview of modelling relations and dependencies 
 
A.3 Notations 
A situation of a sequence of aircraft, which fly toward an airport, is assumed. For the position 
and velocity components of aircraft i, there is a process ( )itititititit zyxzyx &&& ,,,,, . In addition, 
there are processes ( )i tzi tyi tx www ,,, ,,  for the wind speed components, and also for the other 
main meteorological components (including atmospheric turbulence and stratification effects) 
together defining the ambient weather conditions acting locally on aircraft. 
 
A.4 Wake vortex severity prediction 
The left and right centres of the vortex at moment s which are generated by aircraft j at moment 
t, are represented by two fields δ  j− (t,s) and δ  j+ (t,s), with s ≥ 0, each of which assumes (y,z) 
values in IR2. At moment t+s, the strengths of the left and right vortices that are generated by 
aircraft j at moment t are represented by the two fields Γ j− (t,s) and Γ j+ (t,s), each of which 
assumes strength values in IR. At moment t+s, the core radius of the left and right vortices that 
are generated by aircraft j at moment t are represented by two fields −j
corer (t,s) and +jcorer (t,s), each 
of which assumes values in IR. Note that it is assumed that the x co-ordinate follows from the 
flight path evolution model (using the relations with t, s, and aircraft speed profiles). To shorten 
the notation, the components are placed into a joint IR8 -valued field χ j(t,s):  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }),( ),,( ,,,,,,,,column, strstrststststst jcorejcorejjjjj +−+−+− ΓΓ=∆ δδχ    (A-1) 
 
Research is ongoing for many years to improve differential equations for the motion and decay 
of the components of the joint field χ j(t,s). Widely known equations in current literature are the 
ones given by Corjon & Poinsot [76, 77, 95], which are largely based on those of Greene [90] 
and Liu [91]. Recent European research activities include work on the validation of different 
decay models and the simulation of probabilistic wake vortex behaviour under different weather 
and wind conditions [3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 96]. When adding an extension for the wind velocity in z 
direction, these equations are of the form: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )sstf
sd
std jjj ℘= ,,, χχ      (A-2) 
 
where ℘ j (s) denotes local external influences such as the local wind { }j tzj tyj tx www ,,, ,,  at 
moment t, the local Brünt-Väissällä frequency N j(t+s), the Turbulent Kinetic Energy (which 
depends on the Root Mean Square (RMS) velocity of atmospheric turbulence qrms j(t+s)) and/or 
the Eddy Dissipation Rate ε j(t+s).  
 
To define the solution of the differential equation for s ≥ 0, the components of χ j(t,0) (the initial 
boundary conditions) have to be characterized. It is known that [77, 98]: 
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with bj0 the initial spacing between the primary vortex centres, m j the mass of aircraft j, g the 
gravitational acceleration, and ρ jt the local air density.  
 
Next, the moment in time that (the longitudinal position of) an aircraft i reaches the wake 
generated at longitudinal position x (by aircraft j) is characterised. To do so, it is assumed that 
the longitudinal wind speed component is height dependent and constant at a certain height, and 
denoted by i txw , (z). Then that moment in time is a stopping time, defined by [3]: 
{ })(0 ,0
,
inf
,
zwsxxzs
zs
j
x
i
s
j
x
ij
x j
x
j
x ττ
ττ +=>>+=
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    (A-4) 
with { }xxt jt
t
j
x =≡ infτ        (A-5) 
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It is furthermore assumed that the airspeeds of both aircraft in x direction are bounded and either 
both strictly positive or both strictly negative. In view of this, this equation means that {τ ijx} is a 
monotonous process. Hence, an IR8-valued stochastic process {χ ijt}, which represents the 
properties (of the vortices generated by aircraft j) that are used to characterise the risk imposed 
to aircraft i, can be defined as follows: 
 ( )jxijxjxjijij
x
τττχχ
τ
−≡ ,        (A-6) 
 
The decay of the vortex circulation strength depends on the ambient atmospheric conditions 
such as e.g. stratification, turbulence, and wind shear. Several deterministic wake vortex decay 
models have been given in literature. Those of Greene [90], Donaldson & Bilanin [92], and 
Sarpkaya [80, 81, 82] have been implemented. All models use the same decay model for 
atmospheric stratification, but differ in the modelling of atmospheric turbulence effects. In the 
model of Greene an additional (weak) viscous decay term is employed. Table A-1 gives an 
overview of the decay terms of the wake vortices generated by aircraft j.  
 
Table A-1  Wake vortex decay terms of the different models 
Model Viscous Interaction Stratification Turbulence 
Donaldson &  
Bilanin none 0
)(4.0
b
tq
dt
d j
rms
Γ
−=
Γ
 
Sarpkaya none 





−Γ−=Γ t
T
C
T
C
dt
d
S
S
S
S exp 0  
Greene DC  045.1 descwdt
d
−=
Γ
 
0
0
2j )(z )(N 
b
zA
dt
d s −
=
Γ
 
0
)(41.0
b
tq
dt
d j
rms
Γ
−=
Γ
 
 
Proper values for the model constants have been defined mainly on the basis of LiDAR wake 
data. Model constant AS is defined as 2020 *83976.2*09.2*73.1*4/ bbAs == pi  and z0 is the initial 
height of the vortex (the flying altitude of the wake generating aircraft), wdesc is the wake vortex 
descent speed and CD the viscous drag coefficient (CD= 0.2). The Brunt-Väissällä frequency N j 
characterises the stability of the atmospheric boundary layer. It is directly related to the vertical 
temperature gradient: 
dz
dgN
j
j
j θ
θ
=         (A-7) 
Here θ j is the so-called potential temperature in the atmosphere acting on aircraft j. The root-
mean-square velocity qrms j (t+s)) is equal to TKE 2 , in which TKE is the Turbulent Kinetic 
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Energy. In Sarpkaya’s model, the parameter CS is a constant (it was taken equal to 0.45 as 
proposed by Sarpkaya) and TS depends on the Eddy Dissipation Rate (ε j or EDR). It should be 
noted that the decay rate due to stratification is zero initially (z=z0) but then increases with time. 
On the other hand the decay rate due to turbulence is largest initially (for the Donaldson & 
Bilanin model the decay rate is proportional to Γ and therefore largest initially, for the Sarpkaya 
model the exponential term is equal to 1 initially and then decays). For the effect of crosswind 
on vortex decay, a simple model proposed by Cox et al. [93] can be used. The model assumes 
that the decay of the vortex with opposite-sign vorticity in comparison with the crosswind shear 
is accelerated by applying a couple in the opposite sense to the vortex circulation: 
 
003
2 bwC
dt
d
cDV σ−=
Γ
       (A-8) 
where CDV  is the viscous coefficient caused by the crosswind and σc  is the crosswind shear. 
 
The following characterisation for the vortex core radius at the moment in time that the aircraft i 
reaches the vortices generated at longitudinal position x (by aircraft j) is adopted [76, 77]: 
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with j
core
r 0,  the initial radius of aircraft j's vortex cores.  
 
The vortex pair can be non-symmetric, with possible different intensities and radii, and can 
induce a non-zero bank angle. For a pair with given strengths and radii, the Burnham-Hallock 
profile of tangential velocity as a function of the distance dvc  to the vortex centre is: 
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Alternatively, a Lamb-Oseen tangential velocity profile can be used: 
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The velocity field resulting from the pair is the vector sum of the velocity fields of each vortex, 
which consists of a side-wash and down-wash velocity component.  
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A.5 Wake encounter severity prediction 
For computing a metric of the wake encounter severity a wake encounter model is to be used. In 
WAVIR two models of different complexity are available. A short description of the models 
and their assumptions and limitations is given in the next sub-sections. At the moment, the 
models only take into account the effect of the prime vortices. Extension of the models to also 
include the effects of the secondary and mirror vortices is to be further investigated. 
 
A.5.1 The Extended Roll Control Ratio Model (ERCR) 
The Extended Roll Control Ratio (ERCR) model computes for a given wake induced rolling 
moment an estimate of the maximum wake induced bank angle. It is based on the one Degree 
Of Freedom (1-DOF) roll model of Tatnall [85]. The roll-control ratio is the wake induced 
rolling moment divided by the available roll-control power for a given position of the aircraft 
with respect to the wake vortices. The wake induced rolling moment CR,v is computed with a 
simplified analytical model as defined by Tatnall. The wing span of the aircraft (dyi ) and the 
wing planform (Taper Ratio (λTR i ) and Aspect Ratio (AR i ))are taken into account, but 
aerodynamic effects on the fuselage and the tail surfaces are neglected. The vortex flow field is 
defined with a Burnham-Hallock type vortex pair: vortex circulation strength (Γ ), vortex core 
radius (rcore ) and the initial lateral distance between the vortices (bjo = pi / dy j ) are user 
controlled input parameters. The roll control power is computed from a simplified formula. 
 
The aircraft is assumed to be aligned with the wake vortices (zero wake intercept angle) and 
therefore does not move with respect to the wake vortices (frozen aircraft position). The 
duration of the encounter has therefore to be limited in order to prevent infinite roll. However, 
Tatnall derived a table of suitable (aircraft type dependent) wake encounter duration times Tv 
such that the 1-DOF model predicts equal maximum roll angles as with a more elaborate 3-DOF 
model. So the aircraft type dependent wake encounter duration time Tv implicitly accounts for 
the dynamic aspect of the encounter. In the WAVIR application these maximum duration times 
are also used. This is probably not fully justified, because not only the most severe (vortex 
centred) encounters (for which the model has been designed) but also weaker encounters 
(aircraft positions relatively far from vortex cores) play a role in the wake encounter severity 
metrics. Using the vortex encounter time Tv, a pilot response time TR, and the aircraft roll 
characteristics (max roll control power, rolling moment of inertia), formulas are obtained for the 
roll rate itp , the bank angle φ i and the maximum bank angle Φmax, inf  (without control input). 
The maximum bank angle is the most important output of the Tatnall model [85], but the roll-
control ratio (RCR) is an output too and can also be used to classify the encounter severity. The 
pertaining equations (A-12) are: 
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where vti denotes the three dimensional velocity (airspeed), p,lC i is the roll damping coefficient 
of the aircraft (note that p,lC <0), ARi is the Aspect Ratio, Ixx the inertial rolling moment, and the 
roll control capability CR,c,max is assumed equal to 0.07 p,lC  [85]. This is based on a minimum 
requirement and therefore a conservative estimate: actual roll control power capability may be 
larger, leading to lower roll control ratio RCR in practice and smaller maximum bank angles. In 
the above equations sub-fix f denotes the following aircraft. H is the Heaviside step function: 

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=
00
01
x
x
xH )(         (A-14) 
The finish time TF for the control input, i.e. when the bank angle has returned to 0, is given by: 
VRF TTT  ξ+=         (A-15) 
where ξ  is the roll control ratio (RCR): 
,
, ,max
R v
R c
C
C
ξ =          (A-16) 
Worst case conditions are assumed: the wake encountering aircraft is placed (instantaneously) in 
the centre of the (non-decayed) wake generating aircraft, assuming a rather small vortex core 
radius (0.025 dy j ). The vortex induced rolling moment coefficient CR,v and the vortex encounter 
duration time Tv are taken according to Tatnall [85]. A rather conservative pilot reaction time TR 
= 0.6 seconds is assumed. A summary of the Roll Control Ratios (RCRs) and maximum bank 
angles is given in Table A.2. The relation between the two wake encounter severity metrics is 
also visualised in Figure A-2. The higher the Roll Control Ratio (RCR), the less becomes the 
influence of the controls on computed maximum roll angle (compare Φmax and Φmax,inf).  
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Figure A-2  Relation between roll control ratio and maximum bank angle 
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Table A-2  Summary of computed RCR and maximum bank angles with ERCR model 
Leader 
Medium Jet  (Γ= 244.3) Large Jumbo Jet  (Γ= 550.5) 
Follower 
Tv RCR Φmax Φmax,inf Tv RCR Φmax Φmax,inf 
Light Turbo Prop 0.72 5.18 84.5 109.9 0.72 9.67 172.2 205.2 
Regional Jet 0.89 2.42 25.2 37.9 0.95 4.72 60.5 78.9 
Medium Jet 1.00 2.02 12.6 31.9 1.1 3.88 36.3 67.4 
Large Jumbo Jet 1.08 1.76 8.0 19.7 1.78 2.81 27.8 51.6 
 
A.5.2 The Reduced Aircraft/Pilot Model (RAPM) 
For the characterisation of how the process {χ ijt} induces a roll and loss of height process {ϑ ijt} 
for aircraft i, the reduced aircraft/pilot model developed in S-Wake is used [89, 100, 101]. It 
consists of a flight dynamics model for the simulation of the aircraft response and a pilot model 
for simulation of the pilot behaviour during wake vortex encounters. The model provides: 
 Vertical position (i.e. loss of height), vertical speed & acceleration; 
 Lateral position (i.e. sideslip) and lateral acceleration; 
 Bank angle, roll rate and roll acceleration; 
 Pitch angle and pitch rate; 
 Yaw angle (i.e. ILS localizer deviation), yaw rate and yaw acceleration. 
 
Aircraft flight dynamics model 
Let the bank angle, pitch angle, and yaw angle at moment s during the encounter which starts at 
moment t, be represented by the three fields φ i(t,s), θ  i(t,s) and ς  i(t,s) (where s=0 denotes the 
beginning of the wake encounter). Let the body-axis roll rate ( itp ), pitch rate ( itq ) and yaw rate 
( itr ) now be defined by: 
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Also, let ith denote the height of aircraft i during the encounter, i.e. it
i
t ij
x
zh
τ+
≡ , where the 
encounter severity is evaluated from the moment τ ijx onwards. To shorten the notation, the 
above components are placed into the joint IR5 -valued field ϑ ij
 
(t,s), characterising the rolling 
process induced on aircraft i: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }),( ,,,,,,,,column, ststststysthst iiiiiij ςθφϑ ∆=     (A-18) 
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Differential equations for the components of the joint field ϑ ij
 
(t,s) are given in Escande [101], 
and are of the form  
( ))(),(),,(),(),(2 ssstg
ds
std
ds
std iiijijij ψϖϑϑϑ =+     (A-19) 
 
with ϖ i(s) denoting the local external influences such as the (auto)pilot response time, aircraft 
characteristics (e.g. airspeed, wingspan, aspect ratio of the wing, horizontal tail, vertical tail, 
mean aerodynamic chord, mass, moments of inertia, aerodynamic derivatives), glide path angle, 
angles of attack and sideslip, heading angle, rudder deflection, air density. The aileron 
deflection ψ i (s) is influenced by the pilot behaviour and allows to take into account the actual 
reactions from the pilot to the roll upsets experienced when encountering the vortices. 
 
To define the solution for the above differential equation for s≥0, the components of ϑ ij
 
(t,0) and 
dϑ ij
 
(t,0)/dt (the initial boundary conditions) have to be characterised. It should be noted that the 
moment s=0 corresponds to the moment τ ijx that a wake generated at longitudinal position x by 
aircraft j will arrive at the longitudinal position of aircraft i.  
 
It is known that the initial state of the aircraft can be represented by [101]: 
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with i
t ijxτ
α
+
and i
t ijxτ
β
+
denoting angle of attack and angle of side slip at the time of encounter. 
 
Pilot behaviour model 
For the characterisation of the rolling process induced on aircraft i, an appropriate model of the 
pilot behaviour during wake vortex encounters is also required. The pilot behaviour and its 
effect on the aircraft is modelled through a so-called crossover model for the inceptor deflection 
or aileron deflection itψ [100]: 
i
tP
i
t
i
t
i
t
P
i
t f
cK
h
h
h
f
ce
f
b
f
cd
f
a
f
c
fK φψ ∆⋅




⋅+










⋅
















⋅
−








⋅
−








−⋅=
&&
&
222
1
   (A-21) 
with the so-called pilot (roll rate) gain (KPi), pilot lead time (Tleadi), aircraft lag time (Tlagi), and 
equivalent time delay (τei) being the four tuning parameters representing the adaptation of the 
pilot model to the different dynamics (of aircraft i).  
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The six constants a, b, c, d, e and f are to be determined on the basis of the latter three tuning 
parameters (pilot lead time, aircraft lag time and equivalent time delay) [100, page 25]. Note 
that the pilot lead-time is determined through the use of a pilot activation time (representing the 
initial time with the pilot not responding) and an alert bank angle (allowing the pilot inactive / 
not responding as long as the bank angle excursion does not exceed a prescribed value). 
 
The input of this model is the bank angle error itφ∆ , which represents the difference between the 
commanded bank angle and the actual bank angle. Clearly, during an approach the pilot tries to 
establish wing levels, so that the commanded bank angle is zero. Hence: it
i
t φφ =∆ . This pilot 
model can be integrated into the aircraft flight dynamics differential equation model. 
 
A.5.3 Comparison of the ERCR and RAPM Model 
A comparison of computed maximum bank angles for the ERCR and the RAPM model, as a 
function of the initial aircraft position in the wake, is shown in Figure A.3. The results are for a 
Regional Jet behind a Large Jumbo Jet configuration (wake circulation strength is equal to 300 
m2/s). The wake intercept angle was assumed equal to zero.  
 
Figure A-3  Comparison between computed maximum roll angles for ERCR and RAPM models, 
as a function of (initial) aircraft position in the wake. Regional jet (wingspan 30m) in the wake of 
a 60m span aircraft having a wake circulation strength of 300 m2/s. 
 
The difference between both results is relatively small. Note that simplifying assumptions are 
made on the initial aircraft attitudes, because the evaluations are made in gate planes at fixed 
longitudinal positions and, as a consequence, the vortex and aircraft positions are defined 
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independently. Further improvements might be realised by developing a wake intercept model, 
which defines more realistic wake intercept routes.  
 
A.6 Wake encounter severity classification  
To support the acceptability of risk assessment results by pilots/crew and passengers, the 
concept of encounter severity has been introduced. The following two metrics have been chosen 
to classify individual encounters: 
 Maximum attained bank angle excursion; 
 Altitude at which the encounter occurs. 
 
NASA determined encounter severity boundaries in terms of maximum bank angle, where the 
boundaries under IFR conditions remain constant for altitudes above 350 ft, but decrease with 
lower altitudes [94, 99]. It was e.g. noted that a maximum roll angle of more than 7 degrees is 
perceived by pilots as hazardous at altitudes of 200 ft or less, whereas roll angles as large as 15 
– 20 degrees seem acceptable above 200 ft. For the analysis of incident reporting data, NATS 
have introduced three encounter severity categories [102]: 
 Category A for a roll angle of more than 30 degrees; 
 Category B for a roll angle of more than 10 degrees and less than 30 degrees; 
 Category C for a roll angle of less than 10 degrees. 
 
These classification schemes are now combined into a newly proposed categorization with four 
encounter severity classes as follows: 
1. Extreme: aircraft disturbance resulting in temporary or total loss of control, with an 
increased possibility of a catastrophic accident in case of an encounter close to the ground.  
2. Severe: aircraft disturbance resulting in a severe maximum bank angle (possibly higher than 
30 degrees) and a critical flight state, where the pilot initiates a go around with considerable 
corrective recovery actions required, and an increased possibility of a hazardous accident. 
3. Moderate: aircraft disturbance with approach limits likely exceeded, resulting in a moderate 
maximum bank angle (possibly in between 10 and 30 degrees), where the pilot initiates a go 
around without exceptional skills required, and an increased possibility of a major incident. 
4. Weak: a slight to moderate aircraft disturbance (no approach limits exceeded), resulting in a 
weak maximum bank angle (less than 10 degrees), with considerable pilot action required, 
can be experienced. An increased possibility of a minor incident with moderate disturbance. 
 
with the aim to establish some kind of probabilistic relation with the four defined risk events 
that are proposed for policy making of wake vortex induced risk. It is now assumed that the 
threshold boundaries are defined as functions of the maximum bank angle, and are dependent on 
the height at which the following aircraft i encounters the wake, i.e. 
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)(hWeakEncφ  < )(hModEncφ  < )(hSevEncφ  < )(hExtrEncφ     (A-22) 
 
It is furthermore assumed that: 
 The threshold boundaries of the four encounter severity categories are constant above a 
certain critical crash-into-terrain height iCCITh  (e.g. the height of 350 ft as determined for 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) conditions by NASA). From the above categorisation, it 
follows that )(hModEncφ  ≡ 10° and )(hSevEncφ  ≡ 30° for iCCIThh > . 
 The lower threshold boundary of the Weak Encounter Category is constant and 
independent of the encounter height. The value is such that aircraft disturbances caused by 
regular air turbulence (i.e. small bank angle) are not classified as being related to a wake 
encounter. 
 There is an increased probability of an Extreme Encounter, in case the encounter occurs 
below the critical crash-into-terrain height iCCITh . Clearly, for such encounter heights, the 
threshold boundaries for the four encounter severity categories decrease with altitude. 
 
Thus the four tests that lead to a classification of individual (simulated) wake encounters into 
the wake encounter severity classes are (A-23): 
 
Weak Encounter:  ],[  t,  )(    }{max   )( encijxijxModEncit
t
WeakEnc Thh +∈<< ττφφφ  
Moderate Encounter  ],[  t,   )(    }{max    )( encijxijxSevEncit
t
ModEnc Thh +∈<< ττφφφ  
Severe Encounter  ],[  t,   )(    }{max     )( encijxijxExtEncit
t
SevEnc Thh +∈<< ττφφφ  
Extreme Encounter            ],[  t,                         }{max     )( encijxijxit
t
ExtEnc Th +∈< ττφφ  
 
A.7 Incident/accident prediction 
The incident/accident prediction model relates the severity of individual wake encounters to the 
severity of the possible risk events, e.g. through a probabilistic relation that includes the initial 
encounter altitude. The encounter severity probabilities are related to accident/incident 
probabilities via a transition probability matrix and probability distributions for the loss of 
height. These probability distributions enable assessment of the catastrophic accident risk 
probability, on the basis of the assumption that the loss of height shall be larger than the initial 
encounter altitude. In order to also assess the other three risk events (Minor Incident, Major 
Incident, and Hazardous Accident), a transition probability matrix is defined. This matrix gives 
the fractions of the simulated wake encounters that result in the three (non-catastrophic) risk 
events, provided that the loss of height is less than the initial aircraft altitude at the start of an 
encounter. The probability distributions for the loss of height during an encounter (and 
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consequently height above ground at the end of an encounter) are to be determined using wake 
encounter simulations with the Reduced/Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM).  
As an example, Table A-3 shows that Weak encounters will most likely result in a Minor 
Incident, whereas Severe Encounters and Extreme Encounters may result in a Hazardous 
Accident. Appropriate values for the transition probabilities can be determined using encounter 
data from incident/accident data collection activities (such as being collected at Heathrow 
airport). Note that, in the following, it is also assumed that certain transition probabilities are 
zero (see also Table A-3). For example, Weak Encounters will never result in a Major Incident 
or Hazardous Accident and Extreme Encounters will never result in a Minor Incident. The 
values in Table A-3 are elicited through expert judgment [61]. Further study on appropriate 
values in the Table A-3 is recommended. 
 
Table A-3  Transition Probability Matrix (individual elements are denoted by eg PT (A→ B) ) 
Risk Event 
Encounter Severity 
Minor Incident Major 
Incident 
Hazardous 
Accident 
Catastrophic 
Accident 
Conditional event  Loss of height smaller than encounter altitude 
Weak 1.0 0 0 
Moderate 0.6 0.4 0 
Severe 0 0.6 0.4 
Extreme 0 0.2 0.8 
Loss of height is 
larger than the 
initial aircraft 
encounter altitude 
(i.e. crash) 
 
The risk metrics to be characterized are: 
1. Probability pijMinInc of a minor incident of aircraft i (induced by the vortices of aircraft j). 
2. Probability pijMajInc of a major incident of aircraft i (induced by the vortices of aircraft j). 
3. Probability pijHazAcc of a hazardous accident of aircraft i (induced by vortices of aircraft j.) 
4. Probability pijCatAcc of a catastrophic accident of aircraft i (induced by vortices of aircraft j). 
 
Let’s start with the characterization of catastrophic accident risk. As long as the aircraft i 
encountering the vortices of aircraft j is able to maintain position above ground, there will be no 
reason for a catastrophic accident. Or, the maximum height loss of aircraft i shall be less than its 
initial encounter height. Let ith denote the height of aircraft i during the encounter. Then 
 
{ }thp itijCatAcc ∀>−≡ ,0Pr1       (A-24) 
 
The instantaneous catastrophic accident risk (in terms of probability at moment t) is defined as 
 
   (A-25) ( ) { } 0 Pr it =≡ htp ijCatAcc
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Evaluation yields 
( )   (h)1 
0∫
∞
=
−=
h h
ij
CatAcc dhptp i
t
     (A-26) 
 
where ( )hp i
th
 denotes the density of hit . 
 
To evaluate catastrophic accident risk in terms of probability per movement, the instantaneous 
risk is integrated over the entire aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure): 
 
∫=
movT ij
CatAcc
mov
ij
CatAcc dttpT
p
0
 )(  1     (A-27) 
 
where Tmov denotes the time-duration of the aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure). 
 
Alternatively, it is also possible to evaluate the catastrophic accident per movement through the 
use of the maximum instantaneous risk over the entire aircraft movement, i.e. 
 
( )tpp ijCatAcc
t
ij
CatAcc max
_
=        (A-28) 
The subsequent characterization for minor incidents, major incidents, and hazardous accidents 
follows a similar approach, but is however based on a two-dimensional requirement on the bank 
angle and the height loss of aircraft i during the encounter. Since these two stochastic variables 
are dependent, their joint probability density function is used. The encounter severity 
classification scheme defined in section A.6 is also used to assess the other three risk metrics. 
 
Let’s proceed with the characterization of minor incident risk. Provided that the aircraft is able 
to maintain position above the ground, it is now assumed that a weak encounter or a moderate 
encounter might lead to a minor incident. Let )(hWeakEncφ , )(hModEncφ and )(hSevEncφ denote the 
height dependent threshold boundaries of the weak encounter class, then equation (A-29) is: 
 { }
{ }} ,0h { } )(h)(h {  :   Pr                 
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φφφ
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The instantaneous minor incident risk (in terms of probability at moment t) is defined as (A-30): 
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where ( )φφ ,, hp itith  denotes the joint density of (h,φ), ( )hp ith  denotes the marginal density 
function of the height hit and ( )φφ itp  denotes the marginal density function of bank angle φ it .  
 
To evaluate minor incident risk in terms of probability per movement, the instantaneous risk is 
integrated over the entire aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure): 
 
∫=
movT ij
MinInc
mov
ij
MinInc dttpT
p
0
 )(  1    (A-32) 
 
where Tmov denotes the time-duration of the aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure).  
 
From a minor incident point of view, the critical moment in time and the associated point along 
the aircraft flight path are defined via: 
 
( )tpt ijMinInc
t
ij
MinInc maxargˆ =      (A-33) 
 
Let’s proceed with the characterization of major incident risk. Provided that the aircraft is able 
to maintain position above the ground, it is now assumed that a moderate, severe or extreme 
encounter might lead to a major incident. Let )(hModEncφ , )(hSevEncφ  and )(hExtEncφ denote the 
height dependent threshold boundaries of the associated encounter classes, then (A-34) is: 
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The instantaneous major incident risk (in terms of probability at moment t) is defined as (A-35): 
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where ( )φφ ,, hp itith  denotes the joint density of (h,φ), ( )hp ith  denotes the marginal density 
function of the height hit and ( )φφ itp  denotes the marginal density function of bank angle φ it .  
 
To evaluate major incident risk in terms of probability per movement, the instantaneous risk is 
integrated over the entire aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure): 
 
∫=
movT ij
MajInc
mov
ij
MajInc dttpT
p
0
 )(  1      (A-37) 
 
where Tmov denotes the time-duration of the aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure). 
From a major incident point of view, the critical moment in time and the associated point along 
the aircraft flight path are defined via: 
 
 ( )tpt ijMajInc
t
ij
MajInc maxargˆ =      (A-38) 
 
Let’s proceed with the characterization of hazardous accident risk. Provided that the aircraft is 
able to maintain position above the ground, it is now assumed that a severe or extreme 
encounter might lead to a hazardous accident. Let )(hSevEncφ  and )(hExtEncφ  denote the height 
dependent threshold boundaries of the associated encounter classes, then equation (A-39) is: 
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The instantaneous hazardous accident risk (in terms of probability at moment t) is defined as 
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Evaluation yields 
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where ( )φφ ,, hp itith  denotes the joint density of (h,φ), ( )hp ith  denotes the marginal density 
function of the height hit and ( )φφ itp  denotes the marginal density function of bank angle φ it .  
 
To evaluate hazardous accident risk in terms of probability per movement, the instantaneous 
risk is integrated over the entire aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure): 
 
∫=
movT ij
HazAcc
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ij
HazAcc dttpT
p
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 )(  1       (A-42) 
 
where Tmov denotes the time-duration of the aircraft movement (e.g. approach or departure). 
From a hazardous accident point of view, the critical moment in time and the associated point 
along the aircraft flight path are defined via: 
 
( )tpt ijHazAcc
t
ij
HazAcc maxargˆ =       (A-43) 
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Acronyms and abbreviations 
A320 Airbus A320 
AGARD Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
AMAAI Aircraft Models for Analysis of (ADS-B based) In-trail following 
AMJ Advisory Material Joint 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCO Air Traffic COntroller 
ATCOD Air Traffic COntrol incident Database 
ATC-WAKE Air Traffic Control Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System 
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management 
ATIO Aviation Technology, Integration and Operations 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
AOM Aircraft Operational Manual 
AVOSS Aircraft Vortex Spacing System 
AWOP All Weather Operations Panel 
B707 Boeing 707 
B737 Boeing 737 
B747 Boeing 747 
BA British Airways 
BADA Base of Aircraft Data 
BKN Altitude at which the clouds are broken 
C172 Cessna 172 
CV990 Convair 990 
CAA Civil Aviation Authorities 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis 
CAT Category 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
COP Climb Out Point 
CR Contract Report 
CRM Collision Risk Model 
CROSS Control, Risk, Optimization, Stochastics and Systems 
CRT Collision Risk Tree 
DA Decision Altitude 
DASC Digital Avionics Systems Conference 
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DCIA Dependent Converging Instrument Approaches 
DCPN Dynamically Coloured Petri Net 
DH Decision Height 
DNV Det Norske Veritas 
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 
DP Deceleration Point 
DTOP Dual Threshold OPeration 
DWA Detection, Warning, and Avoidance 
EC European Commission 
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference 
EDR Eddy Dissipation Rate 
ERCR Extended Roll Control Ratio 
ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETD Estimated Time of Departure 
ETWIRL European Turbulent Wake Reporting Log 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
F50 Fokker 50 
F86 North American F-86 Sabre 
F100 Fokker 100 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAC Follower Aircraft 
FANOMOS Flight track and Aircraft Noise Monitoring System 
FAP Final Approach Point 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FAS Final Approach Speed 
FCOM Flight Crew Operational Manual 
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
FHA Functional Hazard Assessment 
FL Flight Level 
FMAA Final Missed Approach Altitudes 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMS Flight Management System 
FORTRAN Formula Translation/Translator 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GND Ground controller 
GS Glide Slope 
HALS High Approach Landing System 
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HDB Heathrow Data Base 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
IASC International Aviation Safety Conference 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICAS International Congress of Aeronautical Sciences 
IF Intermediate Fix 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
IST Information Society Technologies 
ISTaR Information System for Safety and Risk analysis 
I-WAKE Instrumentation for on-board wake vortex DWA 
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities 
JAR Joint Aviation Requirements 
KLM Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij 
LAC Leader Aircraft 
LiDAR Light Detection And Ranging system 
LOC Localizer 
LOP Lift Off Point 
LVNL Lucht Verkeersleiding Nederland 
MA Missed Approach 
MAG Magnetic North 
MAPt Missed Approach Point 
MTOW Maximum Take Off Weight 
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NATS National Air Traffic Services Ltd. 
ND Navigation Display 
NM Nautical Mile 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
NTZ No Transgression Zone 
NPA Non Precision Approach 
OCA Obstacle Clearance Altitude 
OCP Obstacle Clearance Panel 
OM Outer Marker 
PANS-ATM Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management 
PANS-OPS Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Operations 
PFD Primary Flight Display 
 NLR-TP-2007-368 
 
  194 
 
PRM Precision Runway Monitor 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
QSA Qualitative Safety Assessment 
R/T Radio / Telephony 
R&D Research and Development 
RAPM Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model 
RASMAR Risk Analysis of Simultaneous MAs on converging Runways 19R/22 
RCR Roll Control Ratio 
RDH Reference Datum Height 
RGCSP Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel 
RMS Root Mean Square 
ROT Runway Occupancy Time 
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum 
RWY Runway 
SID Standard Instrument Departure 
SW II Swearingen Metro II 
SRC Safety Regulatory Commission 
SRD Single Runway Departures 
TAS True Air Speed 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
THR Runway Threshold 
TLS Target Level of Safety 
TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area 
TOL Take Off Length 
TOP Take Off Position 
TOPAZ Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer 
TP Turning Point 
TWR Tower Controller 
UK United Kingdom 
USA United States of America 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
WAVENC Wake Vortex Evolution and Wake Vortex Encounter 
WAVENDA Wake Vortex ENcounter Detection Algorithm 
WAVIR WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment 
WV Wake Vortex 
WVBC Wake Vortex Behavior Classes 
WVE Wake Vortex Encounter 
WVV Wake Vortex Vector 
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Articles and Conferences 
All the work presented in this report has been carried out under contract to and/or with key 
customers of National Aerospace Laboratory NLR. The results have been published and 
presented at various conferences in the field of aviation safety and risk analysis. The customers 
have all granted NLR permission to publish the results. The details and acknowledgements to 
the co-authors of the technical publications are provided in the following. Acknowledgements 
for review and feedback are e.g. provided in the publications listed below and in reference 117. 
 
 Section 2 has been carried out under contracts awarded by the Civil Aviation Authorities the 
Netherlands over the period 1995 – 1997. This study was published by NLR as TP-97183, 
entitled "Collision risk related to the usage of parallel runways for landing", with authors L.J.P. 
Speijker, M.J.H. Couwenberg, H.W. Kleingeld† [2]. The study was presented by Mr. Speijker at 
the International Aviation Safety Conference (IASC 1997), Rotterdam, 27 - 29 August 1997. 
 Section 3 has been carried out under the RASMAR contract awarded by the Civil Aviation 
Authorities the Netherlands. This study was published by NLR as TP-2000-644, entitled "Risk 
analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on Schiphol converging runways 19R and 22", 
with authors L.J.P. Speijker, H.A.P. Blom, G.J. Bakker, A.K. Karwal, G.B. van Baren, M.B. 
Klompstra, E.A.C. Kruijsen [2]. The study was presented by Mr. Speijker at the 6th 
International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management (PSAM6) [8]. 
 Section 4 is based on work carried out under the S-Wake contract awarded by the European 
Commission (EC), contract number G4RD-CT-1999-00099. This study was also published by 
NLR as TP-2003-248, entitled "S-Wake Final Report for Work Package 4, Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment”, with author L.J.P. Speijker [10]. Part of the S-Wake study has also been presented 
at the 22nd International Congress of Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS 2000), in Harrogate, and the 
23rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC 2004), Salt Lake City, Utah (see [11]). 
 Section 5 is based on work carried out under the ATC-Wake contract awarded by the 
European Commission (EC), project number IST-2001-34729. A summary paper has been 
published by NLR as TP-2006-465 for the ESREL 2006 (in the Proceedings as "Safety 
assessment of ATC-Wake single runway departures", with authors L.J.P. Speijker, A. Vidal, and 
R.M. Cooke [56]). ATC-Wake results have been published in the Journal of Air Traffic Control. 
 Section 6 results from work carried out as part of the NLR basic research programme, using 
an overview of a WV DWA system developed under the I-Wake contract for the EC (contract 
number G4RD-CT-2002-00778). A summary paper has been published by NLR as TP-2006-
532, entitled "Safety assessment of a single runway arrival procedure for aircraft equipped with 
a WV DWA system", with authors L.J.P. Speijker, G.B. van Baren, R.M. Cooke [21].
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